Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. HQDA PB6-05-2 March-April 2005 A Joint Magazine for US Field Artillerymen March-April 2005 Field Artillery 22 A Joint Magazine for US Field Artillerymen Redleg Hotline & Email (Organization, Material, Doctrine and Training) DSN 639-4020 or (580) 442-2204 (24-Hours) email@example.com CounterStrike Task Force https://counterstrike.army.smil.mil Field Artillery Home Page & Email sill-www.army.mil/famag; firstname.lastname@example.org Editor: Patrecia Slayden Hollis Art Director: Fred W. Baker III Managing Editor: Reta L.
Rogers Assistant Editor: Vacant David P. Valcourt Major General, United States Army Field Artillery School Commandant Official: March-April 2005HQDA PB6-05-2 By Order of the Secretary of the Army: DISCLAIMER: Field Artillery 4 is published bimonthly by Headquarters, Department of the Army, under the auspices of the US Army Field Artillery School (Building 758), Fort Sill, OK. The views expressed are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its elements.
Field Artillery's content doesn't necessarily reflect the US Army's position and doesn't supersede information in other official Army publications. Use of news items constitutes neither affirmation of their accuracy nor product endorsements. PURPOSE: (as stated in the first Field Artillery Journal in 1911): To publish a journal for disseminating professional knowledge and furnishing information as to the Field ... more. less.
Artillery's progress, devel- opment and best use in campaign; to cultivate, with the other arms, a common understanding of the power and limitations of each; to foster a feeling of interdependence among the different arms and of hearty cooperation by all; and to promote understanding between the regular and militia forces by a closer bond; all of which objects are worthy and contribute to the good of our country.<br><br> OFFICIAL DISTRIBUTION: US Army and Marine Corps Active and Reserve Components FA units: seven copies to corps artillery, division artillery, brigade and regimental headquarters; 13 copies to battalions; and seven copies to separate batteries or detachments. In addition, other Department of Defense or govern- ment agencies that work with Field Artillery or fire support personnel, issues, material, doctrine, training, organization or equipment may request a limited number of free copies of the magazine. These include, but are not limited to, other coordination and support units, training centers and branch schools, recruiting commands, readi- ness groups, libraries and education centers, program/project man- agers, military arsenals and laboratories, state adjutant generals, liaison officers, military academies, ROTCs, major command head- quarters, military attaches and public affairs offices.<br><br> PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS: Those ineligible for Official Dis- tribution may subscribe through the US Field Artillery Association, P.O. Box 33027, Fort Sill, OK 73503-0027 or www.fieldartillery.org. Telephone numbers are (580) 355-4677 or FAX (580) 355-8745 (no DSN).<br><br> Dues are $20 per year to US and APO addresses. The international rate is $55 for a one-year subscription. SUBMISSIONS: Mail to Editor, Field Artillery , P.O.<br><br> Box 33311, Fort Sill, OK 73503-0311. Telephone numbers are DSN 639- 5121/6806 or commercial (580) 442-5121/6806 or FAX 7773 with DSN or commercial prefixes. Email is email@example.com.<br><br> Material is subject to edit by the Field Artillery staff. REPRINTS: Field Artillery is pleased to grant permission to reprint articles. Please credit the author and Field Artillery .<br><br> ADDRESS CHANGES: Field Artillery (ISSN 0899-2525) (USPS 309-010) is published bimonthly. Periodicals postage is paid by the Department of the Army at Lawton, OK 73501 and an additional mailing post office. POSTMASTER: send address changes to Field Artillery , P.O.<br><br> Box 33311, Fort Sill, OK 73503-0311. Front Cover: An aerial view of Fallujah, Iraq. Fallujah is roughly 40 kilometers west of Baghdad on the Euphrates River.<br><br> Its population is about 250,000 people. The Battle of Fallujah was conducted from 8 to 20 November 2004 with the last fire mission on 17 November. The battle was fought by an Army, Marine and Iraqi force of about 15,000 under the I Marine Expeditionary Force (IMEF), sweeping from north to south.<br><br> SANDRA R. RILEY Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army , 0432802 Peter J. Schoomaker General, United States Army Chief of Staff ARTICLES DEPARTMENTS 4 S o You Want to Be a Maneuver Brigade Commander?<br><br> CTF Thunder in Afghanistan By Colonel Gary H. Cheek 9 M777 Starts Fielding in the 11th Marines By Captain Waco Lane, USMC 10 Maneuver and Other Missions in OIF 41-37 FA, 3/2 SBCT By Lieutenant Colonel Steven A. Sliwa 16 Call-for-Fire Trainer and the Joint Fires Observer By Colonel Stephen D.<br><br> Mitchell 18 1st ID in Iraq: The New JFEC and Targeting By Colonel Richard C. Longo, Majors Marty P. Chavers, Steven W.<br><br> Nettleton, and Michael D. Goains, and Captain Jonathan G. Bleakley 22 The Fight for Fallujah TF 2-2 IN FSE AAR: Indirect Fires in the Battle of Fallujah By Captain James T.<br><br> Cobb, First Lieutenant Christopher A. LaCour and Sergeant First Class William H. Hight 29 B/377 PFAR: Platoon-Based Fires in Afghanistan By Captain Shane P.<br><br> Morgan, First Sergeant Robert H. Levis and Lieutenant Colonel Harry G. Glenn III, IN 34 1st ID in OIF II 4The Role of the TAB in Radar Operations By Captains John J.<br><br> Neal and Adam C. Wojcik and Major Mark N. Roder, MNARNG 37 CMO in Baghdad: 3-82 FA Red Dragons Hit the Streets By Captain Evans A.<br><br> Hanson 42 The S5 NCO and CMO Project Management By Staff Sergeant Thomas J. Kelly III 44 NFCS 4Naval Fire Control System By Master Sergeant (Retired) Gregory T. Kollar, USMC 1 Crossed Cannons on Your Collar 3 Incoming (Photo courtesy of DigitalGlobe) Click on the title of the article you would like to access.<br><br> Field Artillery March-April 2005 1 Issues and Updates: FFA HQ, FA Units as cTruck Companies, d Training and Others I n this column, I deal with some tough issues facing the FA and the Army and provide updates on train- ing initiatives and other opportunities in the FA. Force FA Headquarters (FFA HQ) . With the most recent transfer of author- ity (TOA) in Iraq between the land com- ponent headquarters of III US Corps and XVIII US Corps, we are reminded of both the differences and the shared capabilities of our nation 9s military com- bat power.<br><br> Focusing on the two corps artillery headquarters involved in this TOA, you readily see the extreme value and capability of the FFA HQ. The role of this headquarters is not simply to enforce and enable subordi- nate artillery formations to continuously follow and precisely master the five requirements for accurate predicted fire. The FFA HQ does much more than enable the traditional gunnery team so- lution; in this fight, it also serves as the critical core of effects coordination for the MultiNational Corps-Iraq 9s (MNC- I 9s) Joint Fires and Effects Cell (JFEC) teamed with the MNC-I 9s Air Support Operations Group (ASOG) and infor- mation operations (IO) elements.<br><br> Full- spectrum, lethal and nonlethal and to- tally joint in design and in effects capa- bility, this organization is truly the cgo- to place d and synergizer for effects plan- ning, coordination and execution. Given the structure of the FFA HQ function in a corps artillery of a mere 55 (+/-) Field Artillerymen, it would seem reasonable that as we move forward into modularity that we recognize this relatively small headquarters as a true joint cbargain. d At the three-star UEx level, we cannot afford not to include an FFA HQ. At the two-star UEx level, clearly it appears the Fires Brigade will have the responsibility of the FFA HQ.<br><br> Being a FFA HQ requires both sci- ence and art. The science is readily covered by ccutting edge d technologies and modernized equipment in the hands of trained, disciplined Artillery Soldiers. The art is based on the personal rela- tionship, mutual trust and mutual confi- dence that the effects coordinator, or ECOORD, (read Fires Brigade com- mander) establishes with his UEx com- mander as part of that commander 9s inner circle of advisors, decision-mak- ers and executers.<br><br> Given the decision to resource six Fires Brigades in each of the Active Component (AC) and Reserve Compo- nent (RC) formations, 12 total, it be- comes obvious that the FFA function will be a geographical challenge as we move into modularity at the UEx level. We will have to work this hard. It 9s not about command relationships but about relationships among commanders.<br><br> It is reasonable to expect that Fires Brigades will be an early and integral supporting brigade for the UEx in every deployment and fight. The task and purpose of this UEx commander is not only to fight the UEx deep in the preci- sion strike fight with UEx-level sensors and responders, but, most importantly, to shape and set conditions that enable its brigade combat team (BCT) fight to be overwhelmingly successful. In the unit life cycle management system as we set the teams, train and certify them for deployment, and then commit them, it traditionally has been the experienced eye of an FA colonel that best can assess and certify for the BCT commanders that their FFA HQ and Fires Battalions are ready.<br><br> Not having a FFA HQ led by an Artil- lery 06 at each UEx station is not a cred star cluster d or an indicator that cthe sky is falling d; however, as we csee our- selves, d it is critical we continue to create the relationships of trust and con- fidence with our maneuver command- ers. As Artillerymen, we must always ensure our Soldiers and the joint fires formation are, indeed, trained and ready to exactingly high standards. We will croll up our sleeves d on this one and get to the hard work.<br><br> Let me hear what you think. Sound off with letters to the editor and (or) to me at email Redleg@sill.army.mil. Deploying cRe-Missioned As d Rather Than for cIn Lieu of d Mis- sions.<br><br> Make no mistake, the decide, detect, deliver and assess (D 3 A) cycle continues to be executed daily in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Don 9t believe everything you see on the television or read in the papers. Lethal, kinetic fires continue to occur virtually everyday in both theaters.<br><br> Knowing that the thun- derous devastation of precisely aimed and responsive cannon fires are less than two minutes away is a point of highest confidence and insurance to the guys on the ground doing the cheavy lifting d in those theaters. That said, a continued source for the Army for trained combat arms Soldiers is our Artillery formations. Recently redeployed from Operation Iraqi Free- dom (OIF) II, the Soldiers from the 2d Battalion, 147th Field Artillery (2-147 FA), South Dakota Army National Guard, did not serve on their guns but in the non-traditional FA role of provid- ing fixed-site security, safeguarding captured enemy ammunition (CEA) and driving truck convoys.<br><br> We all recognize that the most vulner- able mission in Iraq today is executing ground convoys, and FA battalions are readily trained to execute this challenging mission. In my view, the mission is clearly March-April 2005 Field Artillery 2 acceptable and a mission-essential task list (METL) task in most FA formations. No question about it 4give an FA battalion the mission to cserve in lieu of d a 300-Soldier truck formation and the same leadership and tenacity that puts 95-pound projectiles accurately and responsively on the heads of the bad guys also will get the truck formation from point A to point B.<br><br> Under the current plan, some corps artillery formations will deploy to Iraq as truck units. What is concerning is that we may separate the FA battalion leadership, retrain the battalion and then re-mission these artillery formations to deploy as truck companies rather than as artillery batteries assigned to execute an cin lieu of d mission. This is a trou- bling issue.<br><br> We have situational aware- ness of this and are working it hard. Some Training Updates. Fort Sill re- cently was designated as one of the Army 9s four Basic Officer Leader 9s Course Phase II (BOLC II) sites.<br><br> BOLC II is expected to begin the Second Quarter of FY06 and be a six-week resident Training and Doc- trine Command (TRADOC) common- core course attended by officers from all branches following commissioning. This means it 9s likely that some FA lieutenants will attend BOLC II at a site other than Fort Sill. After completing BOLC II, FA offic- ers will attend BOLC III at Fort Sill, which will instruct branch core compe- tencies for assignments as FA platoon leaders, fire support team (FIST) chiefs and fire direction officers (FDOs) in a 15-plus week curriculum.<br><br> Our second Joint Fires and Effects Course will be 4 to 16 April at Fort Sill and is in high demand with all seats taken. The next course will be in Au- gust. Seats are available through the Army Training Requirements and Re- sources System (ATRRS) or by con- tacting the Fort Sill G3 at DSN 639- 2199/5124 or (580) 442-2199/5124 or the Joint and Combined Integration (JACI) Directorate at DSN 639-1701/ 8671 or (580) 442-1701/8671.<br><br> TRADOC 9s pilot Tactical IO Course , focusing on IO and effects-based op- erations at the brigade level and below, is scheduled for 25 April through 13 May at Fort Sill. This will be a terrific course for NCOs, warrants and officers who serve in JFECs coordinating the lethal and nonlethal effects of IO at the BCT level and below. Seats are avail- able through ATTRS or by calling the G3 at DSN 639-2199/5124 or (580) 442-2199/5124.<br><br> The pilot FA Master Gunner 9s Course is scheduled for 27 July. Its target is E7 Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 13B Cannoneers and 13M Missileers who will receive Additional Skill Iden- tifiers (ASIs) A7 and A9, respectively. This four-week technical course will cover training management, mainte- nance and advanced gunnery.<br><br> Those senior NCOs who want to attend the course should email gregory.plant@us. army.mil. Training Joint Fires Observers (JFOs) remains a priority task for all FA units.<br><br> For those units preparing to deploy, training JFOs with simulations is the next best thing to live-fire conducted at home station or at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs). Most units have a guard unit armory device, full-crew interactive simulation trainer (GUARDFIST). GUARDFIST enables basic fire mission processing, but it lacks the ability to train close air support (CAS), has a marginal capabil- ity for training fires in urban terrain and does not have state-of-the-art technol- ogy and granularity.<br><br> Many of you have read about and may have seen the Joint Fires and Effects Trainer System (JFETS) now at Fort Sill that has the Call-for-Fire Trainer (CFFT) imbedded in it, including in the urban terrain module. (See the article cCFFT and the JFO d in this edition.) The great news is that the CFFT will replace the GUARDFIST and close the training gaps. However in the near term, JFETS with the CFFT is found only in Fort Sill courses and in a Special Operations Com- mand (SOCOM) course.<br><br> For FA units not at Fort Sill with immediate pre- deployment training needs, there are some very good commercial indirect fire trainers available for CAS training. Units can obtain information about these simulators from the General Services Administration (GSA) catalog. The Army will field both Active and Guard units with CFFTs beginning the latter part of FY05 and into the FY06.<br><br> Trainees in Basic Combat Training at Fort Sill now are conducting convoy live fire as part of Warrior Ethos train- ing. Mounted in trucks with modified center row seating, Artillery Soldiers engage enemy insurgents in both open and then closed ambush scenarios. Also, every trainee now has had to go ceyeball to eyeball d with an opponent in combative scenarios, including timed bouts.<br><br> They arrive at their units under- standing the basic moves and techniques. Additionally, our Field Artillery Train- ing Center cadre now uses the weapon immersion concept of issuing each new Soldier a personal weapon (not a crub- ber duck d) immediately following the Soldier 9s first basic rifle marksmanship training. The Soldier maintains the weapon along with a magazine of blank ammunition during all training and in the barracks.<br><br> This technique teaches each trainee better weapon 9s discipline and responsibility as well as instills better muzzle awareness. Consider Becoming an Artillery War- rant Officer . Given the expansion of FA modularity, there is plenty of room to grow and serve your branch in the techni- cal specialties of FA warrants.<br><br> The skill set required to be successful as a 131A Targeting/Radar Warrant tracks most closely with the skills found in our MOS 13F Fire Support Specialist and 13R Firefinder Radar Operator NCOs, but the most important cingredients d are leader- ship coupled with a penchant for atten- tion-to-detail found today in all our FA NCO ranks. I encourage leaders in every forma- tion to talk about this career opportu- nity with promising promotion poten- tial for our Soldiers. In mid-May, Chief Warrant Officer Four Walter G.<br><br> Ayer, Fort Sill 9s Senior Targeting Warrant Officer, will discuss FA branch warrant officer opportunities in a video stream on our Fires Knowledge Network site on Army Knowledge Online (AKO). Check this out, and give it some thought. c Sad Face d for Fort Sill and cSmiley Face d for our Army.<br><br> No Soldier likes to lose a Battle Buddy, and that goes doubly if you are the FA Commandant. Recently our senior enlisted Field Artil- lery NCO, Command Sergeant Major Tommy A. Williams, was selected to depart Fort Sill to assume new duties as the CSM of America 9s Corps, I Corps, at Fort Lewis, Washington.<br><br> Truly Fort Sill 9s loss is a win for the FA as we all recognize the tremendous honor of hav- ing an FA leader serve as a corps-level CSM. Fort Lewis and I Corps Soldiers are gaining a leader of the highest order. And we know that CSM Williams will keep a close eye on the summer crop of Warrior Forge ROTC Cadets while at Fort Lewis as well as the Stryker Bri- gade Combat Team (SBCT) Redlegs at Fort Lewis to ensure our branch re- mains strong and maintains the highest of standards.<br><br> Create the Thunder! Field Artillery March-April 2005 3 As an institution, we, the FA, always seem fearful that the Army will cmove out without us. d This fear may be justified, given some of the recent deployments and the redesign of the Army 9s formations. With this in mind, and with reflec- tion on my year in Iraq command- ing an FA battalion that was chal- lenged with many missions, mostly nonstandard missions, I believe the Field Artillery should embark on a new path to ensure relevance.<br><br> I propose the FA reassess its ca- pabilities, ensuring it always can provide fire support and formally tak- ing on a secondary mission of fighting as infantry . In 2003 as units attacked north from Kuwait into Iraq, they relied on the firepower of all weapons at their dis- posal and did so with realistic rules of engagement. This allowed the FA to impact many battles significantly until the fall of Baghdad.<br><br> From DS [direct support] 105-mm to GS [general sup- port] ATACMS [Army tactical missile system] fires, all fires were responsive and, from the reports I read, quite dev- astating. However, with a relatively short campaign at the higher end of the spectrum of warfare, this opportunity to employ our trade was short compared to the current operational pace and in- tensity in Iraq. As the Army continues the long haul in Iraq, it is challenged with an ex- tremely large battlespace and a com- plex insurgency that continuously chal- lenges the number of cboots on the ground d conducting offensive opera- tions and SASO [stability and support operations].<br><br> Many Field Artillery, En- gineer, Cavalry, and Armor units find themselves in unique roles that differ significantly, in many cases, from their METLs [mission-essential task lists]. Many are performing as infantry and doing so admirably, given their train- ing, level of resourcing and design. They are successfully filling the gaps to ex- tend the Army 9s presence on the ground and providing economy-of-force for their higher headquarters.<br><br> Why should the FA change its mission to include a secondary ability to cfight as infantry? d Serving as infantry is the reality on the ground in Iraq for most FA units. Daily these units perform maneuver tasks that truly provide an economy-of-force for the effort. Units are taking advantage of the rapid field- ing initiative (RFI) to overcome se- lected shortcomings in equipment.<br><br> The training has been, thus far, conducted on their own with assistance coming at times from maneuver units in their bri- gades. The problem is that many FA battalions have not been formally trained or resourced for this fight. Based on the reality of both the opera- tions in Iraq and the capabilities of non- infantry units performing them, a unique thing is happening in the force.<br><br> The METLs of FA battalions are being al- tered to include maneuver tasks. As the Army continues to modularize its bri- gade combat teams [BCTs] into units of action (UAs), this trend is likely to continue. However, I also would like to point out that as the METLs of these FA units change, so must the training base outside of the battalion.<br><br> We must insti- tutionalize changes to support the em- ployment of these units. Some may argue that this is a unique moment in time, that the current use of artillery as maneuver will be short-lived. I disagree.<br><br> I believe that future opera- tions could prove just as challenging once the higher intensity of combat is over. The Artillery needs to be able to shift gears from fire support to maneu- ver. I do not propose FA battalions seize terrain; however, they can cer- tainly hold, control and shape it once it has been seized, as they are doing now The Field Artillery should use the reality of the current array of forces on the ground in Iraq for a justifica- tion to fight for additional resources from the Army.<br><br> The Soldiers in Ar- tillery battalions should have the equivalent individual and crew- served weapons systems, optics (both day and night vision) and com- munications equipment for small- unit actions as their Infantry breth- ren. We must continue the fight to get this kit into the hands of Redlegs and into the schoolhouse at Fort Sill. With that said, Fort Sill also must look inward and adjust its training at every level within the schoolhouse.<br><br> This is challenging, given current resources, but it must happen. It must begin with an Artillery-Infantry mindset as soon as new Soldiers arrive and be fully inte- grated into all courses of instruction. I find it disappointing and concerning that some GS units have been earmarked for future operations in Iraq as transpor- tation units.<br><br> Without a doubt, we, as a branch, are going to provide whatever is required for the current fight; how- ever, I ponder the difference these same units could make if they were deployed to fight on the ground conducting ma- neuver tasks and controlling battlespace. I look at this period as one of incred- ible opportunity for the branch. What brigade or higher commander would ever propose leaving his artillery at home if he were assured his artillery could provide the force a secondary role and preserve options?<br><br> We have proved much in Iraq as a branch serving as maneuver and en- joyed much success; however, much of that success is still limited by the base of training and physical resources. I pro- pose changing the mission and the train- ing while continuing to fight for Soldier equipment now. Once this is accom- plished, relevance will never be ques- tioned again.<br><br> LTC Steven A. Sliwa, FA Former Cdr, 1-37 FA, 3/2 SBCT Fort Lewis, WA Artillery and Maneuver 4Relevance and Reality Soldiers of 1/37 FA practice clearing a building in Iraq. March-April 2005 Field Artillery 4 C/2-27 IN patrols in Terwa, Afghanistan, on 20 December 2004.<br><br> (Photo by SSG Bradley Rhen, Public Affairs (PA) NCOIC, CTF Thunder) Field Artillery March-April 2005 5 A s one might expect, deploy- ment orders sending the 25th Infantry Division (Light) (25th ID), Tropic Lightning, into combat for the first time since the Vietnam War caused great excitement all across the military community at Schofield Bar- racks, Hawaii. Unfortunately, even though the division would deploy into two theaters, Afghanistan and Iraq, the Division Artillery was not on the origi- nal troop list 4we would, it seemed, be left behind. However, that all changed on 21 Feb- ruary 2004 when the Department of the Army tasked the division to source a second maneuver brigade headquarters in Afghanistan.<br><br> Our commanding gen- eral tapped the division artillery (Div Arty) for this mission; we, ultimately, were known as Combined Task Force (CTF) Thunder. Suddenly we were on the team; we were elated with the chance to make a contribution to our nation 9s Global War on Terrorism, albeit in a non-traditional role. In just over 90 days, we deployed to Afghanistan to direct operations in Re- gional Command East as a provisional infantry brigade responsible for 16 prov- inces in the eastern region of Afghani- stan.<br><br> After eight months of a yearlong tour in theater, this article examines the ex- perience of the 25th Div Arty in Af- ghanistan and offers some thoughts on maneuver brigade command for Field Artillerymen and combined arms war- riors everywhere. Understanding the Conflict in Af- ghanistan. Sun Tzu 9s maxim to cknow the enemy and know yourself d is sound advice for any conflict; the war in Af- ghanistan is no exception.<br><br> Add to this the people, weather, terrain, culture, regional neighbors and a host of foreign interests, and Sun Tzu 9s words take on incredible complexity. Yet understanding the operational construct is fundamental to efficiently applying resources and operations to achieve the effects necessary to accom- plish the mission and, ultimately, win the conflict. This was one of our first endeavors as a brigade headquarters: examine the conflict and commit our- selves to an overarching construct that would serve as the foundation for our operations.<br><br> cSeeing the enemy d might seem simple at first 4Taliban, Al Qaeda and the other insurgent elements we faced in Afghani- stan. Yet, what is the enemy center of gravity? Does one exist with so many CTF Thunder in Afghanistan By Colonel Gary H.<br><br> Cheek factions? Does it matter? In our assessment, we determined the enemy 9s center of gravity to be his radi- cal ideology 4a binding force that cen- ters on hatred of the West and serves to motivate combatants, attract recruits and, significantly, gain the sympathy and support of the general population.<br><br> We were careful to differentiate be- tween the violence, Jihad and intoler- ance of the various terrorist groups, the discriminators that made these actors and their ideology cradical, d and the more moderate and mainstream inter- pretations of Islam by other groups. Identifying this center of gravity drives home that this war is larger than just kinetic operations against insurgents and their leadership; it is also about the Afghan people. To be victorious we must win their trust and confidence through our actions, reconstruction of their infrastructure and information operations (IO) that advocate moderate Islam for the people with a peaceful and prosperous future for their children.<br><br> I would argue that getting this right is essential to success 4misunderstand- ing the enemy drives you to operations that may do little to further your cause and, in the end, could even be counter- productive. cSeeing yourself d also would seem Field Artillery March-April 2005 5 March-April 2005 Field Artillery 6 simple enough 4 perhaps just laying down the order of battle for our own forces and those of our allies. Yet, what stands out as the center of grav- ity?<br><br> At first blush, we might look for com- bat force, some aspect of our ability to strike the enemy or some asymmetri- cal advantage we have over our adver- sary, such as air power. However, our assessment is that the Afghan Government is the friendly center of gravity. This, again, is important, as it directs us to do more than combat operations against the insurgents 4it directs us to continuously strengthen the Afghan Government while attacking those forces that seek to disrupt or destroy it 4be they enemy or some aspect of the environment.<br><br> As the government gains strength and wins the trust and confidence of the populace, the people will, in turn, deny sanctuary, support and manpower to the enemy. The people 9s support is just as essential to success as understanding the enemy. As for the environment, CTF Thunder commands the eastern portion of Af- ghanistan, 16 provinces in an area roughly the size of the state of Iowa.<br><br> The terrain ranges from rolling high desert in the southeast to rugged moun- tains in the west and mountainous re- gions in the north with low-lying river valleys and sparse forests. Overall, the region is arid, hampered by drought over the past several years. Tempera- tures are significantly impacted by alti- tudes: lower areas have hot summers and mild winters while the high deserts across the mountain ranges have hot summers and cold winters.<br><br> Paved roads are rare 4some provinces have none. Riverbeds are the typical road networks, and such conditions make for slow road traffic. Afghan society is tribal, with strong village structures and elder influences and a host of alliances, feuds and disputes that have been around for generations.<br><br> The tribal society, compartmentalized terrain and size of the area of operations (AO) mandates distributed operations over a nonlinear battlefield. It places enormous trust in company- and pla- toon-level commanders as each must operate independently with great re- sponsibility. This construct is the basic foundation for our operations in Afghanistan: de- feat the insurgents, strengthen the gov- ernment and win the trust and confi- dence of the population.<br><br> Our goals fol- low the doctrinal basis for counterin- surgency warfare where you seek to separate guerillas from the population. We offer the Afghans tremendous ad- vantages over our adversaries: a promise of security, good governance, reconstruction of the war-torn infra- structure and, above all, a peaceful and prosperous future. Our adversaries of- fer threats, destruction of property, op- pression of various groups and a virtual guarantee that violence will continue through many generations.<br><br> It is a compel- ling difference, one that gives us enor- mous credibility with the Afghan people as they see the genuine sincerity of Ameri- can policy through our actions. CTF Thunder: A Study in Diver- sity. Matched to this operational con- struct is CTF Thunder 9s rather unique task organization.<br><br> It consists of three US infantry battalions: 2d Battalion, 27th In- fantry (2-27 IN), 25th Division, the Wolf- hounds ; 3-3 Marines from Marine Corps Base Hawaii, America 9s Battalion ; and 3-16 IN, 29th Infantry Division (Light), Virginia Army National Guard, Norm- andy. We also have three Afghan Na- tional Army infan- try battalions: the 2d and 3d Kandak Bat- talions and the 23d Kandak Battalion. This is an infantry footprint that may increase as time goes on.<br><br> In addition, we have eight Provin- cial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that are interagency or- ganizations fo- cused on recon- struction and good governance at vari- ous locations with- in our AO. We have several other attachments, but one element we lack is a direct support (DS) Field Artillery battalion 4 although we share two of the four firing batteries from our sister brigade to the south. That we can bring these diverse units together and be successful is a tribute not only to our headquarters, but also to our incredible teamwork and the versa- tility of our military.<br><br> In addition, we host a variety of other units and agencies throughout our AO, each with its own missions, capabilities and chain of command. While on the surface one would see unity of com- mand issues from such a structure, much of this is obviated by continuous coor- dination and unity of effort toward com- mon goals. It takes continuous empha- sis to bring units together and continu- ous oversight of all operations to ensure the effects generated by any operation contribute to the overall strategy for the region.<br><br> Key Lessons. Against this backdrop of a diverse organization thrust into a complex operating environment, what are the key lessons I learned? War really is an extension of politics.<br><br> In a counterinsurgency conflict, such as the one in Afghanistan, the political aspects of operations are perhaps more important than the combat operations. All company-level leaders must devote considerable energy to engaging a host of local informal and formal leaders, to include those who are part of the gov- ernment as well as tribal elders and religious mullahs. Influential leaders COL Gary H.<br><br> Cheek, Commander of Combined Task Force (CTF) Thunder, and CPT Tage Rainsford, Commander of C Company, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, listen to village elders on 20 December 2004 in Waza Khwa, Afghanistan. Photo by SSG Bradley Rhen, PA NCOIC, CTF Thunder Field Artillery March-April 2005 7 who support coalition efforts contrib- ute to our overarching goal to separate insurgents from the population and strengthen support for the Afghan Gov- ernment. IO takes continued, well organized and synchronized efforts as well as posi- tive and continuous relations with both local and international press.<br><br> It means being sensitive to the Afghan culture, adapting to changes in the environment and, above all, being forthright and hon- est in everything we do. An additional benefit of working ex- tensively with the local population is that it builds relationships between the Soldier and the people, one that engen- ders a desire within the Soldier to help the people through both combat opera- tions and humanitarian assistance. The Afghan conflict, in essence, is a human battlefield where the objectives are not hills or towns, but rather the people themselves.<br><br> Commit yourself to an operational con- struct. Through our military schooling, we are well versed in the orders process and such mundane, but essential, tasks as mission analysis and the military deci- sion-making process (MDMP). Many times leaders are reluctant to venture into identifying the operational cornerstones upon which they will build their plans.<br><br> This is largely because no leader wants to suffer the embarrass- ment of fixating on a ccenter of gravity d only to be shown that his intellectual csword d has a few dings on the edge. However, com- mitting yourself to this endeavor reaps some veiled ben- efits that can great- ly enhance opera- tions. For exam- ple, supporting na- tional elections might seem an odd fit for a military force, and some might say that elec- tions rightly be- long in the domain of the State De- partment or United Nations.<br><br> Yet, by viewing the Af- ghan Government as our center of gravity, we saw the elections as a forc- ing function to ac- celerate the growth and strength of gov- ernment leaders and their security ap- paratus. Keeping your eye on the center of gravity keeps your mind open to oppor- tunities that might otherwise be hidden in less sophisticated thinking. In the case of Afghan Presidential Elections, the successful elections elevated the prestige of the government, increased the confidence of the local police and the Afghan National Army and greatly accelerated the growth of all.<br><br> The elec- tions were a decisive win with lasting positive results. Write terms of reference for senior leaders. While this is always a good practice, it is particularly important for combat deployments where inevitably there will be a lot of non-standard re- quirements and command relationships.<br><br> For example, we were blessed with a deputy commanding officer (DCO), an Infantry officer pre-positioned for bat- talion command. While there could be concerns that adding a DCO would cause friction between him and the executive officer (XO) or even the S3, having written terms of reference for key lead- ers 4the DCO, XO, S3 and command sergeant major (CSM) 4helped clarify their roles and responsibilities. In the end, personalities make a big difference, but our DCO became the staff synchronizer and planner, leaving the XO to focus on logistics and base operations and the S3 to focus on cur- rent operations and near-term planning.<br><br> My experience has shown me the value of writing terms of reference as well as the extraordinary value-added a DCO provides. Build teams and relationships for the future. While this may seem obvious at first glance, building teams is key to success and must start as early as pos- sible.<br><br> Continuous, positive contact with provincial leaders at all levels is like financial investments 4some will pay big dividends while others bear no fruit. Likewise, establishing positive and co- operative relations with other units re- duces friction when circumstances re- quire working together. The key is that you have to build relationships to have them when you need them.<br><br> A great example of this was when we had three non-combatant deaths in one of our provinces. The relationship the battalion commander had established with the governor of that province proved to be key in defus- ing a very difficult situation. Without that positive relationship, the governor might have aggravated the situation to advance his own interests.<br><br> The same holds true with joint and combined combat operations. Welcom- ing other units into your tent, contribut- ing forces to their operations, providing support for their operations and sharing intelligence all pay off when you need to include their capabilities in your op- erations. Such was the case in one par- ticular operation in Kunar Province that included forces and assets from no less than eight separate organizations.<br><br> Commanders and leaders can 9t wait until they need help to build relation- ships 4by that time, it 9s too late. Be positive in all communications 4 up and down. A wise commander shared an interest- ing philosophy with me: c 8Bad mouth 9 no one. d His point was nothing good comes from critical or cynical com- ments about other units, leaders or Soldiers.<br><br> To that Marines from 3d Battalion, 3d Marine Regiment, part of CTF Thunder, leap from a CH-47 Chinook helicopter onto the snowy hills of Korangal, Afghanistan, during Operation Spurs in January. Photo by CPL Rich Mattingly March-April 2005 Field Artillery 8 end, we established two philosophies within the Thunder Brigade: First love your higher headquarters, and second ensure our own headquarters is adding value to the operations of subordinates. Loving our higher headquarters was not difficult as its guidance, policies and products were all great assets to our operations and its various staff sections had superb talent.<br><br> Positive relations with our higher headquarters fostered in- creased productivity based upon healthy relationships between the various staff principals and their counterparts. Likewise, our relationships with our 11 subordinate units had to be founded on actions 4not words. We were deter- mined not to be a headquarters that focused simply on deadlines and re- ports.<br><br> We listened patiently to the needs of our subordinate units and pushed hard to remedy every issue they had. Our S4 section was a particularly heroic section, meticulously tracking every material request and following it up until completion. Positive communications facilitate cooperation and, in the end, enhance operations to the benefit of all.<br><br> Trust everyone 4but keep your pow- der dry. Conducting brigade-level op- erations in an AO the size of Iowa is a bit larger than our doctrine suggests. The size of the AO mandates decentral- ized operations with a clear understand- ing that neither you nor your forces can be everywhere at once.<br><br> Brigade-level operations synchronizing multiple bat- talions in our AO are rare. We execute virtually all operations by allocating resources and giving guidance. This places a premium on trust 4afforded at every level of command.<br><br> Battlefield circulation became key, and it is how I ckeep my powder dry, d ensuring subordinates are executing operations within our intent and that of the Combined Joint Task Force 76 (CJTF-76) Commanding General. I learned that our subordinates are mag- nificent in execution and that I gained more from my experiences with them than they could have gained from any cpearls of wisdom d or corrective ac- tions from me. In nonlinear operations, a commander unaccustomed to trusting his subordinates will stifle initiative and, while he may ensure perfection of a few missions, he 9ll get far less done than he would by giving guidance, providing resources and trust- ing his subordinate leaders to accomplish multiple missions at once.<br><br> I learned to trust my instincts as well, placing myself in operations where I felt my personal presence would be a combat multiplier. Keep the fire in your eye! Spending a year deployed is a long time.<br><br> As with any operation of this duration, it is im- portant to continuously challenge the organization and its subordinate ele- ments. The commander should never be content with the status quo and should always be looking for a way to improve operations and the efficiency of the organization. Just as important, he must recognize those Soldiers and leaders who take up the challenge and find new ways to do business.<br><br> Interestingly, innovation is one of the true virtues of a yearlong deployment. It took us several months to really un- derstand the battlefield as well as the complexities of our operations. By con- stantly pushing innovation, we moved forward in virtually every area 4mea- suring effects, battle tracking, counter- strike, intelligence fusion, reconstruc- tion, good governance, communications systems, Soldier quality of life, air- ground integration, public affairs 4the list is unending.<br><br> Challenging Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines to ckeep the fire in their eye d ensures your unit always moves forward and, just as important, keeps your joint troopers excited about the contributions they are making to the mission. Some Thoughts on Maneuver Bri- gade Command. In the movie Cool Hand Luke , the warden admonished Luke, telling him cA man 9s got to know his limitations. d That 9s pretty sage ad- vice that certainly speaks to me as a Field Artillery officer commanding an Infantry brigade in combat.<br><br> No officer has perfect experience; all are missing some job, some experience that would make them a better leader. Not being an Infantryman might be enough for many to say I am not qualified for my current position. Fair enough.<br><br> But I would say that it begs the ques- tion: Must an officer be an Infantryman or tanker to be qualified to command a combined arms formation at the bri- gade level? I 9ll leave the answer to the Army 9s leadership 4but I will offer to our younger audience some thoughts about my experience and what has helped me the most as an FA maneuver brigade commander that might help them in the future. Service in DS units.<br><br> I have served in both general support (GS) and DS FA units. My DS experience included op- erations with armored cavalry, mecha- nized infantry and armor units. Oddly enough, it did not include light infantry.<br><br> But, my experience with five different brigade-level commanders and intimate workings with the staffs at the field grade level were essential to my ability to direct a maneuver brigade staff. For all Field Artillery officers, I would advocate service in DS units. Without this experience, you simply will not fully understand the complexity and nature of maneuver operations.<br><br> The School of Advanced Military Stud- ies (SAMS) and the Advanced Strategic Arts Program (ASAP). SAMS at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, added an intel- lectual edge to my experience base, giving depth to my understanding of current operations in the crucible of military history and theory. Spending a year studying the profession of arms enlightened me in the art and science of war, and the follow-on year as a divi- sion planner helped me understand the MDMP and the complexities of war plans, exercises and operational plan- ning.<br><br> These experiences enabled me to better understand the complex environ- ment of Afghanistan and lead our staff through the campaign planning process for our yearlong deployment. I also was fortunate enough to attend ASAP at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. This program focused on strategic planning and joint and combined operations.<br><br> In addition, it introduced me to emerging warfight- ing concepts, such as effects-based op- erations (EBO). Taken together, these programs offer officers opportunities to challenge them- selves intellectually and provide a base of knowledge for analysis and deci- sion making. Observer/Controller (O/C) at the Na- tional Training Center (NTC), Fort Ir- win, California.<br><br> It is hard to beat the tactical skills you develop as an O/C at any of our Army 9s training centers. A general officer once told me, cI thought I was a pretty damn good battalion commander until I went to be an O/C at the NTC and found out how little I knew about our profession. d Truer words have never been spoken as O/Cs stay im- mersed in tactics, techniques and pro- cedures (TTPs). Having spent two years after battalion command as Wolf 07, I was amazed at how much I learned about warfighting Field Artillery March-April 2005 9 and the synchronization of combined arms warfare on the battlefields of the NTC.<br><br> There is, perhaps, no greater pro- fessional experience for both officers and NCOs than to serve as O/Cs at one of our Combat Training Centers (CTCs). So you want to be a maneuver bri- gade commander? It is a great honor to serve our nation at a time when we face such an enormous threat.<br><br> I am grateful for the opportunity to be part of this fight in any capacity, and my time as a Div Arty commander leading an infan- try brigade in combat is the highlight of my career. Our experiences in Afghani- stan are rich in their lessons and reward- ing in accomplishments. While there is some uncertainty in the future of Redlegs 9 brigade command opportunities, I encourage all Field Ar- tillery officers to cstay the course d and choose the path that will make them the best combined arms leaders possible.<br><br> From the observation post (OP) to the battlefield coordination detachment (BCD), Field Artillerymen are the Army 9s integrators of joint fires and effects, duties that keep us intimately involved in combined arms operations. As the Chief of Field Artillery said in his January-February column, Field Artillerymen have a cfeel for the battle 4 a deep understanding that we share in- stantly at every level & Field Artillery- men, quite simply, 8 get it. 9 d The experiences and training you re- ceive today are what ensure that you will c get it d and will be essential to your development as a leader in the future 4 perhaps of a maneuver brigade. Colonel Gary H.<br><br> Cheek commands the 25th Infantry Division (Light) Artillery out of Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. He deployed to Afghanistan for Operation Enduring Free- dom in June 2004 to command the 25th Division 9s Combined Task Force Thunder, an Infantry brigade, for 12 months. He also served as the Senior Fire Support Trainer (Wolf07) at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California.<br><br> Other assignments include commanding the 1st Battalion, 9th Field Artillery (1-9 FA), 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Georgia; and serving as Executive Officer of the 1-41 FA and G3 Plans Officer, both in the 24th Infan- try Division (Mechanized) at Fort Stewart; and Exchange Officer in the Canadian Field Artillery School at the Canadian Forces Base Gagetown, New Brunswick, Canada. He commanded A/2-28 FA, part of the 210th Field Artillery Brigade, VII Corps, Germany. The new M777 light- weight 155-mm towed howitzer will begin fielding in May to the 3d Battalion, 11th Ma- rines at Twentynine Palms, California.<br><br> The M777 is replac- ing the aging 155-mm towed M198 howitzer. Some of the M777 9s greatest improvements are in its mobility, trans- portability, survivabil- ity and lethality. The M777 can be emplaced and ready to fire in less than two minutes, which is significantly faster than the M198.<br><br> The new weapon can be rapidly displaced within two to three min- utes, allowing the bat- tery to shoot and move before the enemy can return fire. Its light weight (less than 10,000 pounds) and inde- pendent suspension allow the weapon to travel over rougher ter- rain (worldwide, that amounts to about 30 percent more terrain) and be sling-loaded under more aircraft than the M198. It fires all current and planned 155- mm munitions.<br><br> Although its max range is still 30,000 meters with cur- rent rocket-assisted projectiles, that range will extend to more than 37,000 meters when firing the new global posi- tioning system/inertial navigation unit (GPS/INU) precision-guided Excalibur munition. The max rate of fire is four rounds per minute while the sustained rate is two rounds per minute. Within a year of the initial M777 de- liveries, both the Marine Corps and Army will start taking delivery of the M777A1, which adds a digital fire con- M777 Starts Fielding in the 11th Marines Current Fielding Schedule for the M777 Legend: EEAP =Enhanced Equipment Allowance Pool M-NET =Maintenance New Equipment Training O-NET =Operations New Equipment Training SBCT =Stryker Brigade Combat Team Marine Unit FY05 11th 11th FY06 EEAP 11th 10th 10th 10th FY07 10th 5th SBCT M-NET May 05 Aug 05 Feb 06 May 06 Jun 06 Jul 06 Sep 06 Oct 06 Dec 06 O-NET May 05 Aug 05 N/A May 06 Jun 06 Aug 06 Sep 06 Oct 06 Dec 06 Location 29 Palms, CA Camp Pendleton, CA 29 Palms Camp Pendleton Camp Lejeune, NC Camp Lejeune Camp Lejeune Camp Lejeune Schofield Barracks, HI trol system (DFCS).<br><br> The DFCS provides the howit- zer highly accurate self-lo- cation and directional con- trol. With the introduction of DFCS, the battery only requires survey control points to initialize the system. The section chief will have a navigational aid inside the cab, and the weapon has an onboard single-channel ground and airborne radio system (SINCGARS) and amplifier for digital commu- nications.<br><br> This provides greater flexibility for the howitzer, which no longer will be tied to wire commu- nications. The M777A1 provides commanders greater flex- ibility in getting to the fight, carrying out their missions and quickly moving to safe locations to carry out subsequent mis- sions. If units have questions, they can call me at the M777 New Equipment Training Team (NETT) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma: Commercial (580) 442- 4418/5301; the DSN prefix is 639.<br><br> Units can email me with their ques- tions: firstname.lastname@example.org. Capt Waco Lane, USMC XO, M777 NETT, Fort Sill, OK March-April 2005 Field Artillery 10 1 st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery (1-37 FA), the FA battalion as- signed to the Army 9s first Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), con- ducted combat operations in Iraq from November 2003 to October 2004. The deployment of 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division (2/3 SBCT) to Iraq was the first operational deployment of an SBCT to combat.<br><br> During this yearlong effort in Iraq, 1-37 FA conducted many operations in support of the brigade 4conducting counterfire and civil military operations (CMO), securing key assets, process- ing detainees, training the Iraqi Na- tional Guard as well as conducting ma- neuver operations in 1-37 FA 9s bat- tlespace. The battalion proved flexible and capable of meeting the demands and preserved options for the brigade commander by serving as an economy- of-force maneuver unit. Just as other FA battalions before and FA battalions currently serving in a maneuver task force (TF) role in Iraq, 1-37 FA had to grow in terms of honing new skill sets, deliberately reorganiz- ing its structure and preparing for many unknowns.<br><br> Most challenging for the battalion and its leadership was serving in the role of infantry 4maneuvering and controlling an area of operations. But, like other FA units, 1-37 FA proved it was fully capable of serving in this capacity. Tough Decisions and Breaking New Ground.<br><br> During the final months of preparation for deployment, the battal- By Lieutenant Colonel Steven A. Sliwa Soldiers from 1-37 FA train at Forward Oper- ating Base (FOB) Endurance at Qayarrah West Airbase, Iraq. (Photo by SPC Gretel Sharpee, 139th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment) Field Artillery March-April 2005 11 ion conducted a mission analysis and created a training plan to set up the batteries and Soldiers for success.<br><br> Im- mediately, we established communica- tions with FA battalions in Iraq to har- vest current tactics, techniques and pro- cedures (TTPs) and enemy trends, build- ing a better understanding of the operat- ing environment and the unique mis- sions being performed by fellow Red- legs. This was a creal-time d source of data from the theater and the basis of our training. We altered the current battalion mis- sion-essential task list (METL) and fo- cused resources on skills that previ- ously had not been at the forefront (see Figure 1).<br><br> Additionally, the task of mass- ing battalion fires was eliminated from training plans. We realized that, given the small-unit decentralized operations in Iraq, it was unlikely there would be a demand for massed fires or that the three batteries would be in position and ready to fire simultaneously. Instead, the battalion ensured each firing battery was proficient in providing fires.<br><br> The battalion also developed standing oper- ating procedures (SOP) for small-unit dismounted military operations in ur- ban terrain (MOUT). Then the battalion focused on indi- vidual and small-unit tasks to bring Soldiers to a new level of confidence in weapons proficiency and battle drills that platoons and batteries could ex- ecute in support of the missions we thought we would be assigned. The batteries were organized into flexible organizations consisting of two platoons (built by dividing the four, 10-man how- itzer sections) and a headquarters de- tachment (created from the fire direc- tion center, or FDC, and remaining bat- tery personnel).<br><br> Another tough decision for 1-37 FA was to train without all its assigned equipment to have additional high-mo- bility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) modified into cSpecial Forces-like gunships. d This later would prove to be one of the best moves we made; these vehicles were the mainstay of our force and operations. Finally, we had to change the mindset of the battery leadership and Soldiers. This was challenging as we had no way to plan and rehearse for specific mis- sions before deploying.<br><br> Both the bri- gade and battalion missions were un- clear. For example, not until 3/2 SBCT had conducted operations in theater did we know we would replace the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). Based on our analysis and feedback from units in Iraq, we took a very broad approach to training on dismounted skills to cover a spectrum of potential operations.<br><br> Operation Arrowhead Blizzard in Samarra. The unit 9s first combat expe- riences were during Operation Arrow- head Blizzard in Samarra. 3/2 SBCT conducted operations with the 3d Bri- gade, 4th Infantry.<br><br> During this opera- tion, TF 1-37 FA conducted a myriad of tasks in support of the brigade. (See Figure 2.) C Battery task organized with sappers from C/1092 EN and constructed and operated a forward detainee-process- ing center to relieve the forces operat- ing in Samarra of the task of processing and transporting detainees. Using its firebase construction skills, the battery established a small strongpoint on the outskirts of Samarra that also provided security for several retransmission teams and a forward medical treatment facil- ity.<br><br> The task force provided 24/7 route security along the two major lines of communication (LOCs) that led from the brigade base of operations on For- ward Operating Base (FOB) Pacesetter, approximately 35 kilometers from Samarra. B Battery secured the north- ern route using our HMMWV gunships. Figure 1: 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery (1-37 FA) Modified Mission Statement and Mission-Essential Task List (METL) Approved July 2003.<br><br> The last three tasks in the METL were added for deployment training. Legend: AOR =Area of Operations CSS =Combat Service Support Notes: 1.Tasks receive reduced level of training (based on information at the time). 2.Basically a full-time implied task 4was placed on METL to provide additional focus.<br><br> 3.Based on the likelihood of having to secure FOBs, entry points, fixed sites, etc. METL: KDeploy/redeploy. "Coordinate and control battalion moves.<br><br> "Conduct counterfire operations. 1 "Control delivery of fires. 1 4.Based on the likelihood that 155-mm fires would not be used extensively but that survey and Met would still be required for mortars and radar intelligence always would be required.<br><br> Mission Statement: On order, 1-37 FA deploys rapidly by land, sea or air to any AOR and provides lethal, nonlethal and joint effects to the SBCT. Be prepared to establish node security, force protection and stability and support operations (SASO) in order to provide economy-of-force to the SBCT. Met =Meteorological SBCT =Stryker Brigade Combat Team "Coordinate/monitor CSS operations.<br><br> "Conduct force protection. 2 "Conduct node security. 3 "Provide survey, Met and radar sup- port.<br><br> 4 HSB (-) CRT, 296 BSB FFT, 296 BSB A Battery (-) B Battery (-) C Battery 1/HSB/1-37 FA 1/1/A/1-37 FA 1/C/1092 EN C/52 IN (9 ATGMs and 1 Fire Sup- port Stryker Vehicles) 1/1/B/1-37 FA C/1092 EN (-), WVARNG (Corps Wheeled EN Battalion MTOE) Legend: ATGMs =Anti-Tank Guided Missiles BSB =Brigade Support Battalion CRT =Combat Repair Team EN =Engineers FFT =Field Feeding Team HSB =Headquarters and Services Battery IN =Infantry MTOE =Modified Table of Organization and Equipment WVARNG =West Virginia Army National Guard Figure 2: Task Force (TF) 1-37 FA Task Or- ganization 4Samarra. The key tasks in Samarra were to provide counterfire; se- cure lines of communications (LOCs) to Samarra from FOB Pacesetter; hold, pro- cess and transport detainees; and provide a FOB quick-reaction force (QRF). March-April 2005 Field Artillery 12 Equipped with the anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) variant of the Stryker vehicle, C/52 IN secured the more dan- gerous southern route.<br><br> C/52 IN was tasked-organized with a howitzer sec- tion from B Battery for greater haul capacity for barrier materials to con- struct traffic control points (TCPs). The section also provided the additional men required for this mission. A Battery provided a 6400-mil firing capability on FOB Pacesetter.<br><br> Three platoons of two howitzers were laid and set on different azimuths to decrease shift time. The FDC directed the pla- toon to the required set of howitzers during fire missions. This paid off one night as rockets attacked the FOB.<br><br> The Q-36 Firefinder radar, also located on the FOB, ac- quired the attack, and A Battery ex- ecuted counterfire, preventing 21 addi- tional rockets from being fired at the FOB. The missions during this phase of the battalion 9s deployment were marked by dispersed and independent opera- tions at the battery and company level. Command and control was challenging but made easier via the use of Force XXI battle command brigade and be- low (FBCB 2 ).<br><br> As a new maneuver commander, I relied on my observations of the bri- gade commander during many training events and my experiences as a fire support officer (FSO) at the company, battalion and brigade levels to lead the operations. I positioned myself forward at the detainee site because it allowed me to best influence the majority of the task force. This was a departure from the traditional positioning I had experi- enced 4 csnaplinked d to the brigade commander.<br><br> Mosul and Relief in Place (RIP) with the 101st. After operations in Samarra, the brigade moved north away from the Sunni Triangle and executed an RIP with the 101st Division. The SBCT took over the battlespace of a division and was stretched across an area ap- proximately 137 miles by 165 miles.<br><br> In other terms, our 5,000 troops replaced the 25,000 troops in the division and its attachments. As 1-37 FA arrived in Mosul, its mis- sion was yet to be assigned, based on the complexities of the RIP with the 101st. Analyzing the area of responsi- bility (AOR) and the capabilities of his units, the brigade commander did not assign a mission to 1-37 FA until late into the RIP.<br><br> This proved challenging for the battalion. However, our earlier experiences with ambiguity allowed us to remain csteady in the harness d and focus on improving force protection to vehicles and Soldier living areas. 1-37 FA 9s assignment eventually be- came securing a large area of opera- tions (AO) encircling Mosul (approxi- mately 1,700 square miles).<br><br> This al- lowed the brigade commander to place his infantry battalions in Mosul and establish an economy-of-force on the outer periphery of the city. TF 1-37 FA was quartered in Mosul and maneuvered through the city to get to anywhere in the AO. This built a unique proficiency among the platoons that navigated daily in the built-up terrain.<br><br> C Battery had the mission to secure FOB Freedom, the home of the brigade headquarters and TF Olympia, the brigade 9s higher headquarters. C Bat- tery maintained this security mission until the battalion redeployed During this phase of the operation, TF 1-37 FA reorganized, losing C Battery and some engineers and gaining a target acquisition battery (TAB) (A/151 TAB) from the Minnesota Army National Guard. In Mosul, TF 1-37 FA secured the AO and a large fuel transport point, built Iraqi institutions, mentored the Iraqi Police and facilities protection services force (FPSF), and improved the Iraqi infrastructure.<br><br> It was in this phase that 1-37 FA gained its csea legs d in conducting ccordon and knocks d as well as combined op- erations with the Iraqi Police. Addition- ally, the battalion standard was to con- duct dismounted patrols and cflash d TCPs during every mission in the AO to increase both maneuver proficiency and our local presence. During these opera- tions, 1-37 FA captured weapons deal- ers, counterfeiters and several arms caches and responded to a number of fights within the battlespace.<br><br> 1-37 FA also prosecuted an intensive CMO campaign to build up the legiti- macy of 10 Iraqi city councils as the country approached Transfer of Sover- eignty. Based on the lack of civil affairs teams (CATs), Redleg officers executed the CA tasks. In Mosul, the battalion 9s depth of lead- ership was put to the test.<br><br> Due to a unique tailoring of forces and person- nel shortages, I left TF 1-37 FA in the capable hands of the battalion execu- tive officer (XO), Major Rodney L. Olson, to take command of TF Sykes for six weeks. This TF was at FOB Regulars (later named Endurance) at Qayarrah West Airbase, approximately 45 miles south of Mosul.<br><br> The assign- ment included a battlespace of about 6,360 square miles (slightly larger than Connecticut). TF Sykes was a unique TF (see Figure 3) consisting of units that remained in the vicinity of Qayarrah. Its parent head- quarters (5-20 IN) was successfully executing convoy security operations to reopen LOCs south of Balad and Baghdad previously interdicted by the enemy.<br><br> This was an awesome task 4a Redleg commanding a TF with an ad hoc staff and no FA units. Additionally, I had one Iraqi National Guard (ING) battalion HQs Plt/HHC 5-20 IN* LST, 296 BSB 445 CAT, CAARNG 136 THT, 1-14 Cav, 3/2 SBCT (DS) 333 THT, 310 MI Bn (DS) 335 THT, 310 MI Bn (GS) (TACON) C/52 IN (9 ATGMs and 1 Fire Support Stryker Vehicles) C/1-14 Cav (9 Reconnaissance, 2 Mortar, 1 Fire Support and 1 Medical Evacuation Stryker Vehicles) C/276 EN (-), VAARNG (DS) (Corps Wheeled EN Battalion MTOE) Legend: CAARNG =California Army National Guard CAT =Civil Affairs Team Cav =Cavalry DS =Direct Support GS =General Support HHC =Headquarters and Headquarters Company ING =Iraqi Army National Guard LST =Logistic Support Team MI =Military Intelligence OPCON =Operational Control Plt =Platoon SBCT =Stryker Brigade Combat Team TACON =Tactical Control THT =Tactical Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Team VAARNG =Virginia Army National Guard Figure 3: TF Sykes 4Qayarrah. The task force 9s key tasks were to secure the area of operations (AO), command and control (C 2 ) the FOB at Qayarrah West Airbase, train Iraqi Army National Guard and secure Am- munition Supply Point (ASP) Jaguar.<br><br> 102d ING Battalion (OPCON) *5-20 IN provided convoy security from April through June 2004. Field Artillery March-April 2005 13 under the operational control (OPCON) of the TF. I relied on my experiences gained during operations in the periph- er<br><br>