CIRCUIT CITY STORES, INC. v. ROCKVILLE PIKE JOINT VENTURE LIMITED

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2003Md.LEXIS466,***8 mationfromCircuitCitythatithadnoclaimofposses- soryinterestinthepropertyandwouldnotinterferewith Magruder'spossessionanduseofthepremises.Infur- theranceofthatdemand,RockvillerequestedthatCircuit CitysignaConsenttoLease,whichCircuitCityrefused todoabsentacompletereleaseofliabilitybyRockville. Inresponsetothatrefusal,whichittreatedasimpairing itsabilityto ndanewtenant,Rockville ledamotion forpartialsummaryjudgmentontheissueofliability-- thatCircuitCitybreacheditsleaseobligations,thatthe leasehadbeenterminated,andthatCircuitCityhadno presentpossessoryinterestintheproperty.OnAugust20, 1998,following[***9]ahearing,thecourtgrantedthat motion,declaringfromthebenchthatCircuitCityhad vacatedthepropertyandthatRockvillehadtheright"to reletthepremisesfreefromclaimsbyCircuitCity." Tothatpoint,CircuitCityhadbeenpayingtheamount ofrentitwasobligatedtopayunderthelease.Beginning inAugust,1998,however,itreducedthatamountbyat least$27,000permonth--theamountthatMARSwould havebeen[*338]obligedtopayhadthesubleasebeen approvedbyRockville--apparentlyonthetheorythatthe subleasewaswrongfullyrejectedandthatCircuitCity wasentitled[**980]toacreditfortheamountthat Rockvillewouldhavereceivedunderthatsublease.n1 n1AwitnessforRockvilletesti edthat CircuitCityreduceditspaymentby$35,000-- $40,000/month. InJune,1998,thecourtenteredaschedulingorder that,amongotherthings,requireddiscoverytobecom- pletedbyNovember30,1998.Throughoutpartsof1998, Rockvilleapparentlyhadengagedindiscussionswithan- otherfoodstore,Food[***10]Lion,Inc.,but,untilMay, 1999,thosediscussionswerenotfruitful.OnMay11, 1999,RockvilleandFoodLionenteredintoa20--year leasefor40,000+squarefeetatthelocationformerly leasedtoCircuitCity.Inordertoprovidethebuilding andcertainaccessoryareasforFoodLion,itwasneces- sarytodemolishtheexistingstructurethatCircuitCity hadoccupied,alongwithstructuresoccupiedbythree othertenants,andtoconstructanewfacility.Thelease requiredFoodLiontodothatworkatitsownexpense. Thebaserentbeganat$344,000perannum,increasing incrementallyafterthe fth,tenth,and fteenthyearsof thelease. Withintwodaysafterthesigningofthelease, RockvilleprovidedacopyofittoCircuitCitywhich, severalweekslater,movedtoamendthescheduling ordertopermitfurtherdiscovery.CircuitCitynoted Rockville'scontentionthatCircuitCityremainedliable forallamountsdueunderitslease,lesscreditforsums receivedfromanyre--lettingofthepremises,andurged that,inordertobeabletocalculatethecredit,itwasen- titledtoknowwhattheoveralleconomicbene tofthe newleasewithFoodLionwouldbe.CircuitCitysought, [***11]asadditionaldiscovery,(1)alldocumentsre- latingtotheFoodLionleaseanditsnegotiationandall documentsrelatingtotheadditionaleconomicinforma- tionconcerningtheshoppingcenter,whichCircuitCity considerednecessaryforoneofitsexpertstoperforma discountedcash owcomparativeanalysis,(2)reopening ofonedepositionforquestioningconcerning[*339]the FoodLionlease,and(3)fournewdepositionsconcerning thatlease.Atthehearingonthemotion,CircuitCitycon- tendedthatinformationregardingthenegotiationswith FoodLionwascriticaltoitsbeingabletoshowthatthe rejectionoftheMARSsubleasewaspretextual,donein orderthatRockvillecouldmakeabetterdealwithFood Lion. Afterahearing,thecourtdeniedthatmotion,agree- ingwithRockvillethatinformationregardingtheamount ofcredittowhichCircuitCitymightbeentitledwasnot relevanttotheissuesattrial.Thecourtexplainedthat theissueattrial,astodamages,wasonlythosedamages accruedasofthedateoftrialandthatthemotiveswith respecttotheFoodLionlease"arenotrelevant." Twoissuesweretriedandsubmittedtothejury:(1) whetherRockvilleprovedthatCircuit[***12]Citycom- mittedanunexcusedorunwaivedmaterialbreachofthe leaseprovisionconcerningcontinuousoperation;and(2) whetherCircuitCityprovedthatRockvillebreachedits leaseobligationsbyunreasonablywithholdingconsentto theproposedsubleasewithMARS.TheFoodLionlease wasadmittedintoevidence,anditssupposedimpacton Rockville'sdecisionnottoapprovetheMARSsublease wasargued.Inspecialverdicts,thejuryansweredthe rst questionintheaf rmativeandthesecondinthenegative, theeffectofwhichwastoestablishliabilityonthepart ofCircuitCity.Thepartiesstipulatedthattheamountof rentandotherchargesdueandowingundertheCircuit Cityleasethroughthedateoftrialwas$488,236. Remainingatissue,withrespecttodamages,were onlypre--judgmentinterestand[**981]attorneys'fees. RiderFourtotheleaseprovidedforlatechargesattherate of1.5%permonthbutCircuitCitycontestedthevalid- ityofthatprovision.Paragraph42oftheleaseprovided for"reasonableattorneys'fees"fortheprevailingpartyin anylitigationtoenforcethetermsofthelease,and,in theabsenceofanagreement,itbecamenecessaryforthe courttodetermine[***13]thatamount. Baseduponthejuryverdictsandthestipulation, thecourt,onAugust27,1999,enteredamulti--part Page4 376Md.331,*339;829A.2d976,**981; 2003Md.LEXIS466,***13 "JudgmentOrder."[*340]Inthe rstpartoftheor- der,thecourtfoundthelatefeeprovisioninthelease valid,calculatedwhatareasonableattorneys'feewould be,and,basedonthosedeterminations,enteredjudgment infavorofRockvilleonCountIofitsSecondAmended Counterclaimintheamountof$488,236,plus$44,262 inpre--judgmentinterest,$166,346inattorneys'fees,and courtcosts.ItalsoorderedCircuitCitytopaytoRockville post--judgmentinterestattherateof10%perannumon theunpaidamountofthejudgment.Finally,inthis rst partofthejudgmentorder,thecourtorderedCircuitCity topaytoRockville,onthedaysoriginally xedinthe lease,amountsequaltotheinstallmentsofrentandother chargesreservedinthelease,asiftheleasehadnotbeen terminated,providedthat,ifthepremiseswerere--let, CircuitCitywasentitledtoacreditequaltotheamount ofrentreceivedbyRockville,afterdeductionforallac- tualandreasonableexpensesincurredinre--lettingthe premises,includingremodelingcostsandbrokeragefees, together[***14]withinterestattherateof1.5%per monthfromthedatethosepaymentsbecamedue. PursuanttoRockville'srequestforadeclaratoryjudg- mentinitsSecondAmendedCounterclaimandconsis- tentlywiththejury'sverdicts,thecourtdeclaredthat(1) CircuitCitybreacheditsleaseobligationsbyvacatingthe premisesinviolationofthecontinuousoperationprovi- sion;(2)Rockvillehadnotexcusedorwaivedthebene t ofthatprovision;(3)CircuitCity'sbreachconstituted amaterialbreachoftheleasethatdischargedRockville fromanyfurtherdutyofperformanceunderthelease;(4) Rockvillethereforehadnocontractualorlegalobligation toconsenttotheproposedMARSsubleasepresentedin December,1997;(5)Rockville'srefusaltoconsenttothat subleasedidnotconstituteamaterialbreachofthelease; (6)Rockvilledidnotunreasonablywithholdconsentto thesublease;(7)RockvilleterminatedtheleaseonMarch 31,1998,andCircuitCityhadnoobligationtoprovide re insuranceafterthatdate;and(8)CircuitCityremained liable,pursuanttothelease,topayamountsequivalent totheinstallmentsofrentandotherchargesreservedin theleaseas[*341]ifthelease[***15]hadnotbeen terminated,lessacreditequaltothenetamountofrent receivedbyRockville,afterdeductionforallactualand reasonableexpensesincurredinre--lettingthepremises. Initsdeclaratoryjudgment,thecourtstatedthatitwas notattemptingtode netheterm"netamountofrent" andwasnotprecludingthepartiesfromlatercontesting themeaningofthatterm.Italsostatedthat,asdamages hadbeenawardedunderCountIoftheSecondAmended Counterclaim,itwasnotnecessarytoenteramonetary judgmentunderCountII. Finally,infurtheranceofitsdeterminationthatCircuit Citywouldbeentitledtoacreditagainstitscontinuing obligation,thecourtdirectedthatRockvillenotifyCircuit Cityandthecourtwhenit rstcommencedtoreceive rentorotherconsiderationarisingfromare--lettingof thepremises,afterwhichthecourtwould,ifnecessary, determinetheamountofcredittowhichCircuitCitywas entitled.Perhapsinthebeliefthat,duetotheprospectof afurtherorderbeingenteredwithrespect[**982]toany credits,thejudgmentorderdidnot nallydisposeofall issues,thecourtmadeanexpressdeterminationthatthere wasnojustreasonfor[***16]delayandthusenteredthe judgmentssetforthintheorderas nalunderMaryland Rule2--602(b). Noappealwastakenfromthejudgmentorder.Circuit Citypaid,infull,theamountthenrequiredofit($ 698,846)andreceivedapartialsatisfactionofthejudg- ment.Itthenresumedpaymentofthemonthlyamounts thatitwouldhavebeenrequiredtopayunderthelease. InFebruary,2000,FoodLionbegandemolitionofthe buildinginpreparationfortheconstructionofitsnewfa- cility.InSeptemberofthatyear,CircuitCity,informed thattheFoodLionstorewasnearingcompletionandwas duetoopeninNovember,wrotetoRockvilleseeking informationregardingtherentcommencementdateand theamountofcreditRockvillebelievedwasappropri- ate.Rockvillerespondedwithaletterandattachedex- hibitsshowing(1)anamountdueundertheleaseforrent andothercosts,throughtheendoftheleaseterm,of $4,327,547,(2)rentandcoststobecollectedfromFood Lion[*342]duringthatperiodof$1,960,120,(3)anet amountofrentandothercostsduebyCircuitCity,after creditingtheamountstobecollectedfromFoodLion, of$2,367,426,(4)$1,889,125incostsofre--letting,and [***17](5)$17,390inmiscellaneousreimbursablecosts. ItisevidentthatCircuitCitydidnotacceptthatpo- sition,anditinformedthecourtoftheneedfora"status conference."ThecourtscheduledahearingforJanuary 19,2001,presumablytoconsiderwhat,ifany,credits wereduetoCircuitCityagainstitscontinuingobliga- tion.Thedaybeforethathearingwastooccur,however, CircuitCity ledamotiontomodifyorvacatetheAugust, 1997judgmentandtorequireRockvilletorefundallpay- mentsmadebyCircuitCityfollowingdemolitionofthe buildingformerlyoccupiedbyCircuitCity.Thegrava- menofthemotionwasthat,uponterminatingthelease andreenteringthepremises,Rockvilleassumedaduty tomitigateitsdamages,notwithstandingthe"survival" clauseinthelease,that,whenitcausedorallowedthe demisedpremisestobedemolished,itactedforitsown bene t,ratherthanthatofCircuitCity,andtherebyef- fectedasurrenderofthelease,andthattheeffectofthe surrenderwastoexcuseCircuitCityfromallfurtherobli- gationunderthelease.Alternatively,CircuitCityaverred thatdemolitionofthebuildingandcancellationofthree Page5 376Md.331,*342;829A.2d976,**982; 2003Md.LEXIS466,***17 adjoiningleasesmade[***18]itimpossibletocalcu- latedamages.Inasubsequentmemorandum,CircuitCity alsocontendedthatthejudgmentshouldbesetasideunder MarylandRule2--535(b)forfraud.Thefraud,itclaimed, arosefromRockville'sfailuretoproduceindiscoverycer- taindocumentsthat,inCircuitCity'sview,indicatedthat Rockville'srejectionoftheMARSsubleasewas,indeed, pretextual. Rockvillecontestedthemotionontwogrounds:one, thatthecourthadnoauthoritytomodifyorvacatean enrolledjudgmentonthegroundsasserted;andtwo,that therewasnomerittothemotioninanyevent.Thecourt rejectedthosedefensesandgrantedthereliefrequested byCircuitCity.InanorderenteredJuly2,2001,thecourt, citingthepartofits1999judgmentdirectingRockville tonotifyCircuitCityand[*343]thecourtwhenit rstbegantoreceiverentandpositingtheprospectof afurtherhearingtodeterminetheamountofnetcredit towhichCircuitCitymaybeentitled,foundthatitdid havetheauthoritytomodifyorvacatethejudgment.On themerits,thecourtconcludedthatatenant'sobliga- tiontopayrentordamagesforvacatingthepremises ceaseswhenthelandlordsubstantiallyalters[***19]the demisedpremises,evenwhereasurvivalclauseexists. Accordingly,itfoundthat,[**983]whenRockvilleal- lowedFoodLiontodemolishthebuildingpreviouslyoc- cupiedbyCircuitCity,Rockvilleacceptedasurrenderof thelease,andthatCircuitCitywasexcusedfrommaking anypaymentsthereafter.ItgrantedCircuitCity'smotion andorderedRockvilletorefundallpaymentsmadeby CircuitCityafterFebruary,2000--thedatethedemised premisesweredemolished. Rockvilleappealed,arguingthat(1)the1999judg- mentactedas resjudicata astoalldefensesthatcould havebeenraisedattrialandthatitcouldnotbevacated basedonanewdefensetheoryasserted17monthslater, (2)the1999judgmentcouldnotbevacatedunderthe guiseofexercisingalimitedretainedjurisdictiontocal- culateacreditduetothejudgmentdebtorforpayments madebyathirdparty,and(3)thecourterredbyapplying aprincipleoflandlord--tenantlawtostrikeanenrolled judgmentawardingcontractdamages. TheCourtofSpecialAppealsfoundmeritinthethird argumentand,asaresult,neveraddressedtheauthority ofthetrialcourttovacateormodifytheinitialjudgment. Theintermediate[***20]appellatecourtconcludedthat thepartieshadadualrelationship--alandlord--tenant relationshipfoundedonpropertylawandacontractual relationshipgovernedbycontractlaw.Itheldthat,al- thoughasurrenderoftheleaseterminatestheleasehold estateandtheobligationsassociatedwiththatestateunder principlesofpropertylaw,thesurvivalclause,obligating CircuitCitytocontinuepaymentofamountsthatother- wisewouldhavebeendueasrentduringthefulllease term,isenforceableundercontractlaw,notwithstanding theterminationoftheleaseholdestate.Thecourtalso concludedthat,althoughtheamountofcredittowhich Circuit[*344]Cityisentitledbyreasonofpaymentsto RockvilleundertheFoodLionleasemaybedif cultto determineifcreditisdueforanyofthemoneyexpended byFoodLionforconstructionofthebuilding,thatwas notareasontoterminatetheobligation.Because,inits view,theCircuitCourterredinconcludingotherwiseand, asaresultofitserroneousruling,interminatingCircuit City'scontinuingobligation,theappellatecourtfoundit unnecessarytodeterminewhetherthe1999judgmentwas evensubjecttomodi cation. DISCUSSION[***21] Introduction Threeissuesareraisedbytheparties:(1)whetherthe 1999judgmentwas nal;(2)ifso,whetheritwassubject tobeingreopenedandmodi edonthegroundoffraud; and(3)ifthejudgmentwassubjecttobeingreopened, whetherthetrialcourterredindeterminingthatdemoli- tionofthebuilding,byeffectingasurrenderofthelease, terminatedCircuitCity'sobligationforfurtherpaymentof rentdamages.Weshallconcludethatthe1999judgment was nal,thattherewasnofraudonRockville'spartthat wouldjustifyareopeningofthatjudgment,andthatthe trialcourtthereforeerredinconsidering,inthecontext ofamotiontovacateormodifythatjudgment,whether demolitionofthebuildingterminatedCircuitCity'scon- tractualobligationtopayrentdamages. Thatdoesnotendthematter,however.Itisclearunder theleasethatCircuitCityisentitledtocreditagainstits continuingobligationforamountsreceivedbyRockville pursuanttoitsleasewithFoodLion,and,totheextent thereisadisputeastotheamountofcredittowhich CircuitCityisentitled,thatCircuitCityisentitledtoa judicialdeterminationofthatdispute.[***22]Although the1999judgmentmaynotbereopened,andthereisno reasontoreopenit,CircuitCityisnotprecludedfrom seekingpost--judgmentreliefintheCircuitCourttore- solvethedisputeovertheamountofcredittowhichitis entitled. [**984][*345]Becauseitisclearthatthereissuch adispute,weshall,pursuanttoMarylandRule8--604(d), remandthataspectofthecaseforfurtherproceedings and,fortheguidanceofthecourtonremand,shallmake clearourviewthat,althoughdemolitionofthebuilding byFoodLion,pursuanttoitslease,didnotservetotermi- nateCircuitCity'sobligationtocontinuepaymentofrent damages,thecourt,indeterminingthepropercredittobe Page6 376Md.331,*345;829A.2d976,**984; 2003Md.LEXIS466,***22 appliedagainstthatobligation,mustconsiderthefullnet economicbene ttoRockvillefromtheFoodLionlease, inaccordancewithParagraph24oftheRockville--Circuit Citylease. NatureandModi abilityof1999Judgment Rockville's rstcomplaintaboutwhattheCircuit Courtdidin2001isthatthecourthadnoauthorityto modifythe1999judgment.Thatjudgment,accordingto Rockville,was nalwhenentered.Itbecameenrolled thirtydayslater,indefaultofanyappealortimelymotion [***23]toreviseit,and,intheabsenceoffraud,mis- take,orirregularity,whichRockvilledeniesexists,the courthadnojurisdictionthereaftertomodifyit. CircuitCity,ofcourse,hasadifferentview.Itclaims (1)thatthe1999judgmentwasnot nalandthusnever becameenrolled,and(2)that,evenifthejudgment was nal,itwasprocuredbyfraudandthereforewassubject toreopeningunderMarylandRule2--535(b).Insupport ofits rstclaim,CircuitCitytreatsthiscaseashaving beenbifurcatedfortrial,withthe rstphaseinvolvingthe issuesof(1)whetherCircuitCitybreachedtheleasebyva- catingthepremisesandfailingtomaintain reinsurance, (2)whetherRockvillebreachedtheleasebyarbitrarily andwrongfullyrefusingtoapprovetheMARSsublease, and(3)ifthoseissuesweredecidedinRockville'sfavor, whatdamageswereduetoRockvillethroughthedateof trial.Ifthat rstphaseresultedinliabilityonCircuitCity's partunderthesurvivalclauseforthecontinuedpayment ofrentdamages,thesecondphasewoulddeterminethe amountofcredittobeappliedtothatcontinuingobli- gation.Thefactthatthejudgmentorderenteredbythe Circuit[***24]Courtin1999expresslyreservedjuris- dictionto[*346]resolveanydisputeoversuchcredits establishes,inCircuitCity'sview,thatthe1999judgment wasnot nalbutwasinterlocutoryinnature. TheclaimoffraudarisesfromCircuitCity'sassertion thatRockvillewrongfullyfailedtodisclose,inresponseto discovery,certaindocumentsthat,inCircuitCity'sview, establishedthatRockville'srefusaltoapprovetheMARS subleasewaspretextual,whichwasacriticalissueinthe rstproceeding.CircuitCitychargesthatthedeliberate non--disclosureofthosedocumentsconstitutedextrinsic fraud,whichisagroundforreopeninganenrolledjudg- ment,that,ifthenon--disclosuredidnotconstituteextrin- sicfraud,itconstitutedintrinsicfraud,andthatthisCourt shouldabandonitslong--heldviewthatintrinsicfraudis notabasistoreopenanenrolledjudgment. Therequisiteof nalityforajudgmenthasmultiple signi cance.n2If[**985]not nal,eitherintrinsically orpursuanttoadirectionunderMarylandRule2--602(b), therulingisordinarilynotappealable,willnotbein- dexed,doesnotbecomealienonland,doesnotcarry post--judgmentinterest,andremainssubject[***25]to revisionbythecourtuntila naljudgmentisentered.If nal,itissubjecttoamotiontoreviseandtoappeal,but thetimelimitsforthoseavenuesofreliefbeginto[*347] runfromthedateofentry.If nal,itmaynotberevised bythecourtexceptinaccordancewithRules2--533,2-- 534,and2--535. n2Tosomeextent,thereisatleastanambigu- ity,ifnotanear--contradiction,inourjurisprudence regardingthenotionofa" naljudgment."Weoften usethattermordiscourseonwhetheraparticular "judgment"is" nal,"andboththeMarylandRules andtheMarylandCodealsoeitherusetheterm " naljudgment"orspeaktowhena"judgment" is" nal." See Md.Rule2--602(a)(1);Md.Code, §12--301oftheCourts&JudicialProceedings Article. YetMarylandRule1--202(n)de nesthe word"judgment"asanorderofcourt" nalinits nature,"suggestingthatiftheorderisnot nal,itis notajudgmentatall;theadjectivemergeswiththe noun.Underthatnotion,thereisnosuchthingasa non-- naljudgment.Thede nitionalRuleisuseful initsapplication,but,inalogicalsense,itoften begsthequestion.Theissue,inmostinstances,is whethertheorderorrulingindisputehastheat- tributeof nalitynecessaryforittobegiveneffect inthedesiredcontext--appealability,enforceabil- ity,preclusiveeffect,imperviousnesstorevision. Whether,givingheedtoRule1--202(n),weview thequestionintermsofwhethertheorderorruling isactuallyajudgmentorspeakinsteadofwhether itisa naljudgmentissubstantivelyirrelevant. [***26] NeithertheCodenortheRulesde newhenanorder orrulingissuf ciently naltoqualifyasajudgment,per- hapswisely,asitissometimesaveryperplexingproblem. TheSupremeCourthasobservedthat"whetheraruling is' nal'...isfrequentlysocloseaquestionthatdecision ofthatissueeitherwaycanbesupportedwithequally forcefularguments,andthatitisimpossibletodevisea formulatoresolveallmarginalcasescomingwithinwhat mightwellbecalledthe'twilightzone'of nality,"and,in lightofthatdif culty,thatCourtconcludedthat"there- quirementof nalityistobegivena'practicalratherthan atechnicalconstruction.'" Gillespiev.UnitedStatesSteel Corp.,379U.S.148,152,85S.Ct.308,311,13L.Ed. 2d199,203(1964) (quotinginpart Cohenv.Bene cial IndustrialLoanCorp.,337U.S.541,546,69S.Ct.1221, 1226,93L.Ed.1528,1536(1949)) .Wehaveexpressed similarcomments. SeeBrewsterv.WoodhavenBuilding, Page7 376Md.331,*347;829A.2d976,**985; 2003Md.LEXIS466,***26 360Md.602,623,759A.2d738,749(2000) ("Thebarhas hadmoredif cultydetermining nalityandappealabil- itythanwithperhapsanyotherissue"); seealso [***27] CarletonM.Crick, TheFinalJudgmentasaBasisfor Appeal , 41YALEL.J.539,540(1932) . Wehaveestablishedthegeneralcriteriafor nalityby caselaw.In Rohrbeckv.Rohrbeck,318Md.28,41,566 A.2d767,773(1989) ,weheld: "Ifarulingofthecourtistoconstitutea naljudg- ment,itmusthaveatleastthreeattributes:(1)itmustbe intendedbythecourtasanunquali ed, naldisposition ofthematterincontroversy,(2)unlessthecourtproperly actspursuanttoMd.Rule2--602(b),itmustadjudicate orcompletetheadjudicationofallclaimsagainstallpar- ties,and(3)theclerkmustmakeaproperrecordofitin accordancewithMd.Rule2--601."n3 n3Since Rohrbeck wasdecided,oneadditional requirementhasbeenadded.MarylandRule2-- 601(a)requiresthatthejudgmentbesetforthin aseparatedocument. [*348] SeealsoBoardofLiquorv.FellsPointCafe, 344Md.120,129,685A.2d772,776(1996) ; Jonesv. Hubbard,356Md.513,524,740A.2d1004,1010(1999). [***28] Whetherthe rsttwoofthoseconditionsaremetusu- allywilldependonwhatisbeforethecourtforadjudi- cation.Althoughanumberofsub--issueswerepresented, vebasiclegalorfactualissueswerebeforethecourt inthe1999proceeding--twodealingwithliabilityand threewithdamages.Theliabilityissues,submittedtoand resolvedbythejury,were:(1)didCircuitCitybreach theleasebyvacatingthepremisesorbynotmaintaining the reinsurance;and(2)ifso,didRockvillebreachthe leasebywrongfully[**986]withholdingconsenttothe MARSsublease.Inlightofthejury'sverdictsonthose issues,thecourtwasrequiredtodeterminewhatrelief Rockvillewasentitledtoreceive.Asnoted,theparties hadagreedthat,ifthe rsttwoissuesweredecidedin favorofRockville,CircuitCitywouldremainliableun- dertheleasetocontinuepaying,asdamages,theamount ofrentandothercostsreservedintheleaseuntiltheex- pirationoftheleaseterm,subjecttocreditforamounts receivedbyRockvillefromanyre--lettingofthepremises. Thepartiesalsoagreedontheamountofthatobligation throughthedateoftrial.Thatlefttwofurtherissues--the amountofpre--judgment[***29]interestandtheamount ofareasonableattorneys'fee. All veofthoseissueswerenotonlyresolved,but wereincorporatedintothecourt'sjudgmentorder,both intermsoftheamountofmoneydeclaredtobedueto Rockville,whichwasentered,recorded,andindexedasa judgment,andinthecontextofthedeclaratoryjudgment enteredbythecourt.Thecourt'sjudgmentorderdisposed ofeveryissuethenincontroversy--allclaimsagainstall parties--anditisclearfromboththecourt'sinvocation ofMarylandRule2--602(b)which,asweshallexplain, wasunnecessary,andfromitsexpressdeterminationthat theamountdeclaredduewastocarryimmediatepost-- judgmentinterest,thatthecourtintendedtherulingsen- teredonthoseissuestobeimmediatelyenforceable,tobe immediatelyappealable,andthustobe nal. [*349]ThequestionofcreditsagainstCircuitCity's continuingobligation,whichlatertriggeredthecontro- versynowbeforeus,wasnotthenincontentionandcould nothavebeenresolvedbythetrialcourt.Inaccordance withthedualrequestsfordeclaratoryjudgmentandin conformancewiththejury'sverdict,thecourtdeclared thatCircuitCityremainedliablefor[***30]theamount ofrentthatitotherwisewouldhavetopayhadthelease continued.Therewasnoquali cationtothatdeclaration, eventhoughthepartiesandthecourtwereawarethatthe demisedpremisesweretobedemolishedbyFoodLion. TheeffectoftheFoodLionleasewasrelevantonlywith respecttotheamountofcredittowhichCircuitCitymight becomeentitledinthefuture. TheinvocationofMarylandRule2--602(b)andtheex- pressreservationofjurisdictiontoconsideranydisputes overcreditsagainstCircuitCity'scontinuingobligation apparentlyproceededfromtheassumptionthatdisputes mightarisewithrespecttothosecredits.Theprospect ofsuchadisputedoesnotaffectthe nalityoftherul- ingsentered,however,anddidnotwarrantactionunder Rule2--602(b).Indeed,ifacontroversyovercreditswas thenproperlybeforethecourt,theentryofjudgmentun- derRule2--602(b)wouldhavebeeninappropriate,asthat controversywouldhavebeenpartofthecontinuingobli- gationclaimmadebyRockville,andwehavemadeclear thatarulingdisposingofonlypartofaclaimmaynot beenteredasajudgmentunderRule2--602(b). SeeBiro v.Schombert,285Md.290,402A.2d71(1979) ;[***31] Eastv.Gilchrist,293Md.453,445A.2d343(1982) ; MedicalMutualv.Evander,331Md.301,628A.2d170 (1993) . Theproblemhereliesinthetrialcourt'shavingtreated adisputeoverpost--judgmentcreditsasdenigratingthe force,effect,and nalityofthejudgmentitself.Judgments oftendonotendthelitigation.Itisnotuncommon,forex- ample,foraCircuitCourt,inreviewingadecisionofthe DistrictCourtorofanadministrativeagency,toremand Page8 376Md.331,*349;829A.2d976,**986; 2003Md.LEXIS466,***31 thematterforfurtherproceedings.Thedecisionresolves theissuespresentedtotheCircuitCourtandcompletes thedispositionofallthatisthenbeforethatcourt,butit doesnotdetermine[**987]theultimate[*350]dispo- sitionofthematterincontroversy,whichmaywellcome backbeforethecourtinasubsequentproceeding.Yetwe haveconsistentlyheldthatsuchanorderconstitutesa - naljudgment. SeeFerrellv.Benson,352Md.2,720A.2d 583(1998) ; Carrollv.HousingOpportunitiesComm'n, 306Md.515,510A.2d540(1986) ; MontgomeryCounty v.Revere,341Md.366,671A.2d1(1996) . Alsoinpointis Jonesv.Hubbard,supra,356Md. 513,740A.2d1004. [***32]There,thecourtentereda consentjudgmentfor$5,000,withaprovisothatitcould besettleduponpaymentof$2,550within30days.The thirtiethdayfellonaSaturday,andthe$2,550waspaid thefollowingMonday.Whentheplaintiffrefusedtomark thejudgmentsatis ed,thedefendantsoughtinjunctivere- liefandalsotoamendorrevisethejudgment.Weheld thatthejudgmentwas nalunderthe Rohrbeck criteria, eventhoughitleftopenafutureevent.Weconcludedthat, becausethediscountprovisionwaspartofthejudgment, MarylandRule1--203(a),whichdealswiththecomputa- tionoftimeandprovidesthat,ifthelastdayofaperiod fallsonaSaturday,Sunday,orholiday,thatdayisnot countedandthattheperiodextendstothenextdaythat isnotaSaturday,Sunday,orholiday,wasapplicable,and thatthepaymentwasthereforetimelyunderthejudgment. Othercourtshaverecognizedjudgmentsas nal, notwithstandingthattheynotonlyleaveopenbutindeed anticipatethatfurtherproceedingswillberequiredinor- dertoimplementthejudgment.In BrownShoeCo.v. UnitedStates,370U.S.294,82S.Ct.1502,8L.Ed.2d 510(1962) ,anantitrust[***33]action,theDistrictCourt foundthatthemergerinquestionviolatedthe ClaytonAct andordereddivestiture.Theorderdidnotspecifyapar- ticularplanfordivestiture,however,but"reservedsuch arulingpendingthe lingofsuggestedplansforimple- mentingdivestiture." Id.at305,82S.Ct.at1513,8L.Ed. 2dat524 .Notwithstandingthatlooseend,theSupreme Courtheldthattheorderwassuf ciently naltoallow anappeal.TheCourtobservedthattheorder"disposedof theentirecomplaint ledbytheGovernment,"that"full divestiture...wasexpresslyrequired,"andthatthede- fendantwas[*351]permanentlyenjoinedfromhaving anyfutureinterestintheothercompany. Id.at308,82 S.Ct.at1514,8L.Ed.2dat525--26 . SeealsoTrujillov. HiltonofSantaFe,115N.M.397,851P.2d1064(N.M. 1993) ; Thompsonv.Hodge,348S.W.2d11(Mo.Ct.App. 1961) . BoththeMarylandRulesandthelawgenerallycon- templatearangeofpost--judgmentdisputesthatmay comebeforethecourtforresolution.Althoughperhaps morefrequentinequitymatters,wheresomecontinuing supervisionbythecourtmaybenecessary[***34]and furtherordersareexpected,disputesovertheinterpre- tationandenforcementofmoneyjudgmentsarenotun- common.Apartfromproceedingssimplytoenforcethe judgment(discoveryinaidofenforcement,attachments andgarnishmentsofproperty,sequestrationofproperty, providedforinMarylandRules2--633,2--642through 2--644,2--645and2--646,and2--648),proceedingsmay arisefromdisputesoverset--offs,agreementstosettlea judgment( seeMillerv.HavredeGraceB.&T.Co., 186Md.678,48A.2d433(1946)) ,orwhetherajudg- menthasbeensatis ed.Inthosekindsofproceedings, thecourtmayenterordersthatnotonlyalterordetermine thedebtor'sobligationunderthejudgmentbut,insome instances,affectthejudgmentitself,yettheprospectof suchorders,oreventhecontemplationofthem,doesnot destroythe nalityofthejudgmentuponwhichtheyare based. ItiscleartousthatthejudgmententeredinAugust, 1999was nalwhenentered,thatitbecameenrolled30 days[**988]later,andthatitwasnotsubjecttomod- i cationthereafterexceptinaccordancewithMaryland Rule2--535(b),forfraud,mistake,orirregularity.Asan alternativeargument[***35]insupportofthecourt's modi cationofthejudgment,CircuitCityurgesthatthere was,indeed,fraud,emanatingfromRockville'srefusalto disclosetwoletterswrittenduringitsnegotiationswith FoodLion.CircuitCitynowcontendsthatRockville's failuretoproducethose"relevantanddiscoverabledocu- ments"preventedCircuitCityfromintroducingthemto supportitscaseinthe1999trial. [*352]TheCircuitCourtdidnot ndanyfraud anddidnotbaseitsreopeningofthejudgmentonfraud, and,aswehaveindicated,therewasnofraud.Theissueof whetherdocumentspertainingtoRockville'snegotiations withFoodLionwerediscoverablewasraisedinCircuit City'sJune,1999motiontoreopendiscovery.CircuitCity sought"alldocumentsrelatingtotheFoodLionlease,in- cludingthenegotiationthereof,"assertingthatdiscovery ofthosedocumentswas"essentialtotheprosecutionof CircuitCity'scaseandtothedefenseofthecounter--claim broughtby[Rockville]."Thecourtdeniedthatmotion, however, ndingthatthosedocumentswerenotrelevant toanyissuetoberesolvedattheAugust,1999trial.Once judgmentwasenteredagainstit,CircuitCitychosenotto appeal[***36]thecourt'srulingonitsdiscoverymotion, asitcouldhavedone.Theeffectoftherulingwasthatthe documentswerenotdiscoverableandwerenotrelevant. Withholdingthemcouldnot,therefore,beregardedeven asviolativeofdiscovery,muchlessasfraudulent.There was,accordingly,noauthorityforthetrialcourttoreopen Page9 376Md.331,*352;829A.2d976,**988; 2003Md.LEXIS466,***36 andmodifytheAugust,1999judgment. TerminationofCircuitCity'sContinuing Obligation AlthoughCircuitCity,by lingamotiontomodifyor vacatethe1999judgment,invokedaninappropriatepro- ceduretopresentitsclaimthatdemolitionofthedemised premisesterminateditsobligationunderthatjudgment, andthecourterredinentertainingsuchamotion,Circuit Cityisentitled,underboththeleaseandthe1999judg- ment,tocreditagainstitscontinuingobligationfor"the netamountofrentreceivedby[Rockville],afterdeduc- tionforallactualandreasonableexpensesincurredinre-- lettingtheDemisedPremises...andincollectingtherent inconnectiontherewith."Totheextentthereisadispute astotheamountofsuchcredit,asclearlythereis,Circuit Cityisentitledtoajudicialresolutionofthatdispute, and,[***37]tothatend,andintheinterestofjudicial economy,weshalldirectthatthecaseberemandedtothe CircuitCourtforappropriatefurtherproceedings. [*353]ThekeyissuepresentedbyCircuitCityis whether,byallowingFoodLiontodemolishthedemised premises,Rockvillesomehowforfeitedorwaiveditsright tocontinuedrentdamagesfromCircuitCity.TheCourt ofSpecialAppealsaddressedandruleduponthatissue, and,fortheguidanceoftheCircuitCourt,weshalldo likewise. See Md.Rule8--604(d). Atcommonlaw,alandlordhadthreeoptionswhen atenantabandonedacommercialleasepriortoitsex- piration.Onewastoacceptasurrenderofthelease andtherebyterminatethetenancy.TheRESTATEMENT (SECOND)OFPROPERTY§12.1notesthatanaban- donmentofthepremisesmaybetreatedasanofferby thetenanttosurrenderthelease,whichthelandlordmay acceptbyreenteringthepremisesforthelandlord'sown bene t.Ifthelandlord,expresslyorbyitsconduct,ac- ceptstheimpliedofferandeffectsasurrender,thetenancy isterminatedandthetenant'sobligationtopayfurtherrent [**989]isalsoterminated.Thelandlordmay,asasecond option,reenterthepremisesfor[***38]theaccountofthe tenant,attempttore--letthepropertyforthetenant'sbene- t,andholdthetenantliableforanyrentthathadaccrued atthetimeofthereentryaswellasanyfuturede ciency ifthepremiseswereunabletobere--letorwerere--letata lowerrentthanwasreservedunderthelease.Finally,un- derthetraditionalcommonlawrule,thelandlordcoulddo nothingandholdthetenantliablefortheentireamount ofrentpayableduringtheremainingtermofthelease. SeeWilsonv.Ruhl,277Md.607,610,356A.2d544,546 (1976) ; seealso 3HERBERTTHORNDIKETIFFANY, THELAWOFREALPROPERTY§902(3ded.1939 and2002Supp.). In1974,theLegislature,bystatute,effectivelyabro- gatedthatthirdoptionwithrespecttoresidentialleases byrequiringresidentiallandlordstomitigatedamages thatresultfromatenant'sterminationofoccupancybe- foretheendoftheterm. See MarylandCode, §8--207of theRealPropertyArticle. Morecontemporarycommon lawhassoughttoachievethesameresultwithrespectto commercialleases.Friedmannotesthat: [*354]"underthemodernrulelandlordmaynotre- mainidlewhen[***39]thetenantabandonsthepremises withoutlegalexcuseforsodoing.Hemustmakeaneffort tomitigatehisdamagesasaconditionofrecoveryagainst thetenant,inthiscasebyendeavoringtorelet." 2MILTONR.FRIEDMAN,FRIEDMANONLEASES §16.3,at1084(4thed.1997)andcasescitedthere. Compare RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFPROPERTY §12.1cmt. i, at391--92(1977),recitingthemoretradi- tionalrule:"Atenantwhoabandonsleasedpropertyis notentitledtoinsistonactionbythelandlordtomitigate thedamages,absentanagreementotherwise." Itisnotnecessaryforustoresolvethatissueinthis casebecauseitisclearthat,inresponsetoCircuitCity's abandonment,Rockvilledid,indeed,acceptasurrenderof thelease.OnMarch31,1998,itinformedCircuitCitythat itwas"terminatingtheLeaseeffectiveimmediately,"that Rockvillehad"re--enteredandrepossessedtheDemised Premiseseffectivethisdate,"andthatCircuitCityhad "norightorauthoritytoenteruponorattempttocon- veyanyinterestintheDemisedPremises."Thataction, supplementedinAugust,1998,byitssuccessfulquest forapartialsummaryjudgmentcon rmingthatthelease had[***40]beenterminatedandthatCircuitCityhad nopossessoryinterestinthepremises,clearlyeffecteda surrenderoftheleaseandaterminationofthetenancy.It thereforechosethe rstofthethreeoptionsandnotthe third. Whenthereisasurrenderofthelease,thelandlord becomesfreeofthetenancyandmayagaindealwiththe propertyunfetteredbyit.Ontheotherhand,becausea surrenderterminatesthetenancy,thetenant'sobligation topayrentceases.Togaintheadvantageofasurrender butavoidthatconsequence,landlordsbegantoinsertin leasesprovisionssimilartothatcontainedinparagraph24 oftheleasehere,makingthetenantliablefortheamounts ofrentreservedinthelease,notwithstandinganyentryor terminationbythelandlorduponthetenant'sdefault,and torelyoncontractlaw,ratherthanpropertylaw,forthe enforcementof[*355]thatobligation.That,inturn,rests ontheproposition,thatwehaveembraced,thataleaseis bothacontractandaconveyanceofaleaseholdestatein land,that,assuch,itcreatesbetweenthepartiesbothpriv- Page10 376Md.331,*355;829A.2d976,**989; 2003Md.LEXIS466,***40 ityofcontractandprivityofestate,andthat,asaresult, "theobligationswhichthepartiesbeartoeach[***41] othermayariseoutofcontractorfromtherealcovenants oftheleaseholdestate,orsometimesfromboth." Arthur Treacher'sv.ChillumTer.,272Md.720,727,327A.2d 282,286(1974) . [**990]Theinclusionofsuchaprovisionoftenshifts thefocusawayfromwhetheracompletedsurrenderoc- curred,because,evenifitdid,thetenantmayremain liablefortheamountofrentreservedintheleaseasa matterofcontractlaw.Thedifferenceisthattheclaimis notforthepost--surrenderrentitselfwhich,underprop- ertylaw,isnolongerowed,butfordamagesarisingfrom breachofthecontract. SeeZazanisv.GoldCoastMall,63 Md.App.364,370,492A.2d953,956(1985) andcases citedthere; seealsoHermitageCo.v.Levine,248N.Y. 333,162N.E.97(N.Y.1928) ("[once]theleasewasatan end...whatsurvivedwasaliability,notforrent,butfor damages"); Hartv.VermontInv.Ltd.Partnership,667 A.2d578(D.C.1995) ; N.J.Ind.Propertiesv.Y.C.&V.L., Inc.,100N.J.432,495A.2d1320(N.J.1985) ; P.S.G. Ltd.v.AugustIncome/GrowthFund,115N.M.579,855 P.2d1043(N.M.1993) ;[***42] Winshallv.AmpcoAuto Parks,Inc.,417F.Supp.334(E.D.Mich.1976) . Ineithercase,whetherseekingtorecoverrentunder propertycovenantsonthetheorythatasurrenderhasnot occurredortorecovercontractdamagesundercontract law,thelandlordhasitsownobligationtomitigatedam- ages.Wehaverecognizedgenerallythat,whenoneparty breachesacontract,theotherpartyisrequiredbythe "avoidableconsequences"ruleofdamagestomakeall reasonableeffortstominimizethelosssustainedfromthe breachandcanchargethedefaultingpartyonlywithsuch damagesas,"withreasonableendeavorsandexpenseand withoutriskofadditionalsubstantiallossorinjury,he couldnotprevent." SergeantCo. [*356] v.Pickett,285 Md.186,203,401A.2d651,660(1979) .Thatprinciple appliesaswelltodamagesresultingfromatenant'saban- donmentofleasedpremises. See FRIEDMAN, supra § 16.303,at1115--16: "Ithasalreadybeennotedthatwhenatenantwalksout duringthetermthelandlordgenerallyneednotreletunder thetraditionalcommonlawrule.Thisisaruleofproperty law.Iftheleasehasbeenterminatedandtheclaimisfor [***43]damages,thelawofcontractsbecomesapplica- ble.Fromnowonthelandlordmustendeavortoreletand minimizehisdamages,thatis,asaconditionprecedent torecoveryagainsttheoriginaltenant." CircuitCityaversthat,whenalandlord,followinga surrender,takesaction"inconsistentwiththenotionofa relettingattheexpenseoftheformertenant,butinstead entirelydemolishestheformerpremises...theprotection ofasurvivalclauseiswaived."Onthatpremise,itargues thattheissueisnolongeroneofcreditsbutofan ipso facto extinguishmentofanyliabilityunderparagraph24 ofthelease.Thatisnotcorrect,andthecasescitedby CircuitCitydonotsupportitsposition.n4In[**991] Wilsonv.Ruhl,supra,277Md.at610--11,356 [*357] A.2dat546--47 ,weconcludedthatthedutyofaland- lordtomitigateitsdamagesuponadefaultbythetenant requiresonlythatthelandlord"exercisereasonabledili- genceinanefforttoobtainanewtenant,"andthat,when thereisadisputeoverthematter,"itisnormallylefttothe trieroffactstodeterminewhetherthelandlord'sefforts toreletsatis edhisdutytomitigate." n4CircuitCityreliesheavilyon P.S.G.Ltd. v.AugustIncome/GrowthFund,supra,855P.2d 1043 .Theleaseinquestioncontainedacontinuing obligationclausethatrequiredthetenanttopay, asliquidateddamages,theamountofmonthlyrent speci edinthelease,butalsorequiredtheland- lordtouseitsbestefforttomitigatealldamages andtore--letthepremisesintheeventofade- faultbythetenant.Theleasewassubordinateto amortgageonthepremises,uponwhichtheland- lorddefaulted.Themortgagewasforeclosedand thepropertysold.That,saidthecourt,precluded thelandlordfromperformingitsobligationtore-- letthepremisesandmitigatedamages,andthus limiteditsrighttotheliquidateddamages.Theob- viousdistinctionbetweenthatcaseandthisoneis thatdemolitionofthebuildingaspartoftheFood Lionleasehas,innoway,precludedRockvillefrom mitigatingdamages.Rockvilleacknowledgesthat CircuitCityisentitledtocreditfornetamounts receivedfromFoodLion.Theonlyissueishow tocalculatethosecredits.In MesillaValleyMall v.CrownIndustries,111N.M.663,808P.2d633 (N.M.1991) ,thetenantdefaulted,thelandlordre- sumedpossession,and,insteadofattemptingto mitigatedamages,itallowedamuseumtooccupy thepropertyrent--free.Thecourtregardedthatas acceptingasurrenderoftheleaseand,astherewas apparentlynoprovisionforcontinuedpayments followingasurrender,heldthattheobligationfor rentceaseduponthetermination.Thecourtacted solelyonthebasisofpropertylaw.Thatsituation prevailedaswellinsomeoftheothercasescitedby CircuitCity. SeeMichiganLafayetteBuildingCo. v.ContinentalBank,261Mich.256,246N.W.53 (Mich.1933) ; Meekerv.Spalsbury,66N.J.L.60, 48A.1026(N.J.1901) .OnecasecitedbyCircuit City-- NorthernIndianaSteelSupplyCompanyv. Chrisman,139Ind.App.27,204N.E.2d668(Ind. Ct.App.1965) --wasmodi edonthisverypoint Page11 376Md.331,*357;829A.2d976,**991; 2003Md.LEXIS466,***43 byasubsequentdecisionnotcitedbyCircuitCity, Nylenv.ParkDoralApartments,535N.E.2d178, 181--82(Ind.Ct.App.1989) . [***44] Onremand,thecourtwillneed, rst,toexaminethe effortsmadebyRockvilleto ndanewtenant,inlight ofCircuitCity'sconduct,anddeterminewhetherthear- rangementwithFoodLionwasreasonable.Ifthecourt determinesthatRockville'seffortsandthearrangement withFoodLionwerenotreasonable,itmay,onthatbasis, concludethatRockvillebreacheditscontractualobliga- tiontomitigatedamagesandthat,fromandafterthetime ofthatbreach,itwasentitledtonofurtherpaymentsfrom CircuitCity.IfthecourtconcludesthatRockvilledidex- ercisereasonablediligenceandthat,inthecircumstances, thearrangementwithFoodLionwasreasonable,itwill thenhavetodetermine,fromthatarrangement,"thenet amountofrentreceivedbyLandlord,afterdeductionfor allactualandreasonableexpensesincurredinre--letting theDemisedPremises...." CircuitCitymakesanadditionalargumentinits briefthat,bysubstantiallyalteringthedemisedpremises, Rockvillehasmadeitimpossibletocalculateitsdam- ages,therebyrelievingCircuitCityfromanycontinuing liability.Itrelies,forthatproposition,on MarcoKona Warehousev.Sharmilo,Inc.,7Haw.App.383,768P.2d 247(Haw.Ct.App.1989). [***45]Thatcaseisinappo- site. [*358]In Marco ,thedefendantleasedthreebaysin a12--baywarehouse.Whenitabandonedthosebays,the landlordre--letthemtoanothertenantinthesameware- house.Thebaysvacatedbythattenantwerethenre--letto athirdtenantfromthewarehouse.Initsactionfordam- agesagainstthedefendant,thelandlordsoughtrecovery forlostrentonthebaysvacatedbythesecondtenantin orderto llthevacancyleftbythedefendant.TheHawaii courtheldthatthedefendantwasnotliableforthoseother "vacanciesofspacewhichitneitherleasednorconsented tobeliablefor." Id.at252 . Marco isneitherbindingnor applicablehere.Rockvillehasnotsoughtdamagesfor vacanciesthatFoodLionmayhaveleftinmovingtothe CircuitCitylocation. IncalculatingtheamountofcredittowhichCircuit Citymaybeentitled,thecourtwillneedtoexaminea numberofthings,amongwhichare:(1)theamountof rentreceivedfromFoodLion;(2)whether,andtowhat extent,thatamountshouldbemodi edbythefactthat theareaoftheleasedpremisesisgreaterthanthatrented byCircuitCity--whether,inotherwords,thereshouldbe someapportionment;[***46](3)what,ifany,netbene- taccruedtoRockvillefromtheimprovements[**992] madebyFoodLionorfromotherprovisionsintheFood Lionlease;and(4)whateffect,ifany,shouldbegivento theterminationoftheotherthreeleases.Thesedetermi- nationsmayrequiresomeexpertaccountingoreconomic evidence,buttheydonotstrikeusasbeingimpossible tomake. SeeDodsonv.AnneArundelCounty,294Md. 490,494--95,451A.2d317,320(1982) ("Thejurymay properlyconsidervariouselementsthatin uencemarket valueatthetimeofthetakinginitsdeterminationof damages...[including]improvementsontheland."); J.L.Matthews,Inc.v.Maryland--Nat'lCapitalPark& PlanningComm'n,368Md.71,107--09,792A.2d288, 309--10(2002) (holdingthat,indeterminingacompensa- tionawardforagovernmentaltaking,thepetitionerwas entitledtopresentevidenceofthefairmarketvalueof hisproperty,includingthevalueofimprovementsthathe wouldhavemadehadhenotbeenprohibitedfromdoing sobyaninjunction). [*359]JUDGMENTOFCOURTOFSPECIAL APPEALSREVERSED;CASEREMANDEDTO THATCOURTWITHINSTRUCTIONSTOREVERSE JUDGMENTOFCIRCUITCOURT[***47]FOR MONTGOMERYCOUNTYANDREMAND THECASETOTHATCOURTFORFURTHER PROCEEDINGSINCONFORMANCEWITHTHIS OPINION.COSTSINTHISCOURTANDCOURTOF SPECIALAPPEALSTOBEPAIDBYPETITIONER, CIRCUITCITY.

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