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Horacio and Carlos Vignali Were Never Considered by Sheriff Baca, U.S.<br><br> Attorney Mayorkas, or the Clinton White House................................................................................43 ii C. The White House 9s Review of the Vignali Clemency Request.......................................45 1. Hugh Rodham 9s Hiring.........................................................................................46 2.<br><br> Hugh Rodham 9s Initial Approach to the White House.........................................48 3. The Justice Department 9s Input on the Vignali Case............................................50 4. The Final Decision on the Vignali Commutation................................................53 a.<br><br> Contacts Between the White House and Interested Parties.....................53 b. Contacts Between the White House and Hugh Rodham.........................55 c. Hugh Rodham 9s Invocation of First Lady Hillary Clinton......................56 d.<br><br> The President 9s Decision to Grant the Commutation..............................57 5. The White House Has No Justification for the Vignali Commutation................58 D. The Aftermath of the Vignali Commutation....................................................................62 1.<br><br> The Response of Hugh Rodham..........................................................................62 2. The Florida Bar 9s cInvestigation d of Hugh Rodham...........................................64 3. The Message Sent by the Vignali Commutation.................................................65 II.<br><br> THE PARDON OF A. GLENN BRASWELL.................................................................67 A. Braswell 9s History of Misconduct...................................................................................67 B.<br><br> Consideration of the Braswell Pardon by the Clinton White House...............................70 III. HUGH RODHAM 9S EFFORTS TO OBTAIN CLEMENCY FOR THE LUMS..........74 A. Background on Gene and Nora Lum...............................................................................74 B.<br><br> Hugh Rodham Approaches the White House About the Possibility of a Pardon for the Lums........................................................................................................................... ......75 IV. FAILURE OF KEY PARTIES TO COOPERATE IN THE HUGH RODHAM INVESTIGATION...........................................................................................................77 A.<br><br> Hugh Rodham................................................................................................................. .77 B. Horacio and Carlos Vignali..............................................................................................78 C.<br><br> James Casso................................................................................................................. ....78 D. Glenn Braswell..............................................................................................................<br><br> ...79 E. Kendall Coffey.............................................................................................................. ...79 F.<br><br> Gene and Nora Lum.........................................................................................................79 G. Nicole Lum.................................................................................................................. ....80 1 FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE Hugh Rodham 9s Involvement in the Vignali Commutation Vignali 9s clemency petition was false and misleading.<br><br> l Carlos Vignali lied in his clemency petition. First, he continued to maintain his innocence, despite overwhelming evidence of his involvement in selling a substantial amount of cocaine across state lines and a specific finding by the sentencing judge that he lied at trial about his involvement in a large drug distribution network. Second, Vignali claimed that he was a first-time offender, despite the fact that he had a prior criminal record.<br><br> By not accepting responsibility for his crime and lying about his background, he should not have been eligible for executive clemency. Vignali 9s supporters provided letters of support that were false and misleading. l A key element of the campaign by Carlos Vignali and his father Horacio, was a series of letters on Carlos 9 behalf from prominent Los Angeles politicians.<br><br> A number of these letters contained misleading statements calculated to create the impression that Carlos Vignali was innocent. The officials who submitted letters included Representative Xavier Becerra, Representative Esteban Torres, State Assembly Speaker Robert Hertzberg, State Assembly Member Antonio Villaraigosa, State Senator Richard Polanco, Los Angeles County Supervisor Gloria Molina, Los Angeles City Councilmember Mike Hernandez, and Cardinal Roger Mahony, Archbishop of Los Angeles. Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca provided critical support for the Vignali commutation that was inappropriate, given his position.<br><br> l Sheriff Baca had a close relationship with Horacio Vignali that was based on Vignali 9s political and financial support for Baca. Sheriff Baca has known Horacio Vignali since 1991, and Vignali has been a key political supporter of Baca, giving him at least $11,000 in contributions, and raising between $60,000-$70,000 more. l Sheriff Baca spoke with the White House in support of the Vignali commutation.<br><br> In January 2001, Baca received a telephone call from Hugh Rodham in which Rodham told Baca that he would get a call from the White House about Horacio Vignali. Shortly thereafter, Baca received a call from White House staff and spoke in support of Horacio Vignali. Based on Baca 9s statements in this telephone call, White House staff clearly and justifiably concluded that Baca supported the commutation of Carlos Vignali 9s sentence.<br><br> l Sheriff Baca continues to claim, without any basis, that he did not support the Vignali commutation. Rather than express regret for his role in the Vignali commutation, Sheriff Baca maintains that he opposed the Vignali commutation, and did nothing that could have been interpreted as support for the commutation. However, Sheriff Baca 9s supposed opposition to the Vignali commutation does not square with the fact that: (1) he drafted a 2 letter that he believed Horacio Vignali would use in the clemency effort and (2) when he was asked squarely by the White House if the President should commute Vignali 9s prison sentence, he stated that it was cthe President 9s decision to make, d rather than express his opposition.<br><br> These facts, and others outlined in this report, indicate that Sheriff Baca wanted to support the Vignali commutation, but was afraid of creating a paper record that would clearly indicate his support. l Sheriff Baca 9s efforts on behalf of the Vignalis are even more inappropriate given that there were extensive allegations that Horacio Vignali, Carlos 9 father, was also involved in illegal drug trafficking. It is inappropriate enough for a senior law enforcement official like Baca to support a grant of clemency for an unrepentant, large-scale drug dealer like Carlos Vignali.<br><br> However, when coupled with credible allegations indicating that Horacio Vignali was a drug dealer, and in fact was the source of cocaine supply for his son, Baca 9s support of Horacio and Carlos Vignali is even more inappropriate. U.S. Attorney Alejandro Mayorkas provided critical support for the Vignali commutation that was inappropriate, given his position.<br><br> l U.S. Attorney Alejandro Mayorkas called the White House in support of the Vignali commutation. Mayorkas, the top federal prosecutor in Los Angeles, was asked by Horacio Vignali to call the White House in support of his son 9s clemency petition.<br><br> Mayorkas then called the White House about the Vignali commutation. While Mayorkas does not recall the details of his conversation, he now concedes that his call conveyed support for the Vignali commutation. l Mayorkas supported the Vignali commutation despite his ignorance of the facts of the case and his knowledge that the prosecutors responsible for the Vignali case opposed clemency.<br><br> Before he called the White House, Mayorkas had spoken twice with Todd Jones, the U.S. Attorney responsible for the Vignali case. Jones told Mayorkas that Vignali was a cmajor player d in drug trafficking, that he was cbad news d and that Mayorkas should not cgo there d when it came to Vignali.<br><br> Despite these warnings from a prosecutor who was intimately familiar with the Vignali case, Mayorkas still called the White House in support of the Vignali commutation. l Mayorkas 9 support for the Vignali commutation was inappropriate. Mayorkas knew little about the Vignali case.<br><br> What he did know indicated that Carlos Vignali was an unrepentant, large-scale criminal. These facts alone make his support for the commutation, as a senior federal prosecutor, totally inappropriate. There are a number of allegations that both Horacio and Carlos Vignali were involved in illegal drug trafficking.<br><br> l There are allegations that, in addition to his son, Horacio Vignali was involved in illegal drug trafficking, and that Carlos Vignali was involved in drug trafficking far beyond the conduct that led to his conviction in Minnesota. DEA reports documenting these allegations include the following statements: 3 c[Horacio Vignali] negotiated with ATF agents to sell a machine gun and stated to them that he had also smuggled heroin into the United States utilizing automobiles. d c[Redacted] has also purchased cocaine from Carlos Vignali Jr. of Los Angeles & Vignali 9s father Carlos Vignali aka cpops d owns a body shop, at 1260 Figueroa and is the source of supply for his son. d cCarlos Horatio Vignali 9s role in [George Torres 9 drug dealing] organization is relatively unknown at this time.<br><br> It is believed that Vignali functions as a financial partner in the organization. d l These DEA reports are corroborated by law enforcement personnel who indicate that they had received information indicating that both Horacio and Carlos Vignali were involved in large-scale drug trafficking. These charges have never been formally made in court or substantiated by physical evidence. However, the mere existence of such allegations should have precluded senior law enforcement and political officials from supporting a commutation for Carlos Vignali on the strength of his father 9s reputation.<br><br> Nonetheless, it appears that no one checked with the DEA prior to granting the commutation. Hugh Rodham provided false and misleading information to the White House in support of the Vignali commutation. l Hugh Rodham was paid $204,200 for his work on the Vignali commutation.<br><br> It appears that, in return for this money, he worked part-time for two months gathering materials in support of Vignali 9s case and making telephone calls to White House staff. It appears that Rodham 9s payment in the Vignali matter was contingent upon his success, as he received the $200,000 payment on January 24, 2001, after President Clinton granted clemency to Vignali. l Rodham repeatedly provided false information during his communications with the White House.<br><br> First, and most importantly, Rodham told Bruce Lindsey that the trial attorney who prosecuted Vignali supported the commutation. This was completely false. Second, Rodham told Lindsey that Vignali was a first-time offender when, in fact, he had two prior convictions and two other arrests.<br><br> Rodham also told Lindsey that Vignali cdid not play a major role in the offense d when, in fact, Vignali was a major source of cocaine for the Minnesota drug-dealing ring at issue in his case. Hugh Rodham told the White House that First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton was aware of his lobbying efforts and that the Vignali commutation was cvery important d to her. l Hugh Rodham told White House staff that the Vignali commutation was cvery important to him and the First Lady as well as others. d This statement is confirmed by the independent recollection of the White House staffer who spoke to Rodham as well as the note that she took contemporaneously.<br><br> Rodham 9s statement raises two possibilities: first, that the First 4 Lady was aware of and approved of Hugh Rodham 9s lobbying efforts; or, second, that Hugh Rodham was lying to White House staff regarding the First Lady 9s knowledge of his efforts. The White House sought the opinion of powerful Los Angeles political figures, but failed to consult with the prosecutors or judge who understood the Vignali case. l White House staff engaged in telephone conversations with a number of outside individuals regarding the Vignali case 3 Hugh Rodham, Lee Baca, and Alejandro Mayorkas, none of whom knew very much about the Vignali case.<br><br> It appears that key White House staff gave great weight to the input provided by Rodham, Baca, and Mayorkas, even though they knew little about the case and had mixed motives. l White House staff failed to reach out to the prosecutors who had convicted Vignali or the judge who sentenced him. White House staff justified their failure to take this simple action by concluding that they knew that the prosecutors and judge would object, so there was no need to speak to them.<br><br> However, if the White House had spoken to Todd Jones, Denise Reilly, Andrew Dunne, or Judge David Doty, they would have learned that Carlos Vignali: (1) was not a small-time drug dealer; (2) was unrepentant about his criminal activity; and (3) never cooperated with law enforcement by telling them who supplied him cocaine. The White House ignored the strenuous objections to the Vignali commutation that were lodged by the Pardon Attorney. l The Pardon Attorney provided the White House with a report that contained his recommendation against granting the Vignali commutation.<br><br> This report contained a number of powerful arguments against the commutation, which were apparently ignored by the White House. The existence of the Pardon Attorney 9s report means that the White House cannot claim that it was totally unaware that Vignali 9s arguments were completely false. The White House knew that the Vignali clemency petition had no merit, yet decided to grant the commutation anyway.<br><br> President Clinton 9s decision raises questions about why the Vignali commutation was granted. Rodham has apparently misled the public about returning to the Vignalis those fees he received in connection with the clemency and ignored former President and Senator Clinton 9s request that he do so. l On February 21, 2001, at the request of former President Clinton and Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, Rodham promised to return to Horacio Vignali the legal fees he received in connection with the Vignali clemency.<br><br> But, as of June 2001, Rodham had apparently returned only about $50,000 of the money that Horacio Vignali paid him. Rodham 9s attorney has confirmed to Committee staff that Rodham has not returned any additional amounts and has no plans to return the remaining $154,000. 5 Hugh Rodham 9s Involvement in the Braswell Pardon Glenn Braswell was under investigation by multiple federal agencies and several state attorneys general when the pardon was granted.<br><br> l Over the past two decades, Braswell has created a dietary supplement empire using false advertising to mislead consumers. After serving time in prison for mail fraud and tax evasion in 1983, Braswell has continued to defraud consumers about the benefits of his herbal remedies. In addition to facing numerous lawsuits, Braswell 9s companies have been investigated by the Internal Revenue Service, Federal Trade Commission, Food and Drug Administration, and Better Business Bureau.<br><br> l Unsurprisingly, Braswell was under another criminal investigation by federal prosecutors for a massive tax evasion and money-laundering scheme when he was pardoned. Braswell 9s petition bypassed the traditional route through the Justice Department and went directly to the White House. If the FBI had conducted a background investigation instead of the White House, Braswell 9s petition would have been rejected quickly.<br><br> Braswell paid Hugh Rodham $230,000 for successfully obtaining the pardon. l Braswell hired Rodham to support his pardon petition for $230,000. For this price, Rodham claims he forwarded a letter of support for Braswell to the White House Counsel 9s Office and made a follow-up inquiry.<br><br> According to Rodham, these two actions were the extent of his role in the Braswell pardon. Rodham refunded the $230,000 to Braswell after facing widespread criticism from the media and members of both political parties. Hugh Rodham 9s Efforts to Obtain Clemency for the Lums Gene and Nora Lum, prominent Democratic contributors and fundraisers, were convicted of making illegal conduit contributions and tax offenses.<br><br> l In 1997, the Lums pleaded guilty to making $50,000 in illegal conduit contributions to the DNC. They were sentenced to home detention, confinement in a halfway house and a $30,000 fine. In August 1998, Gene Lum pleaded guilty to tax fraud for filing tax returns claiming more than $7.1 million in false deductions and was sentenced to two years imprisonment.<br><br> The Lums attempted to obtain executive clemency through Hugh Rodham. l Hugh Rodham lobbied the White House as part of the Lums 9 efforts but failed to secure them a grant of clemency . In December 2000, Nora Lum called one of her husband's criminal attorneys and asked him to send various documents to Hugh Rodham at the White House.<br><br> He did so. In early January 2001, Rodham called Gene Lum 9s attorney again and asked him to resend those documents directly to, among others, Meredith Cabe, an associate White House counsel responsible for clemency matters. Subsequently, Rodham telephoned Cabe and discussed the merits of the Lums 9 pardon request.<br><br> Cabe then told White House Counsel 6 Beth Nolan and Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey about her discussion with Rodham. Both told Cabe that the Lums were not going to receive clemency. The Lums and Hugh Rodham have refused to cooperate with the Committee 9s investigation.<br><br> l Gene and Nora Lum have refused to cooperate with the Committee 9s investigation. The Lums 9 daughter, Nicole (with whom Hugh Rodham apparently had some sort of business relationship), has likewise declined to be interviewed by the Committee. Hugh Rodham has also refused to cooperate with the Committee 9s request for an interview.<br><br> Therefore, the Committee is unable to obtain a full understanding of the Lums 9 efforts to obtain executive clemency and Rodham's role in those efforts. INTRODUCTION Unlike Roger Clinton, Hugh Rodham was highly successful in leveraging his relationship with the President and First Lady into lucrative work lobbying for grants of clemency. The Committee is aware of three cases in which Hugh Rodham lobbied the White House for grants of executive clemency: Carlos Vignali, Glenn Braswell, and Gene and Nora Lum.<br><br> Rodham was successful in two of these cases and was paid over $430,000 for his work. Simply put, Rodham inappropriately used his access to the White House to lobby for grants of clemency, which were not deserved and would not have been granted but for his intervention. Carlos Vignali was a supplier of cocaine to a major drug-dealing ring in Minnesota who never admitted his guilt or cooperated with law enforcement.<br><br> Yet, because of Hugh Rodham 9s efforts, he had his sentence cut from 15 to 5 years. Glenn Braswell was a highly successful con artist who had his earlier fraud conviction erased despite that he was under active investigation for tax fraud at the time of the pardon. The fact that Vignali and Braswell received clemency from President Clinton through the efforts of Hugh Rodham undermines public confidence in the President 9s exercise of the clemency power and in the equality of our laws.<br><br> I. THE CARLOS VIGNALI COMMUTATION A. The Case Against Carlos Vignali On December 20, 1993, a federal grand jury in Minnesota issued a 34-count indictment against 30 defendants.<br><br> The indictment resulted from the largest drug investigation in Minnesota history. 1 According to the indictment, Carlos Vignali and his co-defendants sent large quantities of cocaine to Minnesota by mail from California, converted it to crack, and distributed it quickly on the street. 2 Vignali was indicted on one count of conspiring to distribute cocaine; two counts of using facilities in interstate commerce with the intent to promote a business enterprise involving narcotics; and one count of illegally using a communication facility to facilitate the 1 Superceding Indictment, U.S.<br><br> v. Vignali (D. Minn.<br><br> Dec. 30, 1993) (Exhibit 1). See also Drug ring case wrapped up with 2 convicted, 1 acquitted , S TAR T RIB .<br><br> (Minneapolis-St. Paul) Dec. 13, 1994, at 2B.<br><br> 2 Id. Superceding Indictment, U.S. v.<br><br> Vignali (D. Minn. Dec.<br><br> 30, 1993) (Exhibit 1). 7 distribution of cocaine. 3 According to the government, Vignali and his associates sold a kilogram of crack a day as late as November 1993.<br><br> 4 The investigation that resulted in Vignali 9s conviction began locally with a probe of Gerald and Shirley Williams, who were suspected of distributing cocaine. 5 As the scope of the investigation expanded, Minneapolis narcotics authorities obtained the assistance of federal law enforcement agencies. 6 Based on information obtained from confidential informants and other sources, authorities initiated a court-ordered wiretap of several residential and cellular telephones to monitor calls to and from Gerald Williams regarding cocaine distribution.<br><br> 7 Many of the intercepted conversations to and from Williams 9 residential and cellular telephones involved coded language and had to be interpreted by investigating officers. 8 In the course of its wiretap surveillance, authorities intercepted telephone conversations between Vignali and others during which cocaine shipments to Minnesota were discussed. 9 Authorities ultimately learned that Williams 9 original supplier of cocaine in California was Dale Evans, who in turn obtained his supply from Jonathan Gray and, later, Carlos Vignali.<br><br> 10 The evidence obtained in the investigation indicated a broad level of involvement by Vignali in a multi-state conspiracy to distribute cocaine. 11 In that context, authorities discovered that, in October 1993, Vignali sold a substantial quantity of cocaine to Todd Hopson in Los Angeles for distribution in the Minnesota area 12 and supplied an additional six kilograms of cocaine to Minnesota-area distributors through use of the mails and the telephone. 13 On November 9, 1993, Minnesota law enforcement executed warrants on several individuals involved in the drug conspiracy, including Dale Evans.<br><br> 14 Within Evans 9 home and vehicles, law enforcement found an AK-47 assault rifle and ammunition, a Desert Eagle pistol and ammunition, a Smith and Wesson 9 millimeter pistol and loaded magazine, a bag containing marijuana, pagers, addresses of other co-conspirators, pictures of him and some of the other co- conspirators target-shooting in California, and various other items. 15 Searches and arrests of 3 Id. 4 Drug ring case wrapped up with 2 convicted, 1 acquitted , S TAR T RIB .<br><br> (Minneapolis-St. Paul) Dec. 13, 1994, at 2B.<br><br> 5 Telephone Interview with Tony Adams, Officer, Minneapolis Police Department, 4th Precinct, Narcotics Division (Mar. 27, 2001). 6 Id.<br><br> 7 Presentence Investigation, U.S. v. Vignali (D.<br><br> Minn. 1994) at para. 33 (Exhibit 2) (incorporated into Judgment in a Criminal Case as finding of fact).<br><br> 8 Id. 9 Id. 10 Id.<br><br> at para. 31. 11 Id.<br><br> at para. 30, 31, 42, 45, 46, 49, 57, 58, 59, 66, 67, 68, 71. See also Telephone Interview with Todd Jones, U.S.<br><br> Attorney for the District of Minnesota, Department of Justice (May 2, 1001) (describing evidence supporting finding of Vignali 9s broad level of involvement in conspiracy). Before leaving the U.S. Attorney 9s Office, Jones obtained, as the lead AUSA in the Vignali investigation, the court orders for the wiretaps; represented the Government at suppression hearings; and presented the case to the grand jury.<br><br> In 1998, Jones returned as the U.S. Attorney for the U.S. District of Minnesota.<br><br> 12 Presentence Investigation, U.S. v. Vignali (D.<br><br> Minn. 1994) at para. 68 (Exhibit 2) (incorporated into Judgment in a Criminal Case as finding of fact).<br><br> 13 Id. at para. 42.<br><br> 14 Id. at para. 85, 87.<br><br> 15 Id. at para. 87.<br><br> 8 other co-conspirators likewise revealed large amounts of cash, cocaine and other contraband, drug paraphernalia, guns, and ammunition. 16 As a result of these searches and arrests and with the assistance of Los Angeles law enforcement, Carlos Vignali was arrested in Los Angeles on May 6, 1994, 17 and extradited to Minnesota for trial. 18 Vignali 9s trial began on October 27, 1994.<br><br> In his opening statement to the jury, Vignali 9s defense attorney, Danny Davis, repeatedly characterized the alleged drug conspiracy as ca black drug network d: [T]he indictment that His Honor read for you 3 it is a sensitive suggestion about the evidence in this case 3 and I do it with complete deference to what the court suggested earlier about drugs, and our sensitivities, about race, and our sensitivities 3 but this conspiracy, the evidence will show, really comes down to a black drug dealing network. One by one those drug dealers, that the prosecution has found it necessary to come in and put on as witnesses, will make clear this is a nationwide black drug-dealing network. You can 9t get around it.<br><br> Disabuse yourself that I am prejudiced when I say that. It is a fact. My client is not [black].<br><br> 19 Counsel for the co-defendants thereupon moved for a mistrial: Mr. Fenster [Counsel for Melvin Campbell]: [I]t is offensive, what he is doing, and I think that just because he is a defense counsel doesn 9t excuse him from this kind of offensive behavior, and I think the court 3 I don 9t know about a mistrial, maybe that is not appropriate 3 I am not quite sure what to do, but I think I will move for a mistrial. I think that kind of presentation to the jury is so offensive to the fabric of our law that it is impossible for the jury to now be able to have a fair trial when he 9s painted the other defendants in a black drug-dealing network.<br><br> Certainly the prosecution would have a mistrial if they did that. Mr. Cascarano [Counsel for Todd Hopson]: I join in that motion.<br><br> Mr. Gray [Counsel for Claude Oliver Phillips]: I join in that motion and, if the court doesn 9t grant it, I move to strike every word that Mr. Davis has said about a black drug network around the nation.<br><br> And, if he says it again, I ask he be jailed. It is the worst conduct I have seen by a defense lawyer in twenty-four years. 16 Id.<br><br> at para. 85-101. See also Telephone Interview with Tony Adams, Officer, Minneapolis Police Department, 4th Precinct, Narcotics Division (Mar.<br><br> 27, 2001). 17 Evans immediately cooperated with law enforcement. Id.<br><br> He told DEA that he worked for Vignali, a.k.a., cC- Low d and identified him with a still-shot photograph of Vignali 9s appearance in a rap video. 18 Presentence Investigation, U.S. v.<br><br> Vignali (D. Minn. 1994) at para.<br><br> 102 (Exhibit 2). When he was arrested, Vignali stated that he knew Gray but had not seen him for about a year; that Gray introduced him to Evans, who was interested in possibly buying his townhouse; and that no one had ever referred to him as cC-Low. d 19 Transcript of Trial, U.S. v.<br><br> Vignali (D. Minn. Oct.<br><br> 27, 1994) at 113-14. 9 Mr. Cascarano: Your Honor, [what] Mr.<br><br> Davis has done is paint not only the three black defendants as not clothed with the presumption of innocence, but what he has done is he has painted them guilty by virtue of their skin color. 20 The district court denied the motion for a mistrial. However, it did caution the jury that the defendants 9 race should play no role in its determination of their guilt or innocence.<br><br> 21 Even though the court did not grant a mistrial, Vignali 9s crude effort to play the race card against his codefendants is highly troubling. Vignali 9s conduct, through his counsel, is even more troubling when considered in light of the fact that one of his supporters later claimed, without any factual support, that Vignali was the victim of racial prejudice at trial. At Vignali 9s trial, the government presented compelling evidence showing that he conspired to traffic cocaine, aided and abetted the mailing of at least two packages of cocaine from California to Minnesota, and used the telephone to facilitate the sale of cocaine.<br><br> That evidence included the testimony of various co-conspirators, including Dale Evans, Gerald Williams, and Ronald Nunn. Evans testified that, beginning in March 1993, he bought cocaine from Jonathan Gray and typically mailed that cocaine to Gerald Williams in Minnesota for distribution. 22 Evans also testified that Gray informed him in 1993 that he was obtaining his cocaine from Vignali.<br><br> 23 Evans first met Vignali sometime during the summer of 1993 when they discussed distributing cocaine and agreed on prices. 24 Evans also testified that Todd Hopson, one of the Minneapolis-based cocaine distributors, flew to Los Angeles around October 20, 1993, and met with Evans and Vignali, and Vignali agreed to sell Hopson cocaine. 25 Hopson, Evans, and a friend of Evans then followed Vignali to an East Los Angeles apartment where Hopson bought between $36,000 and $70,000 of cocaine from Vignali.<br><br> 26 Evans testified that prior to leaving Los Angeles for Minnesota, he made arrangements with Carlos Vignali and Jonathan Gray to have an additional six kilograms of cocaine sent to the residence of Todd Hopson 9s relative in Minnesota. 27 On October 21, 1993, officers conducted surveillance on Evans, Ronald Nunn, and Todd Hopson. 28 In the course of that surveillance, officers observed Ronald Nunn picking up Evans at 20 Id.<br><br> at 115-16. 21 On appeal, co-defendant Todd Hopson argued that those comments made by Vignali 9s attorney were so prejudicial that he was entitled to a new trial. U.S.<br><br> v. Williams, 97 F.3d 240, 244 (8th Cir. 1996).<br><br> However, the appellate court found that Hopson failed to show prejudice. In particular, the court observed that the jury 9s verdict indicated that it declined any invitation to use race as a proxy for guilt. In support of that view, the court cited the jury 9s acquittal of co-defendant Claude Phillips, an African-American, and its conviction of Vignali, a Hispanic, on three of four counts.<br><br> 22 Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D.<br><br> Minn. Nov. 16, 1994) at 86.<br><br> 23 Id. at 100. 24 Id.<br><br> at 101. 25 Id. at 119.<br><br> 26 Id. at 120-21. 27 Id.<br><br> at 137-43. Transcript of Trial, U.S. v.<br><br> Vignali (D. Minn. Nov.<br><br> 17, 1994) at 10-12 (Evans testifying that he planned with Ronald Nunn to pick up Hopson and collect a parcel the mailed by Vignali at the residence of Hopson 9s relative in Egan, Minnesota). 28 Transcript of Trial, U.S. v.<br><br> Vignali (D. Minn. Nov.<br><br> 14, 1994) at 184-86 (testimony of Officer Tony Adams). 10 Gerald Williams 9 apartment in Minneapolis. 29 Nunn and Evans then drove to Hopson 9s home in Apple Valley, Minnesota, picked him up, and went to the drop-off location in Eagan, Minnesota.<br><br> 30 They picked up a large parcel and returned with it to the Apple Valley residence. 31 Evans, Nunn, and Hopson detected police surveillance while driving and attempted evasive maneuvers. 32 After Evans noticed that he was being tailed by undercover surveillance, he paged Vignali and Gray in Los Angeles from his cell phone with the emergency code c911. d After he had managed to shake off his pursuers, Evans spoke with Gray and Vignali.<br><br> They did not realize that their conversation was being monitored by the police. Evans told Vignali that c[t]hey followed us all around. d 33 He further stated that c[w]e had to shake them, get them off, one in front, back one came, parked down the street, waiting for us, dog, undercrizzovers. d 34 Evans testified that by cundercrizzovers d he was referring to undercover police and was conveying that he was being chased by the police. 35 Evans also told Vignali that he had to start cbusting u- turns d to evade the police.<br><br> 36 In response to Evans 9 report, Vignali asked, cIs that right? So everything 9s cool, though? d 37 Vignali later asked Evans, cHow long ago was this? d 38 As Evans was continuing to talk to Vignali about the cundercrizzovers, d Vignali asked, cHey, but, you, you, you, um, you made everything straight, right? d 39 Vignali also asked, cDon 9t you think you should be careful before you bust a move? d 40 Evans responded, cthat 9s what I 9m doing. d 41 Vignali later paged Evans to determine whether Evans was arrested. At trial, Vignali contended that, during his conversation with Evans, he did not know what Evans meant by cundercrizzovers d and that he was disoriented because Evans 9 call had woken him.<br><br> 42 Vignali testified that he inferred only that csomething was wrong d with a $20,000 cbusiness loan d that he supplied to Jonathan Gray 43 and that Evans either lost or someone stole 29 Id. 30 Transcript of Trial, U.S. v.<br><br> Vignali (D. Minn. Nov.<br><br> 17, 1994) at 16 (testimony of Dale Evans). 31 Id. 32 Id.<br><br> at 14 (Evans testifying that Nunn detected undercover police surveillance). 33 Transcript of Trial, U.S. v.<br><br> Vignali (D. Minn. Nov.<br><br> 22, 1994) at 51 (testimony of Dale Evans); Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D.<br><br> Minn. Nov. 29, 1994) at 204 (Vignali testifying that Evans paged him c911 d).<br><br> 34 Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D.<br><br> Minn. Nov. 22, 1994) at 51.<br><br> 35 Id. at 51, 56 (testifying that he later described to Vignali, cThey were following us, riding and shining d). 36 Transcript of Trial, U.S.<br><br> v. Vignali (D. Minn.<br><br> Nov. 29, 1994) at 276. 37 Transcript of Trial, U.S.<br><br> v. Vignali (D. Minn.<br><br> Nov. 22, 1994) at 51. 38 Id.<br><br> at 52. 39 Id. 40 Id .<br><br> at 53. 41 Id. at 54.<br><br> 42 Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D.<br><br> Minn. Nov. 29, 1994) at 204.<br><br> 43 Vignali claimed that Gray had told him that he needed $20,000 for a short-term business deal involving Stacy Augmon and several other professional basketball players. Transcript of Trial, U.S. v.<br><br> Vignali (D. Minn. Nov.<br><br> 29, 1994) at 248-49 (cross examination of Carlos Vignali); Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D.<br><br> Minn. Dec. 1, 1994) at 39-40 (direct examination by Horacio Vignali); Transcript of Trial, U.S.<br><br> v. Vignali (D. Minn.<br><br> Dec. 5, 1994) at 232 (closing argument of Carlos Vignali). According to Vignali, Gray assured him that he would get $25,000 back in a matter of days and that, if the deal fell through, Gray would sell his Porsche to cover Vignali 9s losses.<br><br> Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D.<br><br> Minn. Nov. 29, 1994) at 192-93.<br><br> Vignali claimed that he had $20,000 in cash to loan Gray because he had saved his allowance since he was a young child and that the resulting stack of $100 bills, which he had ironed and carefully stacked in his closet, represented his clife savings. d See Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D.<br><br> Minn. Dec. 1, 1994) at 40-43.<br><br> According to Vignali, Gray returned to him the $20,000 and an additional $5,000. See Transcript of Trial, U.S. v.<br><br> Vignali (D. Minn. Nov.<br><br> 29, 1994) at 188. Also, according to Vignali, a second cbusiness loan d was made 11 that money. 44 At trial, prosecutors pointed out that Vignali 9s defense made no sense.<br><br> Though he claimed to be confused and cfreshly woken up, d Vignali cautioned his friend to cbe careful d and asked if ceverything was cool. d The trial transcript makes it clear that Vignali 9s defense was implausible: Dunne: I thought that you said, on direct examination, that you didn 9t understand what he meant by under crizzovers because you had just gotten up? Vignali: Yes, he, he had just woken me up with the page, sir. Dunne: Okay.<br><br> And you will agree with me, will you not, that the time on this transcript [is 12:09 p.m.], Minneapolis time? 45 * * * Dunne: You say, when Dale gives you the explanation about the under crizzovers . .<br><br> . cIs that right? d Vignali: Yes. Dunne: Do you say 3 you don 9t say to him, cDale what are you talking about? d Vignali: No.<br><br> Dunne: Okay. And you don 9t say, cI don 9t understand this? d Vignali: No, sir. Bear in mind that I, I had just freshly woken up.<br><br> 46 * * * Dunne: Now you just said that the reason you called . . .<br><br> [was] that you were concerned about your money? Vignali: Yes sir. Dunne: Concerned enough to say Don 9t you think you should be careful before you bust a move?<br><br> Vignali: Yes sir. Dunne: But you don 9t ask him what the problem is? when Vignali cloaned d Gray $25,000, which, with $5,000 interest, resulted in the $30,000 referred to on the tapes.<br><br> Id. at 192-95, 273-75. 44 Id.<br><br> at 173, 204, 259; Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D.<br><br> Minn. Dec. 5, 1994) at 232.<br><br> 45 Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D.<br><br> Minn. Nov. 29, 1994) at 269-70.<br><br> 46 Id. at 273. 12 Vignali: I, I have a little understanding that something wrong is going on, but I 9m not exactly sure, he didn 9t make it clear to me.<br><br> 47 * * * Dunne: What do you mean, something is going wrong? Vignali: I have no idea. I wasn 9t there.<br><br> Dunne: What did you think was going wrong with your 25,000 dollars? Vignali: I have no idea. Dunne: You have no idea?<br><br> Vignali: No, sir. I thought maybe, when he told me that it was smashing, maybe something was following him trying 3 maybe trying to carjack him or something, I don 9t know 3 and then he was going to try to tell me, Well I lost your money, or something. I was just concerned about, in that aspect.<br><br> 48 * * * Dunne: Now let me ask you, during this phone conversation where you are concerned about Dale 9s busting a move with your 25,000 dollars because someone might carjack him. Do you ever tell Dale: Dale, maybe you should call the police if someone is trying to carjack you? Vignali: I, I didn 9t, again I will tell you I didn 9t know exactly what was going on.<br><br> Dunne: But you thought somebody was trying to carjack him? Vignali: It was, it was the morning. I 9m 3 my head 3 I had just woken up, I wasn 9t 3 it 3 nothing was clear to me, it never was clear to me.<br><br> 49 Evans testified that he returned to California the day after he escaped the undercover surveillance. 50 But, before returning to California, he mailed himself the money he obtained for 47 Transcript of Trial, U.S. v.<br><br> Vignali (D. Minn. Nov.<br><br> 30, 1994) at 10-11. 48 Id. at 12-13.<br><br> 49 Id. at 13. 50 Transcript of Trial, U.S.<br><br> v. Vignali (D. Minn.<br><br> Nov. 17, 1994) at 56. 13 the cocaine.<br><br> 51 Evans told Vignali and Jonathan Gray in intercepted telephone conversations that he would meet with them to give them the money. 52 On October 26, 1993, agents tapped into a phone conversation between Dale Evans and Gerald Williams regarding a new shipment of cocaine, six kilograms sent from Los Angeles to Ronald Nunn 9s Minnesota home. 53 That shipment was intercepted by postal inspectors on or about October 28, 1993.<br><br> 54 On October 31, 1993, agents overheard a call between Williams, Evans, and Carlos Vignali regarding the October 26th shipment. Evans asked, cLove [the cocaine shipment] never got there? d 55 Williams replied, cno. d 56 Evans stated that they had called the post office to see if the package had arrived. 57 At that point, Vignali, who was apparently with Evans, got on the telephone, said c[t]his is the other end, d and told Williams to send somebody into the post office to find out about the package.<br><br> 58 Vignali then said, cWe sent that right down that day d and told Williams to get on cgood horns [a public telephone]. d 59 During that conversation, a prospective 15-kilogram deal was discussed. 60 The parties conferred about whether the quantity should be broken up into one or two kilogram shipments or shipped all at once. 61 They also discussed the prospect that the buyers might not want to pay for the shipment up front before obtaining all of their cocaine.<br><br> 62 They further discussed having someone either drive the shipment from California to Minnesota or having someone come down from Minnesota to California. 63 In attempting to explain away these conversations, Vignali argued that the money referred to clife savings d he accumulated as a child from his father and ultimately clent d to Jonathan Gray. Vignali supposedly lent Gray, who had been recently released from jail for a crime Vignali knew nothing about, a $20,000 cbusiness loan d for a project which Vignali also knew nothing about.<br><br> This part of Vignali 9s story met with skepticism from prosecutors: Dunne: Now when you gave Jonathon [Gray] this 20,000 dollars for this loan & for this business proposition or whatever, did he show you any kind of contract? 51 Id. at 56.<br><br> 52 Transcript of Trial, U.S. v. Vignali (D.<br><br> Minn. Nov. 14, 1994) at 189, 193 (Officer Tony Adams); Transcript of Trial, U.S.<br><br> v. Vignali (D. Minn.<br><br> Nov. 17, 1994) at 56-58 (Evans testifying that he received money he mailed to himself in California and took about $80,000 or $90,000 to Vignali and Gray at Vignali 9s house). 53 Transcript of Trial, U.S.<br><br> v. Vignali , (D. Minn.<br><br> Nov. 22, 1994) at 70 (Evans); Transcript of Trial, U.S. v.<br><br> Vignali (D. Minn. Nov.<br><br> 17, 1994) at 59-60, 64-66 (Evans testifying to conversation). See also Presentence Investigation, U.S. v.<br><br> Vignali (D. Minn. 1994) at para.<br><br> 57-58 (Exhibit 2). 54 Id. at para.<br><br> 65. 55 Transcript of Trial, U.S. v.<br><br> Vignali (D. Minn. Nov.<br><br> 22, 1994) at 69. cLove d was the code word used by the conspirators to refer to cocaine. 56 Transcript of Trial, U.S.<br><br> v. Vignali (D. Minn.<br><br> Dec. 5, 1994) at 164. See also Transcript of Trial, U.S.<br><br> v. Vignali (D. Minn.<br><br> Nov. 22, 1994) at 66-68. 57 Transcript of Trial, U.S.<br><br> v. Vignali (D. Minn.<br><br> Dec. 5, 1994) at 164. 58 Transcript of Trial, U.S.<br><br> v. Vignali (D. Minn.<br><br> Nov. 22, 1994) at 70-71. 59 Transcript of Trial, U.S.<br><br> v. Vignali (D. Minn.<br><br> Nov. 17, 1994) at 68. 60 Id .<br><br> at 75-76. 61 Id. at 76.<br><br> 62 Id. 63 Id. at 76-77.<br><br> That transaction appears not to have been consummated. 14 Vignali: No, he didn 9t. Dunne: Did he show you any kind of paperwork about this business proposition?<br><br> Vignali: No, he did not. Dunne: Did he have you sign anything to validate that you were giving him 20,000 dollars in cash? Vignali: No, sir.<br><br> * * * Dunne: And do you recall how much money was in your checking account at the time you had 20,000 dollars in a safe in your house? Vignali: No, I never, I never kept much money . .<br><br> . in the bank, I 9m sorry. Dunne: Well, when you have money in a bank you earn interest.<br><br> Right? Vignali: If it is in your savings account, yes. Dunne: Are you earning any interest on 20,000 dollars in a safe in your house?<br><br> Vignali: No, but it is in my possession. 64 * * * Dunne: In 1992 you file an income tax return where you declared your income was thirteen thousand nine hundred nine dollars? .<br><br> . . Now the 20,000 dollars that you had in the closet at home, was that part of the thirteen thousand dollars that you made in 1992?<br><br> Vignali: That was part of the money that I had accumulated over my lifetime. Dunne: Over your lifetime? Vignali: Absolutely.<br><br> Dunne: Okay. And so all of your life savings you put in . .<br><br> . the closet in the townhome. 65 64 Transcript of Trial, U.S.<br><br> v. Vignali (D. Minn.<br><br> Nov. 29, 1994) at 240, 243. 65 Id.<br><br> at 247-48. 15 Rather than refute the facts prosecutors had marshaled against him, Vignali argued that the co-conspirators who cooperated with law enforcement made csweetheart d deals for leniency. In particular, Vignali charged that Dale Evans had falsely identified Vignali as his source of cocaine in California because he wanted to conceal the involvement of his family members and close associates in criminal activity.<br><br> 66 Nonetheless, the testimony of the cooperating co- conspirators and law enforcement officers and the corroborating physical evidence was overwhelming. The combination of evidence admitted at trial showed beyond a reasonable doubt that Vignali supplied significant quantities of cocaine from California for distribution in Minnesota. On December 12, 1994, Vignali was convicted of all the crimes for which he was indicted, except one count of using facilities in interstate commerce for the promotion of his drug operation.<br><br> 67 All but one of the original thirty defendants in the drug conspiracy either pleaded guilty or were convicted. 68 At sentencing, the probation office for the federal district of Minnesota submitted to Judge David S. Doty a pre-sentence report.<br><br> This report recommended an imprisonment range of 151 to 188 months for Vignali. 69 In determining the proper sentence under the federal sentencing guidelines, Judge Doty found that Vignali was, in fact, a willing participant in the shipment of cocaine to Minnesota on October 20, 1993. 70 Judge Doty also found that Vignali was accountable for distributing between five and fifteen kilograms of cocaine, rather than the fifteen to fifty kilograms suggested in the pre-sentence report.<br><br> 71 Vignali was sentenced to imprisonment for 175 months, about 15 years, on July 17, 1995. 72 On January 20, 2001, President Clinton commuted Vignali 9s sentence to time served. B.<br><br> Vignali 9s Efforts to Obtain Executive Clemency As described below, 55-year old Horacio Carlos Vignali, a successful Los Angeles-area businessman, 73 apparently used every tool at his disposal to see that his son would not fully serve out his prison sentence. When attempts to have his son released before sentencing and on appeal failed, Horacio, who cultivated political contacts over time through substantial campaign 66 Transcript of Trial, U.S. v.<br><br> Vignali (D. Minn. Dec.<br><br> 5, 1994) at 232. 67 Judgment in a Criminal Case, U.S. v.<br><br> Vignali (D.Minn. July 17, 1995) (Exhibit 3). 68 Id.<br><br> Claude Phillips, 50, of Memphis, Tennessee, was acquitted of conspiring to distribute cocaine 4 the sole count against him in the superceding indictment. Also convicted was Todd Hopson, 23, of Apple Valley, Minnesota. 69 Id.<br><br> 70 Id. Judge Doty also found that, in late October, co-defendant Todd Hopson traveled to California and co- defendant Dale Evans arranged for Hopson to buy additional quantities of cocaine from Vignali. 71 Id.<br><br> Judge Doty did so by referring to the testimony of co-defendant Dale Evans. According to Evans, Vignali may have been the source of two packages of cocaine sent to Minnesota 4 one on October 21, 1993, and the other on October 28, 1993. Judge Doty noted that the second package was, in fact, seized by law enforcement authorities and found to have contained six kilograms of cocaine, and Evans testified at trial that the first package contained four kilograms of cocaine.<br><br> However, Judge Doty found Evans 9 testimony regarding the sale of additional quantities of cocaine by Vignali unpersuasive. 72 Id. 73 Horacio Vignali, who immigrated to the United States in 1962, has owned several businesses, including parking lots, body shops, and real estate.<br><br> See Richard Serrano and Stephen Braun, Working the American System , L.A. T IMES (L.A. T IMES Mag.) Apr.<br><br> 29, 2001, at 10. Apparently, Horacio Vignali has been financially successful and owns a $9 million home in Pacific Palisades that apparently once belonged to Sylvester Stallone. Id.<br><br> 16 donations, fundraising activity, 74 and civic involvement, directed his considerable resources to a concerted effort to lobby President Clinton for an eleventh hour pardon of his son. 1. Initial Efforts to Reduce Vignali 9s Sentence a.<br><br> Contacts with Prosecutors in Minnesota Efforts to reduce Carlos Vignali 9s sentence apparently started soon after Vignali was convicted. According to Assistant U.S. Attorney Andrew Dunne, who prosecuted Vignali in Minneapolis, Vignali 9s political associates exerted ca lot of influence d in Vignali 9s sentencing.<br><br> 75 Dunne explained that he and the other prosecutors working on the case received periodic calls from state representatives in California on behalf of Carlos Vignali after the sentencing. 76 Characterizing some of the calls as cperhaps improper influence, d Dunne recalled that cthey wanted to know: Is there anything that could be done to help reduce the sentence? d 77 Denise Reilly, the lead government prosecutor in the Vignali case, likewise confirmed that they cwould get calls from different people 3 politically placed d throughout the course of the case. 78 She characterized the input of those who called codd, d stating cI don 9t know how they do things in the rest of the country, but that isn 9t what we do in Minnesota. d 79 Judge Reilly described the incoming calls as inquiring, care you sure you know what you 9re doing? d and care you sure that you have the right person? d 80 Judge Reilly believed that the calls came from political officials in Los Angeles.<br><br> 81 b. Vignali 9s Appeal Carlos Vignali appealed his conviction immediately after the verdict. Vignali appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, claiming juror misconduct, witness perjury, improper jury instruction, failure to grant a severance, and improper exclusion of defense evidence.<br><br> A unanimous appellate court upheld Vignali 9s conviction, dismissing Vignali 9s arguments with minimal discussion. 82 In affirming the district court 9s ruling, the appellate court agreed that cthere was considerable evidence of Vignali 9s guilt. d 83 Vignali subsequently sought habeas relief, asserting ineffectiveness of counsel. 84 This claim was also denied.<br><br> 85 74 For example, Horacio Vignali has hosted several political fundraisers, including outdoor barbecue fundraisers (for which he became locally well known), and provided food for various political events. Id. 75 Richard A.<br><br> Serrano and Stephen Braun, Drug Kingpin 9s Release Adds to Clemency Uproar , L.A. T IMES , Feb. 11, 2001, at A1.<br><br> 76 Id. 77 Id. 78 Telephone Interview with the Honorable Denise Reilly, Juvenile Court Judge, 4th Judicial District of Minnesota (Hennepin County) (May 11, 2001).<br><br> 79 Id. 80 Id. 81 Id.<br><br> 82 U.S. v. Williams, 97 F.3d 240 (8th Cir.<br><br> 1996). 83 Id. at 246.<br><br> 84 NARA Document Production at 2 (Report to the President on Proposed Denial of Executive Clemency for Carlos Anibal Vignali, Jr. (Jan. 12, 2001)) (Exhibit 4).<br><br> 85 Id. 17 c. Letters to the White House and Justice Department Horacio Vignali was hard at work gathering political support for his son 9s cause even before filing his son 9s clemency petition.<br><br> Vignali had a number of prominent California politicians write letters to the White House in 1996, requesting a creview d of Carlos Vignali 9s case. At least five similarly phrased letters were sent to the White House cPardon Secretary d requesting an examination of the case. 86 The first letter, dated May 24, 1996, from California Assembly Member Antonio Villaraigosa, stated, cAfter reviewing Mr.<br><br> Vignali 9s case, I am convinced that he has been falsely linked to a drug ring in Minneapolis, MN, and that his conviction is a product of 8guilt by association, 9 among other factors. d 87 Villaraigosa noted that Carlos Vignali had no prior record and that Vignali 9s cmilitary academy schooling adds to his superior resumé. d 88 Villaraigosa was apparently unaware that Vignali both had a prior criminal record and had dropped out of military school. 89 Under those circumstances, Villaraigosa 9s characterization of Vignali 9s resumé as csuperior d was, at best, hyperbole and, at worst, misleading. Villaraigosa has since admitted that he did not independently investigate the details of Carlos Vignali 9s case and regretted not having done so.<br><br> 90 Villaraigosa stated, cI was convinced at the time . . .<br><br> that his son was not a major player in this drug ring. I made a mistake in not investigating. d 91 Villaraigosa stated that he was moved by Horacio Vignali 9s emotional plea: cIt was a conversation between fathers as much as anything. .<br><br> . . He was very distraught. d 92 On May 28, 1996, Los Angeles City Councilman Richard Alatorre wrote in support of Vignali: It is difficult for me to understand why Mr.<br><br> Vignali received such an exorbitant sentence. It has been pointed out that this may have been due to the fact that his case was grouped together with a much larger case involving the sale of drugs. 86 There is no position of cPardon Secretary d at the White House.<br><br> It is not clear who received and reviewed these letters when they were sent to the White House in 1996. However, the letters were ultimately made part of the Vignali clemency file at the White House Counsel 9s Office years later in 2000. 87 NARA Document Production (Letter from Antonio R.<br><br> Villaraigosa, Assembly Member, Forty-Fifth District, California Legislative Assembly, to Pardon Secretary, the White House (May 24, 1996)) (Exhibit 5). 88 Id. 89 Presentence Investigation, U.S.<br><br> v. Vignali (D. Minn.<br><br> 1994) at para. 130 (Exhibit 2). 90 Mateo Gold, Vignali Case Casts Shadow Over Mayor 9s Race , L.A.<br><br> T IMES , Feb. 28, 2001, at B1 ( cI wrote that letter without talking to prosecutors on the other end. d). 91 John Antczak, L.A.<br><br> Heads Retract Support for Pardon , AP O NLINE , Feb. 13, 2001; See also Mateo Gold and Larry B. Stammer, 2 City Leaders Say They Regret Helping Dealer; Clemency: Cardinal Mahony and Politician Villaraigosa Say They Shouldn 9t Have Written on Behalf of a Cocaine Convict They Had Never Even Met , L.A.<br><br> T IMES , Feb. 13, 2001, at A22. 92 Matea Gold and Larry B.<br><br> Stammer, 2 City Leaders Say They Regret Helping Dealer; Clemency: Cardinal Mahony and Politician Villaraigosa Say They Shouldn 9t Have Written on Behalf of a Cocaine Convict They Had Never Even Met , L.A. T IMES , Feb. 13, 2001, at A22.<br><br> It is widely believed that Villaraigosa 9s involvement in the Vignali matter cost him his election as mayor of Los Angeles to Robert Hahn. See, e.g. , Beth Barrett, Villaraigosa 9s Refusal to Hit Back Cost Him 4 Rival 9s Attack Went Unanswered , D AILY N EWS OF L.A., June 7, 2001, at N9.<br><br> 18 Others contend that it may have been because of his Latino background, which I hope is not the case. 93 However, Alatorre was not fit to provide a character reference for Vignali or anyone else. Throughout his extensive career in Los Angeles politics, Alatorre was the subject of various public corruption investigations, recently pleaded guilty to federal tax evasion charges, and is himself a proven cocaine user.<br><br> 94 93 NARA Document Production (Letter from Richard Alatorre, Councilman, Fourteenth District, L.A. City Council, to Pardon Secretary, the White House (May 28, 1996)) (Exhibit 6). 94 Department of Justice Press Release No.<br><br> 01-062, Former Los Angeles City Councilman Richard Alatorre Charged With Tax Evasion For Failing To Report Bribes; Defendant Agrees To Plead Guilty To Felony Offense , U.S. Attorney 9s Office for the Central District of California, Apr. 3, 2001.<br><br> As a result of Alatorre's failing to report bribes, he evaded the payment of at least $12,970 in federal income tax. In addition to pleading guilty, Alatorre has agreed to file an amended 1996 federal income tax return and to pay any penalties and interest assessed by the Internal Revenue Service. Less than a year after being elected to the Los Angeles City Council, Alatorre agreed to pay a record fine of more than $140,000 for improperly financing his campaign for City Council with money he raised as a state lawmaker.<br><br> Rich Connell and Robert J. Lopez, Alatorre 9s Fall Belies Early Promise, Achievements , L.A. T IMES , Jan.<br><br> 17, 1999, at Al. In 1988, Alatorre was fined for attempting to steer a $722,000 contract to The East Los Angeles Community Union ( cTELACU d), a firm that was headed by a longtime friend. Earlier, TELACU had flown Alatorre to a meeting at Lake Tahoe and paid him a $1,000 speaking fee.<br><br> When Alatorre was on the board of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority ( cMTA d), which administers Los Angeles 9 multibillion-dollar subway and light rail system, Alatorre reportedly solicited contributions of more than $500,000 from organizations with interests before the MTA and the City Council for the benefit of a children 9s charity he helped create. Rich Connell and Robert J. Lopez, Alatorre 9s Fall Belies Early Promise, Achievements , L.A.<br><br> T IMES , Jan. 17, 1999, at Al; Robert J. Lopez and Rich Connell, MTA Probes Charities Promoted by Alatorre , L.A.<br><br> T IMES , July 7, 1997, at Al. That charity exclusively hired Eventually Yours, an event-planning firm founded by Alatorre 9s third wife, Angie, paying the firm tens of thousands of dollars in fees. Ultimately, Alatorre was fined $8,000 by state and local watchdog agencies for improperly intervening on behalf of the firm before a city licensing agency.<br><br> That was the maximum fine allowed under state and local laws. Also, in the custody dispute described below, Alatorre conceded to receiving a $13,200 loan (without a repayment plan) from TELACU. At that time, Alatorre was also supporting a TELACU team for a $65 million MTA subway contract and a TELACU partnership for a $2 million city development for a shopping center in his district.<br><br> The investigation of Eventually Yours broadened an earlier probe of how another firm that was ranked last in competing for a lucrative subway contract, but which Alatorre backed, came to be recommended for that contract. Robert J. Lopez and Rich Connell, MTA Probes Charities Promoted by Alatorre , L.A.<br><br> T IMES , July 7, 1997, at Al. That controversy resulted in the resignation of MTA 9s executive director, who selected the team after it made a $20,000 donation to a golf tournament benefiting a charity of which Alatorre was an honorary chairman. Eventually Yours was also investigated by the California Attorney General 9s Office for failing to account for hundreds of thousands of dollars in charitable donations it helped raise.<br><br> Robert J. Lopez and Rich Connell, MTA Probes Charities Promoted by Alatorre , L.A. T IMES , July 7, 1997, at Al.<br><br> After repeated press inquiries for information regarding the firm 9s five-year failure to account for certain contributions, the firm 9s attorney stated that the firm 9s forte was in staging cspectacular d events 4 not in faithfully tending to administrative matters. In the course of its investigation, the State Attorney General 9s Office received an inquiry from State Senator Richard Polanco, generally well known to be an Alatorre ally. According to a State Justice Department official, Polanco stated that he was concerned about the pressure being brought to bear on the firm.<br><br> The official recounted that Polanco said he knew the people associated with Eventually Yours to be upstanding and asked why they were targeted. In response, Polanco was told that, because the investigation was pending, he could be given no information about the matter. Robert J.<br><br> Lopez and Rich Connell, MTA Probes Charities Promoted by Alatorre , L.A. T IMES , July 7, 1997, at Al. In the course of a child custody dispute regarding his niece in which Alatorre 9s competency to care for the girl was in controversy, Superior Court<br><br>