Air Force Flight Screening: Evolutionary Changes, 1917-2003

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Air Force Flight Screening: Evolutionary Changes, 1917-2003 By Ann Krueger Hussey Office of History and Research Headquarters Air Education and Training Command Randolph AFB, Texas December 2004 iii FOREWORD Until World War II, the Army Air Corps counted on its stringent qualification requirements and low production goals to screen its pilot candidates. During World War II, the Army Air Forces needed men to fill its requirements for 100,000 aircrew positions, and thousands of candidates went through the training process. Qualification requirements relaxed initially and became more rigorous as the need for pilots changed during the course of the war, but no true flight screening program existed until the Korean War with the advent of the Revitalized Pilot Training Program in November 1952.

Demand for more pilots and high attrition rates during the Korean War, which were prevalent during World War II as well, combined with tight defense budgets to force the Air Force to turn to some sort of flight screening to reduce attrition rates. For most of the next decade, Air Training Command (ATC) continued to run a light plane screening program; but the introduction of the T-37 and the all-jet training program in 1958 encouraged Air Force officials to ... more. less.

view light plane screening as counterproductive. It ended two years later. However, the war in Southeast Asia increased the demand for pilots again, and ATC reintroduced light plane screening, which continued in various forms until insurmountable problems with the T- 3A prompted the end of the program in 1997. Inevitably, attrition rates rose, ensuring the return to a new program, Introductory Flight Training. By 2002, however, the hunt was on for a replacement program to provide a higher degree of standardization and uniformity. As the Air Force faces an era of stressed budgets, filling its ranks with those who will earn their wings is imperative. A flourishing flight screening program is as important today as any time in the Air Force 9s history. As Air Education and Training Command embarks on yet another revision, returning to the philosophy of flight screening before flight training, it is instructive to examine how the command got to where it is today. Ultimately, concern with the monetary and personnel costs associated with high attrition rates guarantees that the Air Force will continue to use some sort of flight screening to identify pilot candidates whose probability to earn their wings is high 4the very people who form the core of the Air Force 9s combat capability. iv CONTENTS Page Title Page i Foreword iii Contents v Illustrations vi Introduction 1 The World War II Experience 5 Post War 14 The Korean War and the Pilot Training Program 19 AFROTC and the Flight Indoctrination Program 25 Post-Korean War Fine-Tuning 27 The Vietnam War and Light Plane Screening 33 Centralized Flight Screening 37 Pilot Selection Research 39 Transitioning from FIP to LATR 49 Enhanced Flight Screening 53 Introductory Flight Training 61 Refining IFT 67 Conclusion 68 v LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Page Photographs JN-4 at Kelly Field 1 PT-1 3 Physical Examinations of Pilot Candidates 5 Early Ground Preflight Trainer 8 Aviation Cadets Taking an Aptitude Test 9 BT-13s and BT-14s 11 AT-6s 12 T-6 Trainer 17 PA-18s 20 T-34s 24 T-41 34 Civilian Contract Instructors 35 T-41C 37 Basic Attributes Test 44 Porta-BAT 46 T-3A 58 T-3A at Hondo 59 An AFA Diamond DA20-C1 64 Figures Air Corps Five-Year Expansion Effort 4 Pilot Training Attrition 1939-1945 14 Post-War Pilot Production 16 Pre-and Post-Revitalized Pilot Training Program 22 ROTC Primary UPT Attrition 28 Pilot Training Attrition 1955-1959 31 Total Pilot Training Attrition 33 Attrition Rate by Source of Commissioning 38 Total USAF Pilot Training Attrition 41 UPT Attrition by Source of Commissioning 49 USAF SUPT Attrition by Source of Commissioning 60 1 A World War I aviation cadet reports for flying training in a JN-4 at Kelly Field. Air Force Flight Screening: Evolutionary Changes, 1917-2003 Introduction It wasn 9t until Air Force leaders began worrying about the effects attrition had on meeting yearly pilot production requirements that flying training officials began to show any interest in a flight screening program to identify pilot candidates with poor potential of completing pilot training. In fact, a flight indoctrination program, which taught only the basic fundamentals of flying, didn 9t even exist until 18 February 1943 with the inauguration of a new college training program. A true flight screening program didn 9t exist for another 10 years. No matter what the Air Force called the program 4flight screening, flight indoctrination, light plane screening 4the ultimate goal was to reduce the number of candidates who did not successfully complete pilot training. That isn 9t to say the Air Force and its predecessors weren 9t concerned about attrition and the attempt to reduce the number of eliminations from flying training, but the times and situations were very different. When the United States entered World War I on 6 April 1917, nearly three years after combat started in August 1914, its Army 9s fledgling air arm had only about 65 officers and 50 flying students, a handful of National Guard and Reserve officers with flying experience, and 2 1,087 enlisted men. They were located on a half-dozen small training fields, flying aircraft that were not combat-capable. With virtually no time to develop a training system of its own and the requirement to train thousands of men to meet General John J. Pershing 9s 5,000-pilot quota, the Aviation Section adopted the program used by Canada, which evolved into 8 weeks (expanded to 12 in late 1918) of ground school at leading American universities, followed by instruction at flying schools. On 21 May 1917, the Army established ground schools at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cornell University, and the Universities of Texas, Illinois, California (Berkeley), and Ohio State. In July, additional ground schools opened at Princeton and the Georgia School of Technology. These ground schools became the forerunner of preflight training. In a large-scale program where educational and military qualifications had to be lowered, some type of preflight training was necessary to help reduce the number of eliminations. 1 Pilot qualifications were fairly simple in the 1917-1918 time frame: candidates had to be honest, athletic, under 25, and possess two years of college or three years of some sort of cscientific d training. Flying centers sprung up quickly 4Selfridge Field in Michigan; Chanute and Scott Fields in Illinois; Wilbur Wright Field in Ohio; Kelly, Taliaferro, Love, Call, Rich, and Ellington Fields in Texas; Post Field at Fort Sill, Oklahoma; and Gerstner Field in Louisiana. The Army almost doubled the number of flying centers in 1918. Cadets received 6-to-8 weeks of preliminary (later called primary) training flying primarily in the Curtiss JN-4 Jenny before receiving their wings and commissions as second lieutenants (Reserve Military Aviator). Training consisted of 40- 50 flying hours divided between 4-10 hours of dual training, 24 hours solo, and a 16-hour cross country flight. Advanced training was given in Europe; after 90 flying hours, 1 The Official Pictorial History of the AAF , 1947, p. 46; Alfred Godberg, ed., A History of the United States Air Force , 1957, pp. 18- 19; Dr. W. Eugene Hollon, History of Preflight Training in the AAF 1941-1953 , Jun 53, pp. 4-7, hereafter referred to as History of Preflight Training . 3 The PT-1 in 1924 was the first post- WW I trainer ordered in quantity to replace the aging JN-4s. pilots were considered qualified for front line duty. By the end of the war, 16,587 cadets had graduated from the eight ground schools, 15,000 had entered preliminary training in the United States, and 8,689 had earned their wings. 2 In the 20 years between the end of World War I and the build up in 1939 prior to American entry into World War II, the high educational standards or previous military experience required of the Army 9s flying trainees precluded the need for a flight indoctrination or screening program or even a separate, formalized preflight phase. In fact, ground training was conducted concurrently with flying training. Between 1919 and 1922, pilot training consisted of a four- month preliminary stage conducted at either Carlstrom Field, Florida, or March Field, California, and three months of advanced training held at Post, Kelly, or Ellington Fields. In June 1922, the Air Service consolidated all flying training in San Antonio, Texas, to save money and take advantage of the good flying weather year- round. Instruction consisted of five months of primary (previously preliminary) instruction at Brooks Field and six months of advanced training at Kelly. Most of the aircraft flown were left over from the war. Between 1919 and 1926, 2,488 students entered preliminary or primary training, but just 793 graduated from advanced training 4only 32 percent of the trainees earned their wings. 3 2 See note above. 3 History of Preflight Training , pp. 7-9. 4 On 2 July 1926, the Army Air Service became the Army Air Corps and began a five-year expansion program to increase the Army air strength to 1,518 officers, 2,500 flying cadets, 16,000 enlisted men, and 1,800 serviceable aircraft. The expansion program led to the establishment of the Air Corps Training Center at Duncan Field, adjacent to Kelly, under Brig Gen Frank P. Lahm, who took over his new duties on 1 September 1926. One of the changes he instituted was a revamping of the curriculum, which now included eight months of primary and basic training and four months of advanced. Another of Lahm 9s goals was to supervise flying training activities more closely and coordinate primary and advanced training to move the higher elimination rates to primary training rather than advanced. As Figure 1 shows, General Lahm was largely successful in this effort. Interestingly enough, the final graduation rate was similar to that of the 1922- 1926 time frame, when only approximately 20 percent of the entering students graduated from advanced training. 4 Figure 1 Air Corps Five-Year Expansion Effort Year Students Entering Primary and Basic Primary and Basic Attrition Rate Students completing Primary and Basic and Entering Advanced Students completing Advanced Advanced Attrition Rate Overall Attrition Rate 1927 738 81% 137 74 46% 90% 1928 1065 81% 204 191 6% 82% 1929 1167 72% 328 313 5% 73% 1930 1187 78% 263 247 6% 79% 1931 1327 76% 325 300 8% 77% Total 5484 77% 1257 1125 11% 79% Source: History of Preflight Training , p. 11. 4 History of Preflight Training , pp. 10-11. 5 Thorough physical examinations of pilot candidates were first introduced in the late 1920s. Air Corps Training Center officials also attempted to devise a classification system that would define potentially successful candidates for flight training. In 1928, they introduced the first use of psychological tests and thorough physical examinations. The psychological tests were supposed to measure various mental aptitudes, but they were not very successful and were soon dropped. 5 The World War II Experience On 1 October 1931, the Air Corps Training Center moved to the newly completed Randolph Field, where the Air Corps would conduct primary and basic training. The Advanced Flying School remained across town at Kelly. Beginning in 1938, the Air Corps formulated various expansion programs that changed rapidly over the next few years as the requirements for pilot production increased dramatically after the war started in Europe. The initial expansion program called for the production of 4,500 pilots in two years to man 24 groups. Contracted civilian flying schools would conduct primary training, while Randolph would accomplish all basic training with advanced training at Kelly and Brooks. Officials reduced the entire flying training cycle from 12 months 5 Ibid . 6 to 36 weeks, 12 each for primary, basic, and advanced. Army officials signed contracts with nine civilian flying schools, and the first classes began on 1 July 1939. 6 The 1939-1940 pilot training expansion program had an interesting feature 4the Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA) project, which established small training centers at a number of colleges to give preliminary (even more rudimentary than primary) flying training to students. Its primary goal was cto make the youth of the nation air-minded, d while building a reserve of partly trained pilots who could be used in the event of an emergency. Congress voted $4 million to train 10,000 pilots, at least 5 percent of whom were not to be college students. The response was enthusiastic. Between September 1939 and July 1940, 9,505 students began training at 435 college locations; 87.6 percent of these students completed the training. Although not designed as a flight screening program, this initial civilian pilot training project achieved its objectives for the most part and would be greatly expanded in the upcoming years. 7 The 24-group program was just the first step in what would become a gigantic expansion of the Air Corps. On 14 May 1940, four days after the German invasion of Western Europe, President Franklin D. Roosevelt approved a 41-group plan, which called for the production of 7,000 pilots a year. On 8 July 1940, the Air Corps redesignated the training center at Randolph as the Gulf Coast Training Center and established two additional training centers to manage its ever-increasing number of flying schools: Moffet Field in California became home to the West Coast Training Center (which later moved to Santa Ana), while the Southeast Coast Training Center was located at Maxwell Field, Alabama. 8 6 Ibid , pp. 13, 15. 7 History, AAFTC, History of AAF Flying Training Command 1 January 1939 to 7 July 1943 , pp. 78-79. 8 History of Preflight Training , pp. 17-18; Thomas Manning, et al ., History of Air Training Command 1943-1993 , p. 6. 7 Almost immediately, a 12,000-pilots-a-year goal overtook the one for 7,000, and Air Corps officials quickly realized the demands for pilots would not stop at 12,000. They also knew there were not enough candidates with two years of college to provide a sufficient number of aviation cadets. Some type of additional training would be necessary to make up for the lowered entrance standards. This point came to the forefront again when planned production mushroomed in March 1941 to an annual requirement for 30,000 pilots. The 7 December 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor catapulted the United States into war and subsequently raised the goals for aircrew members to 50,000, 75,000, and ultimately 100,000 a year. 9 Prior to American entry into the war, an applicant couldn 9t become a cadet unless he was older than 20 and had completed two years of college or passed a special exam. Even so, applicants still had to be approved by cadet examining boards and the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps. The Air Corps still had quotas for the number of cadets it could admit. After December 7 th , the need to get aviation cadets into training wiped out all quotas, examining boards received the power of final approval, and a qualification test substituted for the college education. Shortly after that, the age requirement dropped to 18. To encourage enlistments and meet its production goals, the Army Air Forces (AAF) began using the Aviation Cadet Qualification Examination after 15 January 1942 in lieu of the former requirement for two years of college. In addition, the AAF couldn 9t afford the peacetime attrition rates. Maj Gen Barton K. Yount, Commander of the AAF Flying Training Command, wrote that some form of preflight training was inevitable to assure a common level of academic background and give newly recruited cadets the fundamentals of military discipline. 10 9 History of Preflight Training , pp. 18-19. 10 On 20 June 1941, the War Department created the U.S. Army Air Forces as its aviation element. On 23 January 1942, the AAF established the Air Corps Flying Training Command, redesignating it as the Army Air Forces Flying Training Command on 15 March 1942. On 7 July 1943, the AAF Flying Training Command merged with the 8 An early ground preflight trainer used at Randolph Field. The Air Corps had begun planning for preflight training as early as 1940. Preflight training allowed cadets from widely different educational backgrounds to receive a thorough indoctrination in physical and academic training to prepare them for the difficult flying training ahead of them. While officials agreed to the need for preflight training, the length of training and emphasis on various parts of the curriculum changed over the course of the war. When preflight training began in the fall of 1941, the course was 5 weeks long. A 9- week program replaced it in January 1942, which in turn was supplanted by a 10-week course in the spring of 1944. The core curriculum included academic preparation (mathematics, military hygiene, first aid, and military law), administrative indoctrination (customs and courtesies of the Air Corps, squadron administration and command, and organization lectures), basic military indoctrination (drill, ceremonies, and inspections), and physical training. As the length changed so did the emphasis on the various subjects; and as the AAF gained combat experience, new courses were included, such as gunnery practice, oxygen indoctrination, and a ground phase of flight training (aircraft identification; code; and maps, charts, and aerial photos). 11 AAF Technical Training Command to form the Army Air Forces Training Command. Alfred Goldberg, ed., A History of the United States Air Force , 1957, pp. 94-95; History of Preflight Training , p. 20. 11 History of Preflight Training , pp. 55-71. 9 Aviation cadets taking an aptitude test for placement as a pilot, navigator, or bombardier. On 21 February 1941, the War Department issued orders to establish replacement training centers at or near (in the case of Randolph and Kelly) the three regional training centers. Soon after the first two schools opened at Maxwell and Kelly in 1941, they began an experimental psychological testing program to direct cadets to appropriate training. While preflight training wasn 9t affected, the program required the trainee to take a series of tests before graduation to measure skills, psychological aptitudes, interest, knowledge, physical qualifications, and other characteristics. By weighing different sections of the psychomotor and psychological examinations, officials hoped to be able to determine a relative aptitude score, or stanine 4standard nine 4 for pilots, navigators, and bombardiers. Army officials began using the term stanine in 1942. It represented a score on a standard scale of measurement, which ran from 1 (the lowest) to 9 (the highest). Classification personnel used these stanines as a common index to place trainees in the proper training. 12 12 The War Department identified Moffet Field as the replacement training center for the West Coast Training Command, but it was returned to the Navy in the late spring of 1941. A newly constructed 10 Within the first three months of 1942, the number of trainees quickly overwhelmed the capacity of the replacement training centers, whose names changed to Preflight Training Centers on 30 April 1942. As a result, AAF training officials decided to split preflight from the classification of trainees, establishing three Classification Centers at Kelly, Santa Ana, and Nashville, Tennessee. By November 1943, however, the need for aircrews began to shrink, and the basic training centers took over all duties of processing and classifying aviation cadets in the spring of 1944. Between February 1942 and March 1944, the three regional classification centers processed 400,000 aircrew candidates: 260,000 (65 percent) as pilots, 40,000 (10 percent) as navigators, and 40,000 (10 percent) as bombardiers. The remaining 60,000 (15 percent) were eliminated for various reasons: physical disability, low aptitude, etc. Technical Training Command 9s basic training centers handled another 100,000. These basic training centers helped prepare the men psychologically for their particular jobs and eliminated those not qualified. 13 While a valuable way of coping with the hundreds of thousands of aircrew applicants and getting them into training as quickly as possible, none of the preflight training involved any actual flying. That came with the start of the College Training Program in 1943. By December 1942, the AAF had a backlog of 93,000 cadets waiting to go into the service. Lt Gen Henry H. cHap d Arnold, chief of the AAF, devised the college program as a way to absorb this backlog and keep the cadets busy, but it was also a way for cadets to get additional college training, primarily in math and physics. On 7 January 1943, the Secretary of War approved Arnold 9s basic plan, a five-month curriculum at various colleges across the country, with some modifications, including cCivilian pilot training for the screening of aircrew personnel to be base at Santa Ana was chosen as the new location, and training there did not begin until April 1942. Psychomotor refers to muscular action believed to result from prior, conscious mental activity. History of Preflight Training , pp. 20, 24, 28- 29, 31. 13 Ibid , pp. 33-34. 11 BT-13s and BT-14s were the standard basic trainers for much of World War II. give each qualified student during the month in which he completes his course. d He directed the AAF to have a minimum of 35,000 cadets in training no later than 1 April 1943. Two weeks later, on 20 January, AAF Flying Training Command told its three regional flying training centers to set it up. On 1 March 1943, some 35,000 trainees reported at the colleges, which had between 500 and 3,000 trainees each. By the end of the program in the spring of 1944, some 153 colleges provided training; enlistment hit its highest point on 31 December 1943 with 68,109 men. 14 By late 1943, the need for the College Training Program was gone. AAF officials believed they had a sufficient number of training facilities to handle the numbers of aircrews required to win the war. Flying Training Command was producing about 100,000 pilots a year, and combat attrition rates were down. Furthermore, the backlog of inactive recruits, the reason behind the College Training Program, was down as well. On 1 January 1944, the order went out to shut the program down. By 30 June 1944, only four students who were hospitalized remained in the program. 15 What makes the College Training Program of special interest was the 10-hour flight indoctrination course the college 14 Ibid , pp. 35-39, 46. 15 Ibid , pp. 42-44. 12 AT-6s flying from Maxwell Field in 1942. trainees received. The War Department included a proviso for civilian pilot training in its plan to initiate the program in January 1943. While the initial direction called for a screening program, in actuality it was a flight indoctrination program, providing flying familiarization only. General Yount, AAFFTC commander, said no student would be eliminated from the flying portion of the program except for airsickness or by personal request. Interestingly enough, many AAF personnel opposed the idea of civilian pilot training for these students, claiming it would be a waste of money, manpower, and critical resources; couldn 9t be operated efficiently; wouldn 9t screen out cmisfits; d and would serve only as a morale booster while the cadets were in college training. Nevertheless, Flying Training Command wired the three flying training centers that Civil Aeronautics Administration- sponsored flying training would be offered. Each trainee was to receive 10 hours of dual instruction, divided between 12 lessons. No students flew solo. While instructor pilots recorded satisfactory or unsatisfactory ratings on a CAA Flight Record form upon completion of each lesson, trainees were rarely eliminated. 16 16 The Civil Aeronautics Authority was renamed the Civil Aeronautics Administration in 1940. Like the earlier CAA project, the goal of the college flying program in 1943-1944 was to provide an introduction to flying, not flight screening. Ibid , pp. 46-47; History, AAFTC, 1 Jan 39- 7 Jul 43, pp. 535. 540, 567. 13 Opinions about the value of the 10 hours of flight indoctrination varied widely. Each of the three flying training centers agreed that the program lowered attrition in primary training; but by the time students reached basic, they were at the same proficiency level of those who didn 9t attend the program. Significant problems existed with the program as well. With no standardization, the actual instruction in many cases was the equivalent of cjoy-riding d and actual hands-on flying limited. Flight line discipline was poor, and the type of training and aircraft were too different from AAF flying training. Moreover, officials from the three flying training centers believed strongly that the costs of the program outweighed the benefits. Nonetheless, the entire College Training Program ended before Flying Training Command could act on its centers 9 recommendations to discontinue civilian flying training. 17 It is noteworthy, however, that the attrition rate in primary dropped in 1943 and 1944 when the college flying program was in operation and rose dramatically again both in primary and basic in 1945 after it ended (see the figure below). Whether or not this change can be attributed solely to the college training program is debatable, but it is interesting that officials from all three flying training centers agreed that even the 10 flying hours of familiarization cadets received helped reduce student washout rates early in primary training. Even though many in the AAF were opposed to a flying indoctrination program when it was initially proposed, they remembered the experience with the College Training Program when faced with skyrocketing attrition rates in the upcoming years. 18 17 History of Preflight Training, pp. 51-52. 18 History, AAFTC, 7 Jul 43-31 Dec 44, p. 281. 14 Figure 2 Pilot Training Attrition 1939-1945 Year Primary Attrition Basic Attrition 1939 36.6% 9.9% 1940 35.4% 9.3% 1941 34.2% 10.1% 1942 29.8% 10.2% 1943 25.8% 10.4% 1944 17.6% 12.1% 1945 24.6% 22.1% Source: History, ATC, Jan-Jun 1954, p. 98. Post War With the end of the College Training Program by mid- 1944, the AAF and its successor, the United States Air Force after 18 September 1947, did not consider light plane screening again until 1951. On 12 October 1945, all American aviation cadets in preflight training who had voluntarily entered the active duty enlisted reserves could either separate or revert to enlisted status, temporarily closing flying training to American cadets. In June 1946, the AAF adopted a 52-week peacetime pilot training program, consisting of 15 weeks of primary, 17 weeks of basic, and 17 weeks of advanced training. While the new program had no provisions for a formal preflight (ground-training) phase, the curriculum specified that the first 40 hours of primary would be designated as preflight. The first peacetime class of 474 U.S. officers entered primary training at Randolph on 15 October 1946, while the first class of aviation cadets didn 9t enter primary training until 1 July 1947, after the pool of existing officers desiring pilot training drew down. 19 19 On 1 July 1946, AAF Training Command was redesignated as Air Training Command. Ibid , pp. 152-154. 15 Air Training Command officials constantly refined the flying training program. On 15 October 1947, they combined primary and basic training into one program called cBasic Pilot Training. d Changes to the basic pilot curriculum made in July 1949 included increasing training from 52 to 56 weeks with the addition of a 4-week informal preflight phase. Furthermore, increased tensions stemming from the June 1948 Soviet closure of land routes into Berlin, Germany, and the resulting Berlin Airlift caused the Air Force to accelerate pilot training again, raising the possibility of returning to contract-operated flying training. On 25 July 1950, 1 month after the start of the Korean War, the Air Staff asked ATC to survey potential sites to accommodate 1,350 basic flying students a year. By October 1951, nine contract schools had opened at Greenville and Columbus AFBs, Mississippi; Spence Field and Bainbridge Airfield, Georgia; Bartow Field, Florida; Hondo Air Field, Texas; Malden Airfield, Missouri; Marana Airfield, Arizona; and Kinston (later Stallings) Airfield, North Carolina, to conduct basic flying training. 20 Tight budgets collided with the need to increase pilot production, derailing all plans to revamp ATC 9s flying training program. Nevertheless, it quickly was necessary to do just that, as recruiting pilot candidates got increasingly difficult at a time when eliminations and resignations from primary-basic training soared. Air Staff personnel examined pilot training in 1950-1951, discovering that of the 53 percent that washed out in the seven classes that graduated in 1950, only about 43 percent were eliminated because of flying deficiencies. The rest of the attrition came from fear of flying (4 percent), dislike of flying (3 percent), academic or military deficiencies (8 percent), physical deficiencies (15 percent), and lack of motivation (27 percent). 20 Ibid , pp. 170-171. 16 Air Staff analysts believed the majority of the problems occurred during basic flying training. Clearly, a means to eliminate trainees prior to their entry into the more expensive basic stage was imperative. 21 21 The attrition rates mentioned in this paragraph are different than those shown in the preceding chart; the rates are for different time periods, which accounts for the disparity. ATC activated Flying Training Air Force and Technical Training Air Force in 1951. History, ATC, Jul-Dec 52, pp. 35-36, 38. Figure 3 Post-War Pilot Production Year Entered Graduated Attrition Primary Basic SE* ME* 1946 629 344 22.7% 16.2% 1947 1,670 322 46.5% 18/9% 8.5% 1948 3,410 799 34.7% 8.2% 1.7% 1949** 3,841 1,765 41.7% 13.1% 2.4% 43.6% 11.8% 4.0% Jan-Jun 1950 2,026 837 46.9% 18.8% 7.8% Jul 1950-Jun 1951 # 5,606 2,110 48.1% 9.6% 4.7% 38.7% 13.6% 2.3% Jul 1951-Jun 1952 ## 9,547 3,062 29.6% 17.1% 4.2% 27.0% 13.5% 5.0% Jul-Dec 1952 3,111 2,313 27.5% 9.5% 2.2% * SE 3 single-engine ME 3 multi-engine ** Attrition separated between Jan-Jun 1949 and Jul-Dec 1949 # Attrition separated between Jul-Dec 1950 and Jan-Jun 1951 ## Attrition separated between Jul-Dec 1951 and Jan-Jun 1952 Source: History of Preflight Training , p. 153; Hist, ATC, Jan-Jun 54, p. 98. 17 T-6 trainer at Perrin AFB, Texas After receiving the Air Staff 9s study, ATC and Flying Training Air Force (FTAF) personnel spent four months analyzing the faults in the existing program, finding that many of the problems stemmed from the exclusive use of the T-6, an aircraft many considered too complicated for beginners. Since 40 hours of dual flying time was necessary before a trainee soloed in the T-6, this lengthy process potentially delayed earlier elimination from training. They, and other Air Force officers, advocated a long preflight and light-plane screening phase to precede flight training in the heavier T-6. By increasing preflight and providing some instruction in light planes, officials believed most of those with fear of flying, lack of motivation, or academic and medical problems would be eliminated before going into advanced training with the T-6 or T-28. Light planes had other advantages as well: they cost less initially and were cheaper to operate. FTAF personnel also believed aviations cadets were not receiving sufficient discipline and indoctrination into Air Force traditions, so they weren 9t ready to assume the full roles and responsibilities of Air Force officers upon graduation from flying training. 22 22 When the Air Force abandoned the advanced trainer (AT), basic trainer (BT), and primary trainer (PT) aircraft designations in 1948, those AT-6s still in USAF service were redesignated as T-6s. The initial phase of pilot training had been called basic; but on 1 Mar 1952, the designation was changed to primary pilot training, and the training formerly known as advanced training was changed to basic pilot training. Activation of the Crew Training Air Force on 16 March 1952 with a mission of conducting advanced training made these redesignations necessary. History of Preflight Training , pp. 178-179; Flying Training Air Force History, Jan-Jun 52, pp. 69, 133; ATC History, Jul-Dec 52, pp. 37, 40. 18 When the Air Staff completed its study of the 1950 pilot training classes, it recommended a four-phased approach to flying training, beginning with four months of preflight, progressing on to one month of light plane screening, and then going on to four months each of basic and advanced training. ATC refined this proposal, suggesting a total of 18 weeks of combined preflight and light plane screening (the latter to occur in the last 6 weeks and consist of 35 flying hours). Officers would enter straight into the light plane screening phase, shortening their course by 12 weeks. Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps (AFROTC) graduates who received the proposed (but not yet implemented) 35-flying- hour, light plane training during college would go straight into primary training. 23 While negotiations between HQ USAF and ATC staffs took place to finalize the new pilot training program, on 10 August 1951, the 3545 th (Basic) Pilot Training Wing at Goodfellow AFB, Texas, began an experiment known as Phase I, encompassing 30 students with no previous flying experience. Wing instructor pilots trained 6 students flying in Beechcraft YT-34s and 9 students in Temco YT-35s while the other 15 (serving as the control group) flew in the T-6 for primary training. Initially these two experimental trainers were referred to as clight d planes because they weighed less than the T-6, but that changed to creplacements for the T-6, d and L-16s, L-21s, and PA-18s were called light planes. Basically, the object of the test was to see if the experimental trainers would be satisfactory replacements for the T-6. Class 52-E graduated in February 1952. The Goodfellow instructor pilots found the students flying the YT-34s and YT-35s were equally, if not more, proficient than those trained in the T-6s. Although the results were compiled, HQ USAF made no decision on which aircraft to acquire as the T-6 replacement. The demands placed on DOD 9s budget in the early 1950s made production of either aircraft a remote possibility 4at best. Even so, by that time, 23 The designation clight plane d referred to the size and weight of the aircraft in which the flying occurred. ATC History, Jul-Dec 52, pp. 41- 42. 19 light plane screening was already an approved part of the four- phase program, known officially as the Revitalized Pilot Training Program. 24 The Korean War and the Revitalized Pilot Training Program For the first time, the Revitalized Pilot Training Program had provisions for early elimination of potentially unsatisfactory students with a goal to avoid the expenditure of excessive amounts of unproductive training efforts, money, and resources in the more expensive phases of pilot training. Light planes cost less to acquire, cost less to operate, and provided the screening to detect weak students early in training. The final concept scheduled 3 months of preflight, 6 months of primary training, 5 months of basic, and 3 months of advanced training conducted by Crew Training Air Force, a total of 17 months. It moved light plane screening from preflight, as originally proposed, to primary training, which consisted of two phases over 24 weeks: 25 flying hours over 6 weeks of light plane screening in Piper Cubs (designated PA-18s) at the contract schools and L-21s at Goodfellow AFB and 120 flying hours over 18 weeks in the T-6. Students in the 18-week basic course either followed the single- engine track in the T-28 or T-33 or the multi-engine track in the T- 6 and B-25. The purpose of the light plane screening phase was to eliminate students with fear of flying problems, chronic air sickness, and motivational deficiencies. 25 24 Although the histories provided no information on the fate of the 30 students who participated in the test, of the 79 students who made up Goodfellow 9s Class 52-E, 46 completed primary training, 5 were held over, 24 were eliminated for flying deficiencies, and 4 were withdrawn (2 for physical deficiencies and 2 for other reasons). This translates to a 41.77% attrition rate for the class. History, FTAF, 1 May 3 31 Dec 51, pp. 203-204; History, FTAF, 1 Jan-30 Jun 52, pp. 133-134, 146. 25 History, Flying Training Air Force, Jul-Dec 52, pp. 44-48; Richard Emmons, Major Changes in Undergraduate Pilot Training 1939-1998 , accessed at http://www.aetc.randolph.af.mil/ho/upt_changes/upt_prt1.htm on 9 Oct 03, hereafter referred to as Major Changes in UPT . 20 The first PA-18s at the contract flying school at Columbus AFB, Mississi pp i. Initially, plans called for opening new preflight schools at Greenville and Columbus AFBs in November 1952; but on 8 August 1952, ATC received permission to substitute Lackland for Greenville and Columbus. On 28 August 1952, Lackland AFB 9s commander, Brig Gen Wycliffe E. Steele, announced that Lackland would become the preflight school in November. Basically, it proved more economical to conduct preflight at one centralized location rather than two, and training at Lackland could be expanded at minimum expense. Furthermore, it cost less to conduct light-plane screening at the primary schools. Separating flight training from preflight wouldn 9t alter the original concept of preflight, so on 1 September FTAF published a revised preflight curriculum. The objective of the 3-month course was cto provide the aviation cadet with the fundamental knowledge required for his development as an Air Force officer. d FTAF officials expected the extended preflight to weed out the cundesirables d before they reached primary training, enabling the aviation cadet trainees to adapt more rapidly to the large-scale pilot training program while increasing training standardization. 26 26 History of Preflight Training , pp. 182-184, 186-187, 198-190; ATC History, Jul-Dec 52, p. 50. 21 The first class of 646 U.S. and 205 foreign pilot trainees to enter the revitalized, four-phase program began preflight training at Lackland on 3 November 1952. Originally identified as Class 53-H, ATC divided the group into three sections and designated them Classes 54-ABC. With the new 23-classes-per-year schedule, two-thirds of the class would graduate in 1954, making it a 954 class. Classes had to enter training every two weeks rather than the previous six weeks to match graduation dates from basic flying training with Crew Training Air Force 9s two-week advanced training entry cycle. This first class entered light plane screening on 6 February 1953. With over 7,000 students flying both the PA-18 and the T-6 during 1953, ATC found it necessary to spread training over 10 bases with 9 flying schools operated by civilian contractors (Bainbridge, Bartow, Graham, Columbus, Hondo, Malden, Marana, Spence, and Stallings) and one by the military (Goodfellow). The new syllabus published on 9 August 1953 cut five flying hours from the light plane-screening phase. Experience showed that 25 hours in the PA-18 were too many: after students became proficient, they began to form bad habits in their flying techniques, which they had to relearn and change when they progressed to the T-6. FTAF syllabus writers also eliminated work with loops and stalls since loops were too stressful on the high-winged Piper Cub and the T-6 had different stall procedures. 27 One of the more problematic discoveries from the Air Staff 9s 1950 study of attrition was that 27.75 percent of the students eliminated were removed from pilot training for motivational problems, indicating the prestige associated with military pilots had been lost somehow. In August 1952, prior to implementation of the Revitalized Pilot Training Program, ATC established Project Tiger to identify and solve the problem of poor motivation and morale in pilot trainees. Command officials concluded they had to build a new pilot training curriculum around the premise that each student was being trained to fly a jet 27 Flying Training Air Force History, Jan-Jun 53, pp. 39-40, 82-83; ATC History, Jul-Dec 53, p. 86. 22 aircraft in combat. By paying greater attention to the development of leadership, discipline, competitive spirit, and a will for combat, they theorized that motivational problems could be mitigated. As a result, the four-phase pilot training program was the first time an integrated training plan had been developed for the conversion of men with no flying experience into combat-ready pilots. During all phases of training, whether it be preflight, primary (including flight screening), or basic, all students would constantly be reminded that they were being trained to fly fighter aircraft in combat. Results from the various Project Tiger initiatives were only moderately successful. 28 When ATC implemented the new training program in November 1952, it set attrition goals at 7 percent for preflight, 17 percent for primary, and 4 percent for basic, with an overall undergraduate rate of 26 percent. However, during the first 18 months of operation, preflight attrition ranged between 12.7 percent and 14.1 percent. While attrition in primary declined from 27.5 percent in the last half of 1952 to 20 percent during the last half of 1954, providing evidence that preflight had some beneficial 28 ATC History, Jul-Dec 52, pp. 54-58, 66; ATC History, Jan-Jun 54, p. 102. Figure 4 Pre- and Post-Revitalized Pilot Training Program Attrition Time Preflight Attrition Primary Attrition Basic SE Attrition Basic ME Attrition Jan-Jun 1952 -- 27.0% 13.5% 5.0% Jul-Dec 1952 -- 27.5% 9.5% 2.2% Jan-Jun 1953 12.7% 24.4% 11.4% 3.5% Jul-Dec 1953 14.1% 22.5% 13.8% 7.5% Jan-Jun 1954 13.1% 20.0% 14.3% 11.2% Jul-Dec 1954 10.4% 17.5% 9.2% 6.8% Source: Hist, ATC, Jan-Jun 1954, p. 98; Hist, ATC, Jul-Dec 1954, pp. 147, 164, 171. 23 effect on primary eliminations, attrition goals were not met. Unfortunately, attrition in basic during that same time period increased from 9.5 to 14.3 percent in single-engine training and 2.2 to 11.2 percent in multi-engine. After examining the problem, the command discovered that self-elimination rates (students who didn 9t want to fly) had increased, replacing lack of motivation as a major cause of attrition. ATC analysts believed most of those who self-eliminated were student officers with college degrees who believed they were qualified for desirable civilian jobs; by self- eliminating, they had a way to get back to civilian life. Clearly, permanent reductions in attrition remained elusive, but other ways of cfixing d the attrition program existed. On 1 July 1954, the start of FY55, the Air Force raised attrition rates to a more realistic level. Beginning with Class 55-Q, the rates for primary increased to 22 percent (up from 17 percent) and 9 percent (up from 4) in basic for an overall total of 29 percent. 29 When the Air Force instituted the revitalized pilot training program in 1952, ATC officials regarded it as a considerable improvement over the previous system; however, they acknowledged that the use of aircraft not entirely suitable to the mission diminished the four-phase program 9s potential value. The ever-increasing speed and improved performance of the newest jets coming into the inventory required the use of faster and more responsive trainers in primary training. Air Force officials chose the PA-18 on an interim basis as the best available light aircraft when it decided to add light plane screening to primary, planning on replacing it with the T-34 as the new trainer became available. At 2,900 pounds and capable of flying at speeds of 120 knots, the T-34 was more like subsequent training aircraft than the PA-18, which weighed only 1,600 pounds and flew at 72 knots (the T-6 weighed 5,300 pounds and flew at speeds of 134 knots while the T-28 weighted 7,500 pounds and averaged 149 knots). 30 29 ATC History, Jul-Dec 53, p. 88; ATC History, Jan-Jun 54, pp. 73, 98, 100-101; FTAF History, Jan-Jun 54, pp. 42, 46-49. 30 The P-80 was introduced in 1945, the P-84 in 1947, and the F-86 in 1948. The Pursuit designation changed to Fighter in 1948. ATC History, Jan-Jun 54, pp. 78-79. 24 T-34s began replacing PA-18s in 1954. The 1952 plan called for converting the PA-18s and T-6s, beginning with the introduction of the T-34 in April 1954, with the retirement of the Piper Cubs and T-6s to be completed by July 1956. Student pilots would then fly the T-34 in light plane screening and the T-28 and its successor, the TX (ultimately the T- 37), for the rest of primary. Specifications called for a side-by- side, two-seat trainer with an average speed of 330 miles per hour, tricycle landing gear, and a minimum endurance of two hours in the air. The T-33 and its successor, the TZ jet, would be used in basic flight training. Air Force officials planned the high performance TZ (ultimately the T-38) to have tandem seating and be capable of speeds in the Mach 1 range (600 miles per hour). 31 On 21 January 1954, FTAF announced that the change out of the T-34 for the PA-18 would begin on 18 June 1954 with Class 55-P. The switch actually happened earlier than planned, and the school at Marana, Arizona, began using the heavier and faster T-34 on 11 May with Class 55-M. With the switch, FTAF increased flying time in the light plane screening portion of primary to 40 hours (12 hours in the pre-solo phase, 22 hours of contact proficiency, and 6 hours of aerobatics). In addition to screening trainees for fear of flying and airsickness problems, the T-34 had an additional advantage over the PA-18 in that it could more adequately screen for flying deficiencies since its curriculum included acrobatics like loops, Immelman loops, slow rolls, and barrel rolls. The command-wide switch from the PA-18 and T-6 to the T-34 and T-28 didn 9t occur until August 1956 when the school at Bartow Air Base in Florida completed its conversion. 32 31 ATC History, Jul-Dec 52, pp. 52-53. 32 FTAF History, Jan-Jun 54, pp. 56-62; History (S/RD), ATC, Jul-Dec 56, p. 38, info used is not S/RD. 25 AFROTC and the Flight Indoctrination Program Early in 1951, Maj Gen William McKee, the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, approved a long-range plan to transform AFROTC into the largest commissioning source of active duty officers. All of these officers would have college degrees, an important consideration for a service driven by technology. If this occurred and AFROTC became a major source for the pilot training program, ATC officials believed a desire for flying training should become a pre-requisite for entry into AFROTC. Unfortunately, in 1951 and 1952, only about 14 percent of AFROTC cadets volunteered for flying training, significantly lower than the 60 percent goal. In a program approved in November 1952, cadets began receiving a lot of pro-flying information during their last two years of college, supplemented by orientation flights in training aircraft during the summer encampments between their junior and senior years of college. 33 Previously, all officers, regardless of commissioning source and extent of military experience, entered flying training at primary. However, as the number of AFROTC graduates in pilot training increased (the goal was a ratio of 65 AFROTC graduates to every 35 aviation cadets), FTAF officials discovered they had insufficient experience and military training to permit direct entry into primary flying training. They recommended establishment of a formal preflight course to fill the cgap d between training provided at the university and training begun in the Air Force, to help these young officers get in the proper mindset for flying training and to motivate them to aspire to spend a career flying in the Air Force. On 6 July 1954, HQ USAF authorized a four-week preflight course for all ROTC graduates scheduled for pilot or observer training. Conducted at Lackland, the course roughly paralleled the 12-week course given to aviation cadets. Lackland began teaching the course on 17 September, and 1,471 AFROTC officers had completed it by the end of 1954. FTAF conducted a 33 ATC History, Jul-Dec 52, p. 59; Vance O. Mitchell, Air Force Officers Personnel Policy Development, 1944-1974 , pp. 108, 114-115. 26 comparison in March 1955 between graduates of the preflight course and those who entered primary directly. The study compared 541 student officers who had not completed the preflight course (Group A) to 538 who had (Group B). While the difference in total attrition between the two groups was negligible (18 percent for Group A versus 17 percent for Group B), the difference in attrition due to self-elimination was more significant 47 percent for Group A as compared to 2 percent for Group B. Overall, the evaluation revealed that the preflight students scored higher in all areas, especially in attitude, motivation levels, knowledge of service, and practical experience. ATC decided to keep the course. 34 The move to encourage AFROTC cadets toward careers as pilots received a big push in the summer of 1956 when Congress passed and President Dwight Eisenhower signed Public Law 879, authorizing the Air Force to provide light plane flying instruction to senior AFROTC cadets similar to that provided in the World War II Civilian Pilot Training Program. The goal of the Flight Instruction Program (FIP) was to motivate cadets toward a flying career, foster their feeling of participation in the Air Force, and provide a screening device to identify those pilot training applicants who lacked the basic aptitude for Air Force pilot training. Originally, Air Force officials hoped to offer FIP at 179 schools across the country to reach 2,880 cadets, but the budget never funded the program sufficiently to reach that level of participation. Air University, which picked up responsibility for AFROTC in August 1952, approved the first contracts early in December 1956. By June 1957, the Air Force had contracts with 41 colleges and universities across the country, which in turn contracted with nearby private flight schools to provide CAA- approved flight training. At the end of 1959, this number had increased to 150 contracts at over 163 schools, providing some 1,650 cadets with rudimentary flying training. Originally 34 ATC History, Jul-Dec 54, pp. 138, 141-144; FTAF History, Jul-Dec 54, pp. 75-76, 81-82; FTAF History, Jan-Jun 55, pp. 107-109 and SD III-5 in this history. 27 authorized for four years and continued incrementally after that, Congress made FIP permanent in November 1964. 35 By November 1958, ATC was able to draw some initial conclusions about the effect FIP participation had on primary flight training attrition. The primary attrition rates for Classes 59-C through 59-G (based on 380 FIP participants, 1,012 non-FIP AFROTC graduates, and 1,125 other American pilot candidates) were as follows: 6.3 percent for AFROTC FIP graduates, 24.7 percent for AFROTC non-FIP graduates, and 18.5 percent for the other American pilot candidates. After these early results, ATC officials believed FIP provided an inexpensive way to identify those not qualified for pilot training while reducing primary flying attrition. Drawbacks existed, however: the program did not produce a standardized graduate and participants had to unlearn a variety of bad flying habits during primary training. Nevertheless, HQ ATC Primary Training Division personnel were pleased with these first results. 36 These initial findings were validated in subsequent years. In the first 10 years of the program, 14,000 ROTC pilot candidates took part in FIP; and during this period, it proved to be an effective screening device, greatly enhancing its participants 9 chances of completing UPT. 37 Post-Korean War Fine-Tuning With the armistice ending the conflict in Korea in 1953, Congress once again reduced funding for defense, although this time America 9s military did not drawdown as precipitously as it had at the end of World War II. This was a time of continual fine tuning 35 AU History, Jul-Dec 56, pp 186-187; AU History, Jan-Jun 57, p. 44; AU History, Jul-Dec 58, pp. 40-41; AU History, Jul-Dec 59, see FY60/2 Quarterly Program Summary in Vol II; Capt Richard H. Jackson, cThe AFROTC FIP 4Success or Failure, d ACSC, Jun 66. 36 Brfg, ATC/DO, cAir Force ROTC Flight Instruction Program, d 17 Nov 58. 37 Capt Richard H. Jackson, cThe AFROTC FIP 4Success or Failure, d ACSC, Jun 66. 28 to the Air Force 9s pilot training program, including establishment of the Air Force Academy, transition to an all-jet training program, and closure of the contract primary flying schools. Happily, however, the primary attrition rate finally began showing a downward trend: by the end of 1954, preflight attrition was at 10.4 percent, down from 13.1 percent; primary attrition was 17.5 percent, down from 20 percent; and the combined single and multi engine basic attrition fell from 13.5 percent to 8.4 percent. On 16 September 1954, with ATC on track to meet its planned production rate for the first time since World War II, HQ USAF lowered subsequent production goals but said it was looking for an increase in the quality of trainees to accompany the decrease in quantity. Since many considered quality to be proportional to the amount of flying time given during training, ATC officials planned to increase flying time and decrease class sizes. Only 338 students would enter 8 primary classes per year instead of 426 students in 23 classes. With the change scheduled to go into effect with classes beginning July 1956, ATC increased flying time in primary and jet time in basic single-engine training. Flying time in the T-34 remained at 40 hours while time in the T-28 went from 90 to 100 hours, increasing time in contract proficiency and Figure 5 ROTC Primary UPT Attrition UPT Attrition FY60 FY61 FY62 FY63 FY64 FY65 FY66 FIP Students 18.1% 20.8% 17.0% 14.0% 15.6% 9.6% 13.1% Non-FIP Students 34.8% 44.8% 33.7% 23.0% 24.8% 15.2% 31.4% Total AF UPT 20% 19.4% 9% 10.3% 11.2% 12.7% * * Information was unavailable. Source: Capt R. H. Jackson, cThe AFROTC FIP 4Success or Failure, d ACSC, Jun 66. 29 navigation while giving the instructors 3 hours of optional training based on the students 9 needs. 38 Congress authorized creation of the Air Force Academy in 1954. Harold E. Talbott, then Secretary of the Air Force, selected a site near Colorado Springs, Colorado; and on 11 July 1955, the first class of 306 men began attending classes at the temporary site at Lowry AFB, Colorado. ATC began offering Pilot Indoctrination Training (PIT), later called the Pilot Indoctrination Program (PIP), for the Academy cadets almost immediately. Between 2 July and 21 September 1956, the first 240 cadets were airlifted from Colorado to four of the command 9s primary schools (Bainbridge, Graham, Moore, and Marana) where cadets received 10 actual flying hours (5 in the T-34 and 5 in the T-28) and about 30 hours of academics 4enough to provide an orientation and general knowledge of the aircraft rather than proficiency. They flew dual sorties only and were not permitted to solo. Instructors performed aerobatics only upon student request. Academy graduates identified for pilot training entered primary training for flight screening. 39 As the DOD budget continued to fall, HQ USAF directed cuts in the pilot production rates beginning in FY58. In response, FTAF conducted capability studies, concluding that it needed only seven primary schools to meet the reduced production requirements. Its officials recommended closing the schools at Marana and Stallings, which HQ USAF approved. ATC inactivated Marana in October 1957 and Stallings in November. But the decreases didn 9t stop there. The Air Staff cut FY 59-61 production rates to 3,800, and late in 1958 began using a 2,300 number as a basis for planning to allow for an increase of 38 ATC History, Jul-Dec 54, pp. 140, 145, 164, 171; FTAF History, Jul- Dec 54, p. 66; FTAF History (FOUO), Jul-Dec 56, p. 76, info used is not FOUO. 39 USAF Fact Sheet, Academy History, accessed at hppt://www.usafa.af.mil/pa/factsheets/history.htm on 20 Nov 03; FTAF History (FOUO) Jan-Jun 56, pp. 140-141, info used is not FOUO; FTAF History (FOUO), Jul-Dec 56, pp. 91-92, info used is not FOUO. 30 additional 38 flying hours in primary and basic. ATC began looking at the content and length of training for a complex of six primary and six basic installations. Officials considered increasing the course length for a higher quality student and devising a new curriculum for the upcoming T-37 and T-38 training. 40 In 1958, ATC officials began looking at the possibility of establishing an call-through d jet primary. As T-37 training at Bainbridge began on 21 January 1958 with Class 59-9, discussion with supervisors and instructor pilots indicated that students could solo in the T-37 almost as early as in the T-34. Furthermore, more and more AFROTC officers entered primary training with 30-40 hours of light-plane time and another 30 hours in the T-34. They had learned techniques peculiar to reciprocating, single-engine aircraft that required 15-20 hours flying time to unlearn once they began flying the T-37. Other advantages to an all jet primary included a smaller inventory of aircraft, with associated reduced levels of supply, support, and maintenance, and fewer flying hours 4all requiring less funding. ATC thought it could reduce the first phase in primary by 50 hours or eliminate it all together. Bainbridge created a test class with 60-D on 19 November 1958. cAll-through d students would receive 115 flying hours only in the T-37 in a 98-day training course, immediately followed by another 15 hours of continuation flying over 10 training days. The control group continued with the 130 hours program in 108 training days 430 hours in the T-34 and 100 hours in the T-37. Upon completion of the test in the summer of 1959, Bainbridge leaders recommended going to all T-37 training. They also wanted to include formation flying and 1½ hours of tactical recovery on instruments for a total of 130 flying hours. 41 40 FTAF History (FOUO), Jan-Jun 57, p. 26, info used is not FOUO; History (S/RD), ATC, Jul-Dec 58, p. 28, info used is not S/RD. 41 History (S/RD), ATC, Jul-Dec 58, pp. 26-27, 36-37, info used is not S/RD; History (FOUO), ATC, Jan-Jun 59, pp. 41-43, info used is not FOUO. 31 As pilot production requirements continued to fall, ATC looked for a new training concept 4combining preflight, primary, and basic instruction at the same locations. In March 1960, the Secretary of the Air Force approved Consolidated Pilot Training (CPT), which would go into effect in March 1961. ATC also wanted to replace the civilian flying instructors with military officers, phasing out the contracted primary schools. The command selected six bases for CPT: Craig, Webb, Vance, Reese, Williams, and Moody, adding Laredo by the end of the year. All training at the remaining contract primary schools, Graham, Moore, Spence, Bartow, Malden, and Bainbridge, ended on 21 December. Students stopped flying the T-34s, used since 1954, after November 1960, ending the ATC-taught portion of flight screening. Consisting of three phases 4preflight (transferred from Lackland to the pilot and navigator schools), primary, and basic, the all-jet (T-37 and T-33) undergraduate pilot training (UPT) program began on 13 March 1961 with the entry of Class 62-F Figure 6 Pilot Training Attrition 1955-1959 Time Preflight Attrition Primary Attrition Basic SE Attrition Basic ME Attrition Jan-Jun 1955 8.4% 21.1% 14.0% 12.4% Jul-Dec 1955 7.0% 23.5% 11.0% 8.1% Jan-Jun 1956 8.1% 19.4% 11.7% 7.2% Jul-Dec 1956 7.9% 18.3% 14.1

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