Is China a Threat to the U.S. Economy?

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Order Code RL33604 Is China a Threat to the U.S. Economy? Updated January 23, 2007 Craig K.

Elwell and Marc Labonte Specialists in Macroeconomics Government and Finance Division Wayne M. Morrison Specialist in International Trade and Finance Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Is China a Threat to the U.S. Economy?

Summary The rise of China from a poor, stagnant country to a major economic power within a time span of only 28 years is often described by analysts as one of the greatest economic success stories in modern times. From 1979 (when economic reforms were first introduced) to 2006, China 9s real gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an average annual rate of 9.7%, the size of its economy increased over 11- fold, its real per capita GDP grew over 8-fold, and its world ranking for total trade rose from 27 th to 3 rd . By some measurements, China has become the world 9s second- largest economy, and it could be the largest within a decade.

China 9s economic rise has led to a substantial growth in U.S.-China economic relations. Total trade between the two countries has surged from $4.9 billion in 1980 to an estimated $343 billion in 2006. For ... more. less.

the United States, China is now its second largest trading partner, its fourth-largest export market, and its second-largest source of imports. Inexpensive Chinese imports have increased the purchasing power of U.S. consumers. Many U.S. companies have extensive manufacturing operations in China in order to sell their products in the booming Chinese market and to take advantage of low-cost labor for exported goods. China 9s purchases of U.S. Treasury securities have funded federal deficits and helped keep U.S. interest rates relatively low. Despite the perceived threat from China, the U.S. economy has recently maintained full employment and robust economic growth. To date, the growth in Chinese exports appears to have come partly at the expense of Asian competitors. However, the emergence of China as a major economic superpower has raised concern among many U.S. policymakers. Some express concern that China will overtake the United States as the world 9s largest trade economy in a few years and as the world 9s largest economy within the next two decades. In this context, China 9s rise is viewed as America 9s relative decline. Another concern are the large and growing U.S. trade deficits with China, which have risen from $10.4 billion in 1990 to an estimated $232 billion in 2006, and are viewed by many Members as an indicator that China uses unfair trade practices (such as an undervalued currency and subsidies to domestic producers) to flood U.S. markets with low-cost goods and to restrict U.S. exports, and that such practices threaten American jobs, wages, and living standards. Many warn that this situation will get worse as China increasingly moves toward production and export of more high-value products, such as cars and computers. A more recent concern has been efforts by Chinese state-owned firms to acquire U.S. companies and China 9s accumulation of U.S. Treasury securities. Negative congressional perceptions of China 9s economic practices have led to the introduction of numerous bills, including some that would impose sanctions against China unless it reforms its currency policy and others that would apply U.S. countervailing laws on Chinese products. This report examines the implications (both challenges and opportunities) for the U.S. economy from China 9s rapid economic growth and its emergence as a major economic power. It also describes congressional approaches for dealing with various Chinese economic policies deemed damaging to various U.S. economic sectors. This report will be updated as events warrant. Contents China 9s Economic Growth: Causes and Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Historical Perspective on China 9s Economic Miracle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The Introduction of Economic Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Results of Economic Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Why Is China Growing So Fast? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 High Savings and Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Foreign Direct Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Productivity Increases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Can China Continue To Grow at Rapid Rates Over the Long Term? . . . . . 11 Projections of China 9s Future Economic Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Comparing the Size of the U.S. and Chinese Economies: Will China Overtake the United States? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Historical Perspective on China 9s Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Using Purchasing Power Parity To Compare the Economies of the United States and China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Will China Overtake the U.S. Economy? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 China as the World 9s Largest Exporting Economy? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Growth in U.S.-China Economic Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Growing U.S. Exports to China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 The Growth of U.S. Imports from China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Why Are U.S. Imports from China Rising So Quickly? . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Growing Trade in Advanced Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 U.S. Direct Investment in China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Does Trade with China Harm the U.S. Economy? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Trade and Jobs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Sectoral Employment Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Trade and Wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 cUnfair d Trade Practices and the Gains from Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Effects of the Bilateral Trade Deficit and the Exchange Rate Policy on the U.S. Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Effect on Exporters and Import-Competitors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Effect on U.S. Borrowers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Effect on U.S. Consumers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Net Effect on the U.S. Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 The U.S.-China Trade Deficit in the Context of the Overall U.S. Trade Deficit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Purchase of U.S. Treasuries To Maintain the Peg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 What Will Happen to the Terms of Trade? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Chinese Takeovers of U.S. Companies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Congressional Concern over the CNOOC Bid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Rising Chinese Demand for Commodities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 List of Tables Table 1. China 9s Average Annual Real GDP Growth Rates, 1960-2006 . . . . . . . 5 Table 2. China 9s Merchandise World Trade, 1979-2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Table 3. Foreign Direct Investment in China, Selected Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Table 4. Exports and Imports by Foreign-Invested Enterprises in China: 1986-2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Table 5. Projections of China 9s Real GDP Growth: 2006-2030 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Table 6. Historical Comparison of U.S. and Chinese GDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Table 7. Estimates of U.S., Japanese, and Chinese GDP and Per Capita GDP in Nominal U.S. Dollars and PPP, 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Table 8. Global Insight Projections of U.S. and Chinese GDP and Per Capita Income (PPP Basis), Selected Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Table 9. Chinese and U.S. Exports of Goods and Services: 2006 and Projections through 2030 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Table 10. U.S. Merchandise Trade with China: 1980-2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Table 11. U.S. Merchandise Exports to Major Trading Partners in 2001, 2005, and January-November 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Table 12. U.S. Imports from Asia and China, as a Percentage of Total U.S. Imports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Table 13. Leading Foreign Suppliers of U.S. Computer Equipment Imports: 2000-2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Table 14. U.S. Trade with China in Advanced Technology Products: 2000 and 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Table 15. Foreign Direct Investment Flows to China: 1979-2005 . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Table 16. China 9s Foreign Exchange Reserves and Chinese Ownership of U.S. Treasuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Is China a Threat to the U.S. Economy? The rise of China from a poor, stagnant country to a major economic power within a time span of only 28 years is often described by analysts as one of the greatest economic success stories in modern times. Prior to 1979, China maintained a Soviet-style command economy under which the state controlled most aspects of the economy. These policies kept the economy relatively stagnant and living standards quite low. However, beginning in 1979, the government began a series of free market reforms and began opening up to the world in terms of trade and investment. These reforms have produced dramatic results. From 1979 to 2005, China 9s real gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an average annual rate of 9.7%, the size of its economy increased over 11-fold, its real per capita GDP grew over 8- fold, and its world ranking for total trade rose from 27 th to 3 rd . China 9s economic reforms and growth have benefitted (or could benefit) the U.S. economy in a number of ways: ! Over the past few years, China has been the fastest growing U.S. export market among its major trading partners. For example, U.S. exports to China in 2006 increased by an estimated 33%. China 9s ranking as a U.S. export market rose from 11 th in 2000 to 4 th in 2006, and may overtake Japan in 2007 to become 3 rd . China 9s rapid economic growth, coupled with its large population and development needs, makes it a potentially huge market for the United States. ! China has become the second-largest source for U.S. imports. In many instances, China has replaced other East Asian nations as a source for many manufactured products imported by the United States. Low-cost imports from China have helped restrain inflation and increased the purchasing power of U.S. consumers, and boosted demand for other products. This has helped U.S. production to shift into areas where the United States has a comparative advantage. ! China has become the second-largest purchaser of U.S. Treasury securities. These purchases have helped to fund the U.S. federal budget deficit and keep interest rates relatively low. At the same time, however, China 9s emergence as an economic power has raised a number of concerns among some Members of Congress who perceive China as a threat, or potential threat, to the U.S. economy. As one Member stated, cChina 9s competitive challenge makes Americans nervous. From Wall Street to Main Street, CRS-2 1 Statement of Senator Max Baucus during the Senate Committee on Finance hearing on U.S.-China Relations, June 23, 2005. 2 During the 1980s, Members complained of a growing U.S.-Japan trade imbalance, Japan 9s growing trade surplus and accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, Japanese trade and investment barriers, government industrial policies intended to promote the development of targeted industries, and Japanese purchases of U.S. assets in the United States (government securities, land, and companies). Americans are nervous about China 9s effect on the American economy, American jobs, on the American way of life. d 1 Areas of concern include the following issues: ! Analysts project that in the near future, China will replace the United States as the world 9s largest economy and exporter. In this context, China 9s economic rise is viewed as America 9s decline. ! The surge in U.S. imports from China is viewed by many as a threat to various U.S. economic sectors, particularly in manufacturing. China 9s nearly unlimited pool of low-cost labor is viewed by some as a serious competitive threat to U.S. manufacturing and is blamed for bankruptcies and/or plant relocation to China, job losses, and stagnant U.S. wages. This process could get worse as China begins to manufacture more advanced products that compete directly with those made by U.S. domestic firms. ! Many are concerned that China employs a number of unfair economic policies intended to benefit its economy at the expense of its trading partners, such as the United States. Many policymakers view the large and growing trade imbalance with China as proof that China does not trade fairly. They contend, for example, that China 9s policy of pegging its currency to the U.S. dollar is a deliberate policy meant to make Chinese exports relatively cheap in world markets, while discouraging imports. They also contend that China uses industrial policies (such as subsidies) and other unfair trade practices (such as dumping) to promote the development of various industries (such as autos and steel) deemed important to national development, which undermines the ability of U.S. firms in these sectors to compete in global markets, including the domestic U.S. market. In many respects, the rise of China as a global economic power is subject to the same interpretation as the economic rise of Japan during the 1970s and 1980s and the impact that rise was thought to have on the U.S. economy. 2 ! Analysts describe a number of negative consequences of China 9s rapid economic growth, such as increasing demand for oil and raw materials (which drives up their prices) and growing pollution (which could have global implications). In addition, the lack of an effective intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement regime (and limited market access for IPR-related products) has led to widespread IPR piracy in China. Not only does such piracy greatly CRS-3 3 The rise of China as an economic power has a number of important political, military, and strategic implications for the United States that are not addressed in this report. For an examination of these issues, see CRS Report RL32882, The Rise of China and Its Effect on Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea: U.S. Policy Choices , by Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery; CRS Report RL32688, China-Southeast Asia Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications for the United States , by Bruce Vaughn and Wayne M. Morrison; CRS Report RL33055, China and Sub-Saharan Africa , by Kerry Dumbaugh and Mark P. Sullivan; and CRS Report RS22119, China 9s Growing Interest in Latin America , by Raymond W. Copson, Kerry Dumbaugh, and Michelle Lau. diminish China as a market for IPR-related industries (such as music and software), such industries are further harmed by China 9s export of pirated products. ! Some analysts have raised concern over the possible consequences if China decided to reduce its large holdings of U.S. Treasury securities. Others worry about the potential effect of Chinese state- owned companies 9 attempts to purchase U.S. firms. This report examines the implications for the U.S. economy of China 9s rapid economic growth and its emergence as major economic power. 3 It addresses various contentions that have been put forth that certain aspects of China 9s economic growth, policies, and practices pose a threat to the U.S. economy. It also addresses several questions, including the following: ! Why is China 9s economy growing so fast? Will China overtake the United States as the world 9s largest exporter or largest economy? If so, what are the implications for the U.S. economy? ! What are the causes of the large and increasing trade deficits with China? Have these resulted from China 9s economic and assessment practices or other global forces? Do they negatively affect the U.S. economy? ! How do allegedly unfair Chinese trade practices, such as trade barriers, industrial policies, and failure to adequately protect U.S. intellectual property rights, affect the U.S. economy? ! How does the high level of low-cost imports from China affect U.S. employment, wages, and terms of trade? ! Is Chinese ownership of U.S. firms and U.S. public debt securities good or bad for the U.S. economy? ! What legislation has been proposed in Congress to respond to unfair Chinese trade practices? What other options might be available to U.S. policymakers? The report concludes that although China will likely become the world 9s largest economy within the next decade or two (provided it can continue to deepen economic CRS-4 reforms), its living standards (as measured by per capita GDP) will remain substantially below those in the United States for several decades to come. The assessment presented in this report suggests that China 9s economic ascendancy will not in and of itself undermine or lower U.S. living standards 4 these will be largely determined by U.S. economic policies. In addition, although various Chinese economic policies may have negative effects on certain U.S. economic sectors (and there are valid economic reasons why many of these should be addressed), other U.S. sectors (as well as consumers) have benefitted, and thus far the overall impact of China 9s economic growth and opening up to the world appears to have been positive for both the U.S. and Chinese economies. From an economic perspective, describing China 9s economic rise or its economic policies as an economic cthreat d to the United States fails to reflect the complex nature of the economic relationship and growing economic integration that is taking place. Hence it may be more accurate to say that China 9s economic growth poses both challenges and opportunities for the United States. China 9s Economic Growth: Causes and Prospects Historical Perspective on China 9s Economic Miracle Prior to 1979, China maintained a centrally planned, or command, economy. A large share of the country 9s economic output was directed and controlled by the state, which set production goals, controlled prices, and allocated resources throughout most of the economy. During the 1950s, China 9s individual household farms were collectivized into large communes. To support rapid industrialization, the central government undertook large-scale investments in physical and human capital during the 1960s and 1970s. As a result, by 1978 nearly three-fourths of industrial production was produced by centrally controlled state-owned enterprises subject to centrally planned output targets. Private enterprises and foreign investment were nearly nonexistent. A central goal of the Chinese government was to make China 9s economy relatively self-sufficient. Foreign trade was generally limited to obtaining only those goods that could not be made in China. Although some growth occurred, these policies kept the Chinese economy relatively stagnant and inefficient, mainly because there were few profit incentives for firms and farmers. Competition was virtually nonexistent, and price and production controls caused widespread distortions in the economy. Chinese living standards were substantially lower than those of many other developing countries. The Introduction of Economic Reforms Beginning in 1979, the Chinese government reversed course and launched several economic reforms in the hope that they would significantly increase economic growth and raise living standards. The central government initiated price and ownership incentives for farmers, which enabled them to sell a portion of their crops on the free market. In addition, the government established four special economic zones along the coast for the purpose of attracting foreign investment, boosting exports, and importing high-technology products into China. Additional reforms, CRS-5 4 Many analysts contend that Chinese government economic data (prior to reforms) may have been exaggerated for propaganda purposes, especially during periods of economic upheaval that took place during the Great Leap Forward (1958-1972) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Similar doubts remain about the quality of current data. which followed in stages, sought to decentralize economic policymaking in several sectors, especially trade. Economic control of various enterprises was given to provincial and local governments, which were generally allowed to operate and compete on free market principles, rather than under the direction and guidance of state planning. Additional coastal regions and cities were designated as open cities and development zones, which allowed them to experiment with free market reforms and to offer tax and trade incentives to attract foreign investment. In addition, state price controls on a wide range of products were gradually eliminated. Results of Economic Reforms Since the introduction of economic reforms, China 9s economy has grown substantially faster than during the pre-reform period (see Table 1 ) and has been one of the world 9s fastest growing economies. From 1960 to 1978, annual real GDP growth averaged 5.3%. 4 However, in the post-reform period from 1979 to 2006, growth averaged 9.7% (it grew by 10.5% in 2006 over the previous year). Table 1. China 9s Average Annual Real GDP Growth Rates, 1960-2006 Time period Average annual growth (%) 1960-1978 (pre-reform) 5.3 1979-2005 (post-reform) 9.7 1990 3.8 1991 9.3 1992 14.2 1993 14.0 1994 13.1 1995 10.9 1996 10.0 1997 9.3 1998 7.8 1999 7.6 2000 8.4 2001 8.3 2002 9.1 2003 10.0 2004 10.1 2005 9.9 2006 (est) 10.5 Source: Official Chinese government data. Economic reforms have transformed China into a major trading power. Chinese exports rose from $18 billion in 1980 to $969 billion in 2006, while imports over this CRS-6 5 Based on purchasing power parity measurements. Source: EIU. 6 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Development Report, 2005 , p. 1. period grew from $20 billion to $791 billion (see Table 2 ). Trade has constituted an important source of China 9s economic growth and efficiency gains. In 2004, China surpassed Japan as the world 9s third-largest trading economy (after the European Union and the United States). China 9s trade continues to grow dramatically: in just three years (2003 to 2006), the size of China 9s trade doubled. In 2006, China 9s exports and imports rose by 26% and 20%, respectively, over 2005 levels. China 9s trade surplus has risen sharply in recent years, going from $24 billion in 2004, to $102 billion in 2005, to $178 billion in 2006. Table 2. China 9s Merchandise World Trade, 1979-2006 ($ billions) Year Exports Imports Trade Balance 1979 13.7 15.7 -2.0 1980 18.1 19.5 -1.4 1985 27.3 42.5 -15.3 1990 62.9 53.9 9.0 1995 148.8 132.1 16.7 2000 249.2 225.1 24.1 2005 762.0 660.1 101.9 2006 969.1 791.5 177.6 Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics , and official Chinese statistics. In addition to the data cited above, some highlights of China 9s rapid economic rise and current level of economic development are reflected in the following data: ! China 9s GDP as a percentage of world GDP rose from 4.5% in 1984 to 16.3% in 2006. 5 ! Foreign direct investment in China rose from $109 million in 1979 to over $72 billion 2005, making it the largest destination for FDI among developing countries and the third-largest overall FDI destination after the United States and the United Kingdom. 6 ! According to the U.S. Commerce Department, China 9s middle class (defined as per capita income over $8,000) currently totals 200 CRS-7 7 Merrill Lynch, Capgemini, 2005 World Wealth Report , 2004, p. 29. 8 People 9s Daily , Jan. 22, 2003. 9 This accounted for only 10.0% of the Chinese population (compared with 70% in the United States). See Internet World Stats, [http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats3.htm]. 10 Poverty level based on the number of people living on less than $1 dollar per day standard. Source: World Bank , Fighting Poverty: Findings and Lessons from China 9s Success . million people. According to Merrill Lynch, in 2004, China had 300,000 millionaires (holdings of at least $1 million in assets ). 7 ! China currently has the world 9s largest mobile phone network and one of the fastest-growing markets, with an estimated 432 million cellular phone users (as of August 2006), compared to 87 million users in 2000. ! In 2002, China replaced Japan as the world 9s second-largest personal computer (PC) market. 8 China also became the world 9s second- largest Internet user (after the United States), with 136 million users in 2006, up from 22.5 million in 2000. 9 ! According to the World Bank, from 1981 to 2001, economic reforms helped raise more than 400 million people out of extreme poverty. 10 ! China 9s foreign exchange reserves rose from $2.5 billion at the end of 1980 to $819 billion at the end of 2005. In February 2006, China overtook Japan to become the world 9s largest holder of foreign exchange reserves (at $854 billion), and by the end of 2006, the Chinese government estimated that reserves had topped $1 trillion. Why Is China Growing So Fast? Table 1 indicates that China 9s real GDP in the reform period has grown nearly twice as fast as before the reform period. What factors have caused this to occur? Economic theory holds that economic output can be boosted by increasing inputs of physical and human capital (e.g., investment in plant and equipment, education, infrastructure) and/or labor (i.e., growth in the labor force). At some point, however, barring technical advances, increases in capital and labor eventually produce diminishing returns to output, and hence the accelerated economic growth is unlikely to be sustained. However, output can also be boosted by productivity gains (i.e., improvements in the efficiency with which inputs are used). Productivity gains can be obtained, for example, by adopting technological advances or improving managerial practices. As a result, greater output can be achieved using the same level of capital and labor inputs. High Savings and Investment. Several economists have attributed China 9s rapid economic growth since 1979 to a large accumulation of capital and to vast improvements in productivity that have resulted from economic reforms. These two factors generally went hand in hand. Improved productivity increased growth and CRS-8 11 In comparison, the U.S. savings rate was 10.2%. Savings defined as aggregate national savings by the public and private sector as a percentage of nominal GDP. ( Economist Intelligence Unit database.) 12 Chinese officials recently revised China 9s 2005 FDI total to $72.4 billion, claiming previous estimates excluded FDI in the banking, insurance, and securities sectors. (See People 9s Daily , June 9, 2006). However, revisions were not made for previous years. generated funds used for new investment. China also benefitted from having a very large pool of domestic savings to draw from to finance investment when reforms were begun. When reforms were initiated in 1979, domestic savings as a percentage of GDP stood at 32%. However, most Chinese savings during this period were generated by the profits of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which were used by the central government for domestic investment. Economic reforms, which included the decentralization of economic production, led to substantial growth in Chinese household savings (these now account for half of Chinese domestic savings). As a result, savings as a percentage of GDP has steadily risen; it reached 51.1% in 2006, among the highest savings rates in the world. 11 Foreign Direct Investment. China 9s trade and investment reforms and incentives led to a surge in foreign direct investment (FDI), which has been a major source of China 9s capital growth. Annual FDI in China showed the fastest growth in the 1990s, when it grew from $3.5 billion in 1990 to $37.5 billion in 1995, more than a 10-fold increase. From 1995 to 2005, the level of annual FDI more than doubled to $72.4 billion. 12 Although small relative to domestic saving, it is argued that this capital is used much more efficiently (much domestic saving flows to state owned enterprises), and thus makes an outsized contribution to economic growth. The cumulative level of FDI in China at the end of 2005 stood at about $633 billion (see Table 3 ). Table 3. Foreign Direct Investment in China, Selected Years Year FDI ($ millions) 1979 109 1985 1,658 1990 3,487 1995 37,521 2000 40,714 2005 72,410 1979-2005 (Cumulative) 632,790 Sources: U.S. Departments of Commerce and State, Doing Business In China: A Country Commercial Guide for U.S. Companies , 2005, and China Daily . Note: In June 2006, Chinese officials revised their 2005 FDI data from $60.3 billion to $72.4 billion to include FDI flows into the banking, insurance, and securities sectors. Therefore, 2005 data may not be comparable to previous data. CRS-9 13 Hu, Zuliu F., and Khan, Mohsin S. Why Is China Growing So Fast? International Monetary Fund Staff Paper, vol. 44, no. 1, March 1997, p. 116. 14 Ibid, p. 117. Much of the FDI going into China has gone into export-oriented manufactured goods, such as consumer electronics. The level of both Chinese imports and exports attributed to foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) in China has risen dramatically, as shown in Table 4 . In 1986, only 1.9% of China 9s exports were from FIEs, but by 2005, this share had risen to 58.3%. A similar pattern can be seen with imports: FIEs accounted for only 5.6% of China 9s imports in 1986, but rose to 58.7% in 2005. Table 4. Exports and Imports by Foreign-Invested Enterprises in China: 1986-2005 Year Exports by FIEs Imports by FIEs $ billions As a % of total Chinese exports $ billions As a % of total Chinese imports 1986 $0.6 1.9% $2.4 5.6% 1990 7.8 12.6 12.3 23.1 1995 46.9 31.5 62.9 47.7 2000 119.4 47.9 117.2 52.1 2005 444.2 58.3 387.5 58.7 Source: Chinese Ministry of Commerce. Productivity Increases. Several studies have shown that productivity gains have been a major cause of China 9s rapid economic growth since reforms were implemented. For example 4 ! An International Monetary Fund (IMF) study concluded that productivity growth was a significant cause of China 9s economic growth during its reform period. The study estimated that from 1952 to 1978, capital accumulation accounted for 65% of China 9s output growth, with productivity and labor input growth accounting for 18% and 17%, respectively. In contrast, between 1979 and 1994 (during China 9s economic reform period), productivity growth accounted for nearly 42% of its economic output growth, while increases in capital and labor inputs accounted for 58%. 13 The IMF study concluded that c[a]lthough growth rates in both capital and labor inputs rose significantly in 1979-1994, the productivity growth differential appears to explain the bulk of the difference in output growth between pre-reform and reform periods. d 14 CRS-10 15 World Bank, World Development Report , 1996, p. 25. 16 Other contributors to growth included capital stock (36%), educational attainment (15%), and labor (13%). 17 Goldman Sachs, China 9s Ascent: Can the Middle Kingdom Meet its Dreams , Global Economics Paper No. 133, November 11, 2005, p. 8. 18 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Economic Survey of China , September 2005. ! A World Bank study reached similar conclusions, estimating that (total factor) productivity grew by more than 3% annually from 1985 to1994 (a rate the World Bank describes as cexceptional by international standards d), and that one-third of the increase in China 9s output was the result of increased productivity. 15 ! Goldman Sachs estimates that China 9s total factor productivity grew at an estimated 3.4% per annum between 1979 and 2004, accounting for 36% of China 9s growth. 16 According to Goldman Sachs, the productivity gains were the result of China 9s extremely low starting point of economic development when reforms began, and a cprofound evolution of government policies that have gradually but consistently reduced inefficiencies in the system. d 17 Economists note that China 9s economic reforms have led to a reallocation of resources to more productive uses, especially in sectors that were formerly controlled by the central government, such as agriculture, trade, and services. Agricultural reforms boosted production and freed workers to pursue employment in activities where their marginal product was higher. From 1978 to 1994, the proportion of the workforce engaged in agricultural production dropped from 71% to 54%. A large share of these workers found employment in locally controlled enterprises or foreign joint ventures. In addition, a greater share of investment was being made by the non- state sector (such as privately owned firms), whose output tended to grow more rapidly than SOEs. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) found that market reforms, which led to a significant decline in the role of the state sector in the economy and a sharp increase in the role of the non-state sector, were a major contributor to China 9s rapid productivity gains and economic growth. The OECD estimated that the private sector was responsible for as much as 57% of the value-added produced by the non-farm business sector (up from 43% in 1998) and three-fourths of China 9s exports in 2003. It also found that the growth of the private sector (including the role of foreign invested firms in China) was a major cause of China 9s productivity gains and that private firms enjoy a significantly higher rate of return on their assets than SOEs (15.0% versus 10.2%). 18 China 9s opening up to trade and investment has contributed to China 9s productivity gains. An important result of foreign investment in China and increased trade has been significant spillovers in technology and managerial know-how to Chinese firms. CRS-11 19 See CRS Report RL33416, Social Unrest in China , by Thoms Lum. Can China Continue To Grow at Rapid Rates Over the Long Term? Growth theory holds that countries can increase their level of economic growth by boosting their savings/investment levels and by increasing productivity. Over time, adding more capital per worker has a diminishing rate of return; therefore, economic growth is equal to the growth in the work force, the so called csteady state d rate of growth. The only way to increase the steady state rate of growth is to increase productivity. Thus, countries such as China with very high savings and investment rates, and improvements to productivity (through acquisition of foreign know-how and reforms to their economy), can obtain very high rates of growth in the short run. Over time, the level of growth will likely slow as capital produces diminishing rates of return and productivity gains slow because the benefits of copying and catching up diminish. At that point, it is expected that China 9s growth rate would slow to a rate comparable to the United States or Japan. But with a per capita income equal to only one-seventh that of the United States (at purchasing power parity), China still has plenty of room for rapid catch-up growth in the near term. At the same time, however, China maintains a number of inefficient and potentially harmful policies that could significantly limit future economic development if not addressed. Some of these include: ! Support for inefficient firms . SOEs, which account for about one- third of Chinese industrial production, put a heavy strain on China 9s economy. It is estimated that between a third and one half of all SOEs are unprofitable and must be supported by subsidies, mainly through loans by government-controlled banks. Many SOEs do not repay these loans, and as a result, the banks have accumulated substantial level of non-performing loans. Government support of unprofitable SOEs diverts resources away from potentially more efficient and profitable enterprises (especially in the private sector) and puts the banking system at risk to future financial crises. ! Public unrest. The Chinese government reported that there were more than 87,000 protests/public disturbances in 2005 (up from 53,000 protests reported in 2003) involving millions of people. Sources of these protests have reportedly included issues such as pollution, government corruption, resentment over growing income disparities, layoffs from SOEs, and government land seizures. 19 Growing unrest could threaten political stability and hence undermine future growth. ! Growing Pollution. Pollution poses serious health risks to the population, and this could undermine worker productivity. According to the World Bank, 20 out of the world 9s most polluted CRS-12 20 World Bank, China Quick Facts . 21 China Daily , June 6, 2006. 22 Xinhua News Service, Dec. 22, 2004. cities are in China. 20 According to Zhu Guangyao, deputy chief of the State Environmental Protection Agency, environmental damage costs the country $226 billion, or 10 percent of the country 9s GDP, each year. 21 The Chinese government estimates that there are more than 300 million people living in rural areas that drink unsafe water (affected by chemicals and other contaminants). 22 Toxic spills in China over the past few years threatened the water supply of millions of people. ! The lack of the rule of law in China has led to widespread government corruption, financial speculation, and mis-allocation of investment funds. In many cases, government cconnections, d not market forces, are the main determinant of commercial success in China. The lack of the rule of law in China limits competition and undermines the efficient allocation of resources in the economy. These problems may undermine China 9s attempts to promote the development of its own globally competitive firms. Projections of China 9s Future Economic Growth. The economic projections of China 9s real GDP growth by three economic forecasting firms (Global Insight, the Economist Intelligence Unit [EIU], and Goldman Sachs) over several years are indicated in Table 5 . Although the three projections differ on how fast China will grow, they all predict that China will be able to maintain rapid economic growth in the near and medium term, but that the rate of growth will slow over time. Five-year average real GDP growth projections are projected to slow from a range of 7.1% to 8.6% during 2006 to 2010 to a range of 4.5% to 6.1% from 2021 to 2025. Goldman Sachs projects that China 9s real GDP will average 3.8% between 2031 and 2040, and 3.2% from 2041 to 2050 (in 2050, real GDP will average 2.7%). Table 5. Projections of China 9s Real GDP Growth: 2006-2030 Average Annual Growth (%) Global Insight Economist Intelligence Unit Goldman Sachs 2006-2010 8.6 8.0 7.1 2011-2015 7.2 5.5 5.8 2016-2020 6.4 4.4 5.0 2021-2025 6.1 4.5 4.5 2026-2030 n.a. 4.7 4.1 Sources: Global Insight, China 4 Interim Forecast , May 2006; the Economist Intelligence Unit, EIU Country Data (database); Goldman Sachs, China 9s Ascent: Can the Middle Kingdom Meet its Dreams , Global Economics Paper No. 133, November 11, 2005. CRS-13 23 OECD, Angus Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective , 2001. Comparing the Size of the U.S. and Chinese Economies: Will China Overtake the United States? This section compares China 9s economy relative to the United States in terms of GDP, per capita GDP, and trade. It also provides projections of future economic performance of the two countries. Historical Perspective on China 9s Economy. A 2001 OECD report, which attempted to measure world GDP and that of major countries (in 1990 international dollars) from 1500 to 1998, determined that for many years, China 9s was the world 9s largest economy (see Table 6 ). 23 In 1820, for example, China constituted nearly one-third of the world 9s economy, 18 times the share of the United States. However, by 1913, China 9s share of world GDP dropped to 8.9% and its economy was less than half the size of that of the United States; by 1950, it was about a third as large. By 1973, China 9s economy was roughly one-fifth the size of the United States 9 economy. Although China 9s GDP grew significantly between 1950 and 1973, the size of its economy relative to that of the United States and the world as a whole changed little. However, this trend reversed significantly after China began to reform its economy. By 1998, China 9s share of world GDP rose to 11.5%, and its economy was a little more than half the size of the U.S. economy. Table 6. Historical Comparison of U.S. and Chinese GDP (millions of 1990 international dollars) United States China GDP As a % of world GDP GDP As a % of World GDP As a % of U.S. GDP 1820 12,548 1.8 228,600 32.9 1814.3 1870 98,374 8.9 189,740 17.2 192.9 1913 517,383 19.1 241,344 8.9 46.6 1950 1,132,434 21.2 239,903 4.5 21.2 1973 3,536,622 22.0 740,048 4.6 20.9 1998 7,394,598 21.9 3,873,352 11.5 52.4 Source: Angus Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective , OECD, 2001. Using Purchasing Power Parity To Compare the Economies of the United States and China. The actual size of China 9s economy has been a subject of extensive debate among economists. Measured in U.S. dollars using nominal exchange rates, China 9s GDP in 2006 was estimated about $2.7 trillion; its per capita GDP (a commonly used measure of living standards) was $2,040. U.S. GDP and per CRS-14 capita GDP were estimated at $13.2 trillion and $44,140, respectively. Japan 9s nominal GDP and per capita GDP were $4.4 trillion and $34,290, respectively. These data could suggest that China 9s economy was substantially smaller than those of the United States and Japan. Many economists, however, contend that using nominal exchange rates to convert Chinese data into U.S. dollars substantially underestimates the size of China 9s economy. This is because prices in China for many goods and services are significantly lower than those in the United States and other developed countries. Economists have attempted to factor in these price differentials by using a purchasing power parity (PPP) measurement, which attempts to convert foreign currencies into U.S. dollars on the basis of the actual purchasing power of such currency (based on surveys of the prices of various goods and services) in each respective country. This PPP exchange rate is then used to convert foreign economic data in national currencies into U.S. dollars. A comparison of economic data using nominal exchange rates and PPP for China, Japan, and the United States for 2006 appears in Table 7 . Because prices for many goods and services are significantly lower in China than in the United States and other developed countries (while prices in Japan are higher), the PPP exchange rate raises the estimated size of Chinese economy from $2.7 trillion (nominal dollars) to $9.9 trillion (PPP dollars), significantly larger than Japan 9s GDP in PPPs ($4.1 trillion), and nearly three-fourths the size of the U.S. economy. PPP data also raise China 9s per capita GDP from $2,040 (nominal) to $7,500. The PPP figures indicate that, while the size of China 9s economy is substantial, its living standards fall far below those of the U.S. and Japan. China 9s per capita GDP on a PPP basis is only 17% of U.S. levels. Thus, even if China 9s GDP were to overtake that of the United States in the next few decades, its living standards would remain substantially below those of the United States for many years to come. Table 7. Estimates of U.S., Japanese, and Chinese GDP and Per Capita GDP in Nominal U.S. Dollars and PPP, 2006 Country Nominal GDP ($ billions) GDP in PPP ($ billions) Nominal Per Capita GDP Per Capita GDP in PPP United States 13,226 13,226 44,140 44,140 Japan 4,371 4,088 34,290 32,070 China 2,677 9,862 2,040 7,500 Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Note: PPP data for China should be interpreted with caution. China is not a fully developed market economy; the prices of many goods and services are distorted due to price controls and government subsidies. Will China Overtake the U.S. Economy? Based on measurements of China 9s GDP on a PPP basis and projections of China 9s economic growth over the next several decades, it appears highly likely that China at some point will overtake CRS-15 24 EIU 9s forecasts of the U.S. and Chinese economies predict that China will not overtake the United States as the world 9s largest economy until 2018. the United States as the world 9s largest economy. Global Insight 9s projections (which are the highest of the three presented) project that China will achieve 7.1% average real growth over the next 20 years. In comparison, the U.S. economy is projected by Global Insight to grow at an average annual real rate of about 3.0%, less than half China 9s rate. Global Insight 9s projections indicate that China could overtake the United States as the world 9s largest economy by 2013. 24 By the year 2025, China 9s economy is projected to be 59% larger than the U.S. economy, according to Global Insight (see Table 8 ). Table 8. Global Insight Projections of U.S. and Chinese GDP and Per Capita Income (PPP Basis), Selected Years GDP ($ billions) Per capita income ($) China United States China 9s as a % of U.S. China United States China 9s as a % of U.S. 2006 9,839 13,244 74.3 7,473 44,196 16.9 2010 13,882 16,041 86.5 10,247 51,702 19.8 2015 22,210 20,169 110.1 15,838 62,309 25.4 2020 35,734 27,584 129.5 25,102 75,971 33.0 2025 57,145 35,963 158.9 39,544 92,790 42.3 Source: Global Insigh t. Note, estimated 2006 is this table differs somewhat from those made by the Economist Intelligence Unit in Table 7 . Although China 9s rise to the world 9s largest economy may shock and alarm some in the United States (who might view it as reflective of poor U.S. economic performance), it is hardly surprising to most economists, given that China 9s population is 4.4 times larger and that China 9s economy continues to grow rapidly from improvements to productivity (i.e., through catching up). Economists contend that a more appropriate measurement of a nation 9s well-being or standard of living is per capita GDP on a PPP basis. As noted earlier, China 9s per capita GDP (PPP basis) in 2006 was 17% percent as large as that in the United States. Global Insight projects that this level will grow to 19.8% in 2010, 25.4% in 2015, 33.0% in 2020, and 42.3% in 2025. These data indicate that although China 9s economy could soon overtake the U.S. economy in size, Chinese living standards are likely to remain significantly below those of the United States for many years to come. Economic growth is not a zero-sum game: China 9s growth is not offset by a decrease in the output of the United States or any other foreign economy. Although a larger Chinese economy would produce more goods that Americans might CRS-16 25 In terms of merchandise imports, Global Insight projects that China 9s imports will exceed those of the United States by 2014. 26 However, the European Union is projected to remain the world 9s largest exporter, both in terms of merchandise exporter, and exporter of goods and services, from 2006-2030. consume, it would also consume more goods that American workers might produce. As discussed below, the long-run net effect of China 9s growth on American well- being will depend on how it affects the terms of trade by which American goods are exchanged for Chinese goods. China 9s future growth will also increase the demands on the world 9s natural resources and commodities (see below), which may affect America 9s terms of trade as well. Likewise, there is no particular advantage to being the world 9s largest economy from the perspective of living standards. For example, the three countries in the world with a higher per capita income than the United States 4 Luxembourg, Norway, and Switzerland 4 are hardly known for their size. Trade takes place not between countries, but between millions of individual economic agents within countries, so country size does not confer any market power that allows a country to negotiate favorable market price. (Size may afford greater bargaining power in trade negotiations and international organizations, however.) China as the World 9s Largest Exporting Economy? In 2006, China was the world 9s third-largest merchandise export economy, after the European Union and United States. China 9s merchandise exports, fueled largely by high levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) in China, have risen dramatically over the past several years. From 2003 to 2006, China 9s merchandise exports grew by 121%; they were up by 27.2% in 2006 over 2005. Given these rapid growth levels, Chinese merchandise exports are likely to exceed U.S. export levels within a very short time period, perhaps early as 2007. 25 A broader measurement of a country 9s export levels would also include export services. Table 9 lists estimates for U.S. and Chinese exports of goods and services in 2006 and projections through 2023 by Global Insight. Based on this broader measurement, China 9s exports are projected to exceed those of the United States by 2009, and by the year 2020 they are projected to be nearly twice as large. 26 CRS-17 Table 9. Chinese and U.S. Exports of Goods and Services: 2006 and Projections through 2030 Year Chinese Exports ($billions) U.S. Exports ($billions) Chinese Exports as a % of U.S. Exports 2006 1,055 1,464 72.1 2007 1,342 1,619 82.9 2008 1,713 1,791 95.6 2009 2,009 1,959 102.6 2010 2,305 2,117 108.9 2015 4,124 3,045 135.4 2020 6,914 4,392 157.4 2025 11,001 6,219 176.9 2030 17,376 8,699 199.7 Source: Global Insight. Growth in U.S.-China Economic Relations U.S.-China trade rose rapidly after the two nations established diplomatic relations (January 1979), signed a bilateral trade agreement (July 1979), and provided mutual most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment beginning in 1980. Total trade (exports plus imports) between the two nations rose from about $5 billion in 1980, to $20 billion in 1990, to an estimated $343 billion in 2006 (see Table 10 ). China is now the 2 nd largest U.S. trading partner. Over the past few years, U.S. trade with China has grown faster than that of any other major U.S. trading partner. Table 10. U.S. Merchandise Trade with China: 1980-2006 ($billions) Year U.S. Exports U.S. Imports U.S. Trade Balance 1980 3.8 1.1 2.7 1985 3.9 3.9 0 1990 4.8 15.2 -10.4 1995 11.7 45.6 -33.8 2000 16.3 100.1 -83.8 2005 41.8 243.5 -201.6 2006* 55.6 287.8 -232.2 Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and USITC Dataweb. *Estimated, based on data for January-November 2006. CRS-18 Growing U.S. Exports to China China 9s ranking as a destination for U.S. merchandise exports rose from 23 rd in 1979 to 18 th in 1990, 11 th in 2000, 5 th in 2004, and 4 th in 2005 and 2006. U.S. merchandise exports to China in 2006 accounted for 5.3% of total U.S. exports (compared with 3.9% in 2003). The top five U.S. exports to China in 2006 (based on January-November data) were semiconductors and electronic components (up 79% over 2005 levels), aircraft and parts (up 40%), waste and scrap (up 64%), oilseeds and grain (up 7%), and resins and synthetic rubber and fibers (up 13%). Over the past few years, China has become been the fastest growing U.S. export market. From 2001 to 2005, U.S. exports to China rose by 118%; and from January- November 2006 they were up by 33.0% over the same period in 2005. If these trends continue, China could replace Japan as the third largest U.S. export market in 2007. Table 11. U.S. Merchandise Exports to Major Trading Partners in 2001, 2005, and January-November 2006 ($ in billions and % change) 2001 2005 Percent Change From 2004-2005 (%) Percent Change From 2001-2005 (%) Percent Change From Jan-Nov. 2006 over Jan-Nov. 2005 (%) Canada 163.7 211.4 12.6 29.1 9.4 Mexico 101.5 120.0 8.4 18.2 13.0 Japan 57.6 55.4 1.9 -3.8 8.4 China 19.2 41.8 20.5 117.7 33.0 United Kingdom 40.8 38.6 7.4 -5.4 17.9 Germany 30.1 34.1 8.8 13.3 20.7 South Korea 22.2 27.7 5.1 24.8 17.7 Netherlands 19.5 26.5 9.1 35.9 17.8 France 19.9 22.4 5.5 12.6 9.0 Singapore 17.7 20.6 5.1 16.4 14.1 World 731.0 904.4 10.8 23.7 14.9 Source: USITC DataWeb. Note: Ranked by top 10 U.S. export markets in Jan.-Nov. 2006. Many trade analysts argue that China could prove to be a much more significant market for U.S. exports in the future if rapid economic growth continues. China 9s goal of modernizing its infrastructure and upgrading its industries is predicted to generate substantial demand for foreign goods and services. According to a U.S. CRS-19 27 U.S. Department of Commerce, FY1998 Country Commercial Guide: China , Aug. 1997. 28 Boeing Corporation, The Boeing Company and China , available at [http://www.boeing.com/companyoffices/aboutus/boechina.html]. 29 Credit Suisse, The Rise of the Chinese Consumer Revisited , Jan. 6, 2006. 30 China 9s combined imports of goods and services are projected to rise even faster 4 from $1.2 trillion in 2006 to $11.2 trillion in 2005, up 831%. Department of Commerce report, cChina 9s unmet infrastructural needs are staggering. Foreign capital, expertise, and equipment will have to be brought in if China is to build all the ports, roads, bridges, airports, power plants, telecommunications networks and rail lines that it needs. d 27 Finally, economic growth has substantially improved the purchasing power of Chinese citizens, especially those living in urban areas along the east coast of China. China 9s growing economy and large population make it a potentially enormous market. For example: ! The Chinese government projects that by the year 2020, there will be 140 million cars in China (seven times the current level), and that the number of cars sold annually will rise from 4.4 million units to 20.7 million units. ! Boeing Corporation predicts that China will be the largest market for commercial air travel outside the United States for the next 20 years; during this period, China will buy 2,300 aircraft, valued at $183 billion. By 2023, Chinese carriers are expected to be flying more than 2,801 airplanes, making China the largest commercial aviation market outside the United States. 28 ! Credit Suisse predicts that by the year 2014, China will be the world 9s second-largest consumer market after the United States (compared to 7 th in 2004), with total household spending of $3.7 trillion (2004 U.S. dollars), accounting for 11% of world consumption (compared to 3% in 2004). 29 ! Global Insight projects that China 9s merchandise imports will increase by 374% (nearly fourfold) over the next 10 years (from $792 billion in 2006 to $3,752 billion in 2015). Assuming U.S. exports to China grow at the same rate as the projected increase in China 9s total imports, U.S. merchandise exports to China could increase from $55.6 billion in 2006 to nearly $208 billion in 2015. 30 The Growth of U.S. Imports from China China is a major source of many U.S. imports, especially labor-intensive products. In 2006, imports from China were estimated at $288 billion, accounting for 15.4% of total U.S. imports in 2006 (up from 6.5% in 1996). U.S. imports from China rose by 18.2% in 2006 over the previous year. The importance (ranking) of China as a source of U.S. imports has risen dramatically, from 8th largest in 1990, to 4 th in 2000, to 2 nd in 2004-2006. The top U.S. imports from China for the first 11 CRS-20 31 Morgan Stanley, Global Economic Forum, China: Punishing Whom? Sept. 11, 2003. months of 2006 were computers and parts (up 15% over 2005 levels), miscellaneous manufactured articles (such as toys, games, etc.) (up 7%), apparel (up 14%), audio and video equipment (up 24%), and communications equipment (up 29%). Why Are U.S. Imports from China Rising So Quickly? Many analysts contend that the sharp increase in China 9s exports is, to an extent, the result of movement in production facilities from other Asian countries to China. That is, various exports that used to be made in Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, for example, are now being made in China (in many cases, by foreign firms in China) and exported to the United States. This trend is reflected in Table 12 , which lists data on U.S. imports from Asia as a whole and from China for 1996-2005. The share of U.S. imports from Asia to total imports decreased from 38.8% to 35.7% in 2005, whereas U.S. imports from China as share of total U.S. imports rose from 6.5% to 14.6%. U.S. imports from China as a percentage of total imports from Asia increased from 16.8% to 40.8%. In absolute terms, the pattern is similar. Between 2000 and 2005, U.S. imports from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Thailand fell by $42 billion in 2000 dollars, whereas imports from China rose by $119 billion. The shift becomes more striking when one considers that imports from the former group fell at a time when overall imports to the United States were rising rapidly. According to Morgan Stanley, the shift in production by East Asian firms to China has saved U.S. consumers more than $100 billion per year since 1997. 31 Table 12. U.S. Imports from Asia and China, as a Percentage of Total U.S. Imports 1996 2000 2005 U.S. Imports from Asia (including China) 38.8 36.6 35.7 U.S. Imports from Asia (excluding China) 32.3 29.2 21.1 U.S. Imports from China 6.5 8.2 14.6 U.S. Imports from China, as a % of Total U.S. Imports from Asia 16.8 22.4 40.8 Source: USITC DataWeb. Another illustration of this shift can be seen in the U.S. imports of computer equipment and parts from 2000 to 2005 ( Table 13 ). In 2000, Japan was the largest foreign supplier of U.S. computer equipment (with a 19.6% share of total shipments), while China ranked 4 th (at a 12.1% share). In just five years, Japan 9s ranking fell to 4 th , the value of its shipments dropped by over half, and its share of shipments declined to 7.8% (2005). Singapore and Taiwan also experienced significant declines in their computer equipment shipments to the United States during this period. By 2005, China had become by far the largest foreign supplier of computer equipment, CRS-21 32 National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators 2006 , February 2006. 33 They include products in 10 main categories, including biotechnology, life science, opto-electronics, information and communications, electronics, flexible manufacturing, advanced materials, aerospace, weapons, and nuclear technology. See U.S. Census Bureau trade website at [http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/www/index.html] for more detailed descriptions of these categories. with a 45.4% share of total imports. While U.S. imports of computer equipment from China rose by 327.7% over the past six years, the total value of U.S. imports from the world of these commodities rose by only 14.2%. Many analysts contend that a large share of the increase in Chinese computer production has come from foreign computer companies that have manufacturing facilities in China. Table 13. Leading Foreign Suppliers of U.S. Computer Equipment Imports: 2000-2005 ($billions and % change) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2000-2005 % change World 68.5 59.0 62.3 64.0 73.9 78.2 14.2 China 8.3 8.2 12.0 18.7 29.5 35.5 327.7 Malaysia 4.9 5.0 7.1 8.0 8.7 9.9 102.0 Mexico 6.9 8.5 7.9 7.0 7.4 6.7 -2.9 Japan 13.4 9.5 8.1 6.3 6.3 6.1 -54.5 Singapore 8.7 7.1 7.1 6.9 6.6 5.9 -32.1 Taiwan 8.3 7.0 7.1 5.4 4.1 2.9 -65.1 Source: U.S. International Trade Commission Trade Data Web. Note: Ranked according to top six suppliers in 2005. Growing Trade in Advanced Technology Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, nearly all U.S. imports from China were low- value, labor-intensive products such as toys and games, footwear, and textiles. However, over the past few years, an increasing proportion of U.S. imports from China has consisted of more technologically advanced products, such as computers. According to the National Science Foundation, the Chinese share of world high- technology production has risen from 1.0% in 1980 to 9.3% in 2003. 32 Table 14 lists U.S. trade with China in cadvanced technology products d (ATP), a classification developed by the U.S. Census Bureau to identify trade in new or leading-edge technologies. 33 These data indicate that U.S. ATP exports to China rose by 123.6%between 2000 and 2005, while imports increased by 454.2%. During that period, ATP exports as a share of total U.S. exports dropped slightly from 33.7% to 29.4%, while for imports, the share rose from 10.7% to 24.4%. These data indicate CRS-22 34 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2005 Annual Report, pp. 86-87, at [http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2005/annual_report_full_05.pdf]. 35 To illustrate, Taiwan has shifted nearly all of its notebook computer manufacturing to China. the importance of China as a destination of U.S. advanced technology exports: their share rose from 2.2% to 5.7%, while the import share of these products rose from 5.4% to 22.8%. The United States went from a $0.1 billion trade surplus with China for ATP to a $47 billion trade deficit. Table 14. U.S. Trade with China in Advanced Technology Products: 2000 and 2005 ($billions and %) Year Exports ($billions) As a % of Total U.S. Exports to China % of Total U.S. Advanced Technology Exports Imports ($billions) As a % of Total U.S. Import s From China % of Total U.S. Advanced Technology Imports 2000 5.5 33.7 2.2 10.7 10.7 5.4 2005 12.3 29.4 5.7 59.3 24.4 22.8 Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics . Some analysts view these statistics with alarm, contending that they are an indicator that Chinese firms will pose an increasing competitive challenge to U.S. high-technology firms. For example, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission warned in its 2005 annual report to Congress that the technology that China is developing and producing is increasing in sophistication at an unexpectedly fast pace. Advances in China 9s technological infrastructure and industries, along with similar advances in other developing countries, pose a significant competitive challenge that is eroding U.S. technology leadership. 34 On the other hand, a joint study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Institute for International Economics concluded that data on China 9s high- technology trade is misleading, noting, for example, that more than 90% of China 9s exports of electronic and information technology are produced by foreign firms in China using imported components, 35 and that China adds relatively little value to products such as computers and mobile phones before export. For example, assembly may take place in China, but research and development takes place elsewhere. The study concluded that Census data on U.S. ATP trade with China chardly reflect a dramatic deterioration in U.S. competitiveness. Rather they reflect CRS-23 36 Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Institute for International Economics, China: The Balance Sheet , 2006, p. 105. 37 Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 38 U.S. data on FDI in China, and Chinese data on U.S. FDI in China differ significantly. According to U.S. data, cumulative U.S. FDI in China (on a historical cost basis) was $16.9 billion at the end of 2005. 39 Source: Invest in China website, [http://www.fdi.gov.cn]. 40 Motorola Press Releas

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