Technically Advanced Aircraft

nothing unique to TAA relative to other categories of aircraft. Training requirements center on differences in new-design TAA handling characteristics and the addition of capable but complex avionics packages.<br><br> Light GA pilots are now undergoing the transition that the airlines and corporate pilots did in prior decades. The use of autopilots as an integral part of single-pilot IFR TAA operations should be embraced. Deliveries of new equipment have overtaken the training infrastructure in some cases.<br><br> CFIs and pilots are adapting with the manufacturers and training organizations, ramping up in experience and in capability. More and better simulation will ease the transition. Training nontraditional avionics in the traditional inflight way is not optimal.<br><br> Use of CD/DVD and online simulation is a big step forward, as is the development of relatively inexpensive simulators for new TAA. Executive summary ............................................................................................................. .............1 I.<br><br> Introduction and overview .................................................................................................. ............4 Questions this report will answer ............................................................................................. .......4 Technically Advanced Aircraft (TAA) defined ................................................................................4 New, classic, and retro........................................................................................................<br><br> ................5 More than just hardware........................................................................................................ ............5 History of TAA ................................................................................................................ ....................5 What 9s next....................................................................................................................<br><br> ......................6 II. Safety implications........................................................................................................ ................8 FAA 4Industry Safety Study......................................................................................................<br><br> ........8 Aircraft handling characteristics.............................................................................................. ........9 Transition to TAA.............................................................................................................. ..................9 New piloting paradigm..........................................................................................................<br><br> ............9 The physical airplane.......................................................................................................... ..............9 The mental airplane............................................................................................................ ..............9 GA 9s future....................................................................................................................<br><br> ......................10 Beyond workload: Over-reliance................................................................................................. ...10 Conclusions.................................................................................................................... ..................10 III.<br><br> Accident reviews ......................................................................................................... .............11 Comparing TAA accident pilots to non-TAA accident pilots........................................................11 Comparing new-TAA to classic-TAA accidents..............................................................................12 Accident summaries and commentary..........................................................................................13 TAA and the parachute.......................................................................................................... ..........15 IV.<br><br> Training for the glass age................................................................................................. ...........19 A training sequence............................................................................................................ ..............20 Training a new breed of pilot..................................................................................................<br><br> ........21 Autopilot essentials .......................................................................................................... ..............22 My Point 4Evolving design and some thoughts for the future....................................................22 Counterpoint 4The future is now................................................................................................. .24 Tracking pilot performance and its effect on human factors......................................................24 The autopilot experience.......................................................................................................<br><br> .........25 Training, Liability and Flight Data Recorders................................................................................25 V. TAA hardware and software................................................................................................... .......26 Weather displays...............................................................................................................<br><br> ...............26 Terrain awareness.............................................................................................................. ..............26 Traffic avoidance.............................................................................................................. ................27 Engine/systems monitoring......................................................................................................<br><br> ......28 Fabulous fuel solution......................................................................................................... .............28 Technology abuse............................................................................................................... .............30 VI.<br><br> Report conclusions ........................................................................................................ ............31 2 www.aopa.org/safetycenter | Technically Advanced Aircraft Table of Contents Technically Advanced Aircraft | www.aopa.org/safetycenter 3 Appendix A 4Edited NTSB accident reports......................................................................................34 Cirrus accidents............................................................................................................... ...............A-1 Cessna 182 accidents...........................................................................................................<br><br> .........A-40 Mooney accidents............................................................................................................... .........A-56 Cessna 210 accident............................................................................................................ ........A-80 Lancair accidents..............................................................................................................<br><br> ............A-85 A36 Bonanza accidents.......................................................................................................... ......A-88 Appendix B 4TAA articles from AOPA Pilot...................................................................................... B-1 cHigh Terrain Tangle d 4AA 965, Cali, Colombia..........................................................................B-2 cBack to Cali d.................................................................................................................<br><br> .................B-4 cFuture Flight: Beaming Up the Weather d....................................................................................B-7 cSwapping Data Promises a Simpler Future d............................................................................B-11 cDiamond DA40-180: The Gee Meter d........................................................................................B-15 cAlan & Dales Excellent Idea 4Take the SR22 Cross Country d ................................................B-21 cSetting the Standard 4A Whole New Panel for the Cessna 182 d............................................B-25 Appendix C 4Selected ASRS reports..............................................................................................C -1 Appendix D 4Suppliers of datalink services....................................................................................D- 1 Appendix E 4Avionics displays................................................................................................... .....E-1 Publication Updated June 21, 2005 Introduction and Overview Section I Questions this report will answer This AOPAASF Special Review of TAA will answer three questions: 1.What is a TAA? 2.What adaptations will be required for the gen- eral aviation (GA) training structure as TAA enter the fleet in significant numbers?<br><br> 3.Do the earliest returns on GA accidents involving TAA show any trend that can be used to direct strategies for reducing GA accident rates in the future? Technically Advanced Aircraft (TAA) defined Technically advanced aircraft are equipped with new-generation avionics that take full advantage of computing power and modern navigational aids to improve pilot positional awareness, sys- tem redundancy, and depending upon equip- ment, improve in-cockpit information about traf- fic, weather, and terrain. By FAA pronouncement, a TAA is equipped with at least: a) a moving-map display b) an IFR-approved GPS navigator c) an autopilot.<br><br> Many new aircraft go far beyond the basic def- inition, sporting enough electronic displays to qualify as having a cglass cockpit. d Exactly how much glass is needed to deserve that label is still being debated, but ASF 9s working definition of a cglass cockpit d includes a Primary Flight Display (PFD) to replace the traditional csix-pack d or csteam gauges d as round-dial mechanical instru- ments are known, and a multifunction display (MFD). The MFD, as the name implies, can show myriad items including a moving map, terrain, weather, traffic, on-board weather radar, engine instrumentation, checklists, and more. (See Section V, page 28).) In terms of new U.S.<br><br> production, TAA have clearly arrived. In 2004, 1,758 light GA piston air- craft rolled off the assembly lines of General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA) member companies, a 10.6 percent increase over 2003. Ninety-two percent were either true TAA or sporting TAA-like equipment.<br><br> The remaining 8 percent were generally tailwheel aircraft, and field reports indicate that even those buyers are often opting to include ele- ments of TAA as the avionics evolution moves forward. There is no current reliable estimate on how many existing aircraft have been retrofitted to become TAA, but it will be in the thousands. Fleet sales to active flight schools and univer- sity flight departments in the last two years have generally been TAA, even for basic trainers.<br><br> Several aviation universities have adopted TAA to prepare pilots for the next generation of flight, be it GA, corporate, or air carrier. 4 www.aopa.org/safetycenter | Technically Advanced Aircraft This report contains a preliminary review of Technically Advanced Aircraft (TAA) accidents. Since TAA are just starting to enter the marketplace in significant numbers, there have been relatively few accidents involving them, making any comparison of accidents rates between TAA and con- ventional aircraft statistically suspect.<br><br> Therefore, any conclusions in this report regarding relative safety must be considered as preliminary. The AOPA Air Safety Foundation (ASF) will continue to monitor the TAA safety record and report as new findings come to light. Fig.<br><br> 1: Primary Flight Display (PFD). AOPA Air Safety Foundation Introduction and Overview New, classic, and retro Some TAA are completely new designs such as the Lancair, Cirrus, Diamond, or Adam 500, while others are updated versions of newly produced classic machines such as the Cessna 182, 206, Piper Saratoga, Beechcraft Bonanza, and Mooney. Retrofitted 4or Retro 4aircraft are older aircraft with reworked instrument panels.<br><br> More than hardware Many observers believe that the deeper impor- tance of the TAA takeover goes beyond just equipment. The larger definition includes a new mindset for pilots, encompassing a revised view of what constitutes GA flying, with airline-style procedures, regular use of autopilot, and greater dependence on avionics for multiple tasks beyond pure navigation. Although pilots flying classic high-performance aircraft under IFR often use this approach, its application is essential in TAA.<br><br> To process large amounts of information and not allow flight safety to suffer, pilots must add csystems manager d to basic stick and rudder skills. This mental shift has proven to be a chal- lenge for some conventionally trained pilots. History of TAA From the beginning of powered flight, through the 1970s and 1980s, traditional instruments and displays dominated aviation.<br><br> For much of that time, VOR, DME, and ADF were considered state of the art, but were not a major concern in the aviation training process. Once pilots mas- tered the principles of avionics systems man- agement, transition to a new airplane required only cursory instruction on avionics because all equipment worked essentially the same way. The bulk of pilot checkouts were spent learning the handling of airplane characteristics and systems.<br><br> Technically Advanced Aircraft | www.aopa.org/safetycenter 5 New TAA Adam Aircraft A-500. Classic TAA Instrument panel in a Mooney Ovation 2GX. New TAA Instrument panel in a Diamond DA 340.<br><br> Retro TAA Instrument panel in a Piper Twin Comanche. Introduction and Overview AOPA Air Safety Foundation Then, in the late 1970s, the first GA area-naviga- tion (RNAV) systems appeared. By the early 1980s, general aviation began to embrace the technologi- cal revolution as computers worked side by side with humans in the cockpit.<br><br> The transition was visible first in military aircraft a decade or so before, but it wasn 9t long before cglass d started invading the cockpits of business jets and large Airbus, Boeing, and Lockheed aircraft . Initial versions of computerized cockpits, in the 1980s and early 1990s, were relatively simple by today 9s standards; small glass TV screens (cathode ray tubes, or CRTs) capable of displaying graphics of traditional aircraft flight instruments. The new systems came to be known as glass and aircraft sporting them as glass cockpitair- craft .<br><br> CRT displays were superseded in the mid- 1990s by Liquid Crystal Displays (LCDs) that delivered much larger pictures at a considerable savings in weight and energy consumption. The early CRTs, however, could graphically represent multiple items of flight information in the same location on the screen, forever changing the basic six-instrument scan three generations of pilots had come to know so well. Today, although the bulk of the existing 180,000-plus light GA airplanes still use steam gauges, virtually every newly designed trans- portation airplane is a TAA, including Lancair, Cirrus, Diamond, and the Adam 500.<br><br> And very few buyers of new production classic machines such as the Cessna 182, 206, Piper PA-28/32 series, Bonanza, and Mooney even consider steam gauges, but go directly for glass. Many owners are retrofitting their classic aircraft to convert them to TAA with IFR-certified GPS nav- igators and multifunction displays. 6 www.aopa.org/safetycenter | Technically Advanced Aircraft New bizjet glass cockpits in a Citation (right) and Beechjet (far right).<br><br> A new Cessna 182 equipped with a Garmin G-1000 (right). Traditional csteam gauges d or csix-pack d on an instrument panel (below). AOPA Air Safety Foundation Introduction and Overview What 9s next?<br><br> Moving into the twenty-first century, airliners and business jets are on the brink of even more sophisticated cockpit technologies, and GA air- craft are likely not far behind. The new Boeing 787, Airbus A380, and the Dassault Falcon 7X will work with Microsoft Windows-like displays and trackballs to simplify data input. Knobs, in fact, will serve only a backup function as equipment tunes everything automatically.<br><br> The trickle-down of Flight Management Systems (FMS) for light aircraft will likely migrate to keyboards with hard and soft key functions in the next few years, replacing multifunction con- trols that must first be configured before data can be entered. Keyboard and trackball data entry, not currently available on new light GA TAA, is due largely to the space and cost constraints of smaller aircraft. In the last decade, IFR-approved GPS naviga- tors have been added to panels already crowded with conventional avionics even for newly built aircraft.<br><br> Space constraints were at least part of the rationale behind limited control interfaces, which experience shows to be one of the more challenging aspects for pilots transitioning to TAA. In the early 1990s there were at least five manufacturers building IFR GPS navigators and all had different operating logic and displays. This contributed significantly to the training challenge for pilots who flew multiple aircraft equipped with different units.<br><br> At this writing, two companies currently survive but others are rumored to be readying new designs.The surviv- ing companies that are committed to the devel- opment of TAA equipment are generally well cap- italized, which will allow more investment in the human factor interface. Technically Advanced Aircraft | www.aopa.org/safetycenter 7 Full-glass cockpit (left). On new/classic TAA there is plenty of space for new pilot interfaces (left).<br><br> Safety Implications Section II The team findings were: 1. cThe safety problems found in the accidents studied by the team are typical of problems that occurred after previous introductions of new air- craft technology and all also reflect typical GA pilot judgment errors found in analysis of non-TAA accidents. d 2. cPrevious safety problems similar to those identified in this study have been remedied through a combination of improved training and, in the case of new aircraft capabilities, pilot screening (i.e., additional insurance company requirements of pilot experience). d 3.<br><br> cThe predominant TAA-system-specific finding is that the steps required to call up information and program an approach in IFR-certified GPS navigators are numerous, and during high work- load situations they can distract from the primary pilot duty of flying the aircraft. MFDs in the acci- dent aircraft did not appear to present a complexity problem. The team also believes that PFDs, while not installed in any of the accident aircraft and just now becoming available in TAAs, similarly are not likely to present a complexity problem. d 4.<br><br> cTAAs provide increased cavailable safety, d i.e., a potential for increased safety. However, to actually obtain this available safety, pilots must receive additional training in the specific TAA systems in their aircraft that will enable them to exploit the opportunities and operate within the limitations inherent in their TAA systems. d 5. cThe template for securing this increased safety exists from the experi- ences with previous new technology introductions 4the current aircraft model-specific training and insurance requirements applicable to high-per- formance single and multiengine small airplanes.<br><br> However, the existing training infrastructure currently is not able to provide the needed training in TAAs. d 6. cEffective and feasible interventions have been identified, mostly recommending improvements in training, and effective implementation mecha- nisms for the recommended interventions exist. Therefore, TAA safety problems can be addressed, and the additional available safety of TAAs to address traditional causes of GA accidents can be realized as well. d We 9ll explore these findings in greater detail while commenting on the aircraft themselves.<br><br> The good news Moving maps with pinpoint GPS navigational accuracy provide pilots with significantly increased positional awareness. Overlays that can include data-linked weather information, terrain databases and traffic avoidance equipment have tremendous potential to increase GA safety. Some newly designed TAA themselves, with high- er wing loading and sleek aerodynamics, are faster than traditional light GA aircraft with similar power.<br><br> Better systems redundancy reduces the probability of single-point failure. The new look has an undeni- able appeal for the light GA industry that has seen lackluster sales for more than 20 years. With progress invariably comes responsibility on the part of designers, regulators, CFIs, and, most importantly, pilots to make sure that all the features, performance and extra information avail- able with TAA actually translate into safer flight.<br><br> Achieving the benefits will depend on training and ultimately, on a continuing evolution in equipment design. Having watched GPS navigators evolve over the last 15 years, the present generation is far supe- rior to early models and we have every reason to believe that it is only going to get better. The challenge The AOPA Air Safety Foundation identified two areas of TAA that are likely to have the most impact on the GA safety record.<br><br> The first is the different 8 www.aopa.org/safetycenter | Technically Advanced Aircraft TAA are creating both a new world of opportunity and challenge for general aviation pilots. In 2003, ASF participated with the FAA, academia, and other industry members to help write General Aviation Technically Advanced Aircraft 4FAA/Industry Safety Study. A multifunction display showing two of many available functions 4 terrain/routing (top) and traffic (bottom).<br><br> AOPA Air Safety Foundation Safety Implications physical handling characteristics of some new- design TAA. This is obvious, straightforward, and will be relatively easy to manage. The second is the widespread adoption of new piloting techniques - different from the traditional role of the GA pilot.<br><br> This may prove a bit more difficult. Increased speed and unique handling character- istics of some TAA are likely, without proper train- ing, to lead less experienced pilots into difficulty in takeoffs and landings and in managing arrivals into the terminal area. Some of these aircraft handle dif- ferently than conventional aircraft, with different csight pictures d in the takeoff and landing phases of flight.<br><br> Using the cold d techniques with a new design may lead to a tail strike, a nose wheel landing or an inadvertent stall. (See illustration at right.) When the Boeing 727 was introduced to the air- line community in the early 1960s, there were a number of accidents until pilots and instructors figured out the quirks of the new design. Different does not mean bad, but the training challenges for some new TAA exceed those for pilots moving between many other classic aircraft.<br><br> High-wing loadings on some of the new aircraft produce blaz- ing speeds and give a smoother ride in turbulence but they also develop a higher sink rate without power on landing. One current difficulty is finding instructors who are knowledgeable and experienced on the new aircraft, but that will improve as more TAA enter the fleet. Several manufacturers have embarked on ambitious programs to educate CFIs, and they are commended for their efforts.<br><br> A related training issue is to bring the cplanning ahead d skills of lower-time pilots up to speed, pun intended, as they transition from slower training aircraft to faster, sleeker designs, Any experienced CFI is well aware of the extra instruction required for pilots to think farther ahead in a faster airplane. If the aircraft is descending at 180 knots into the terminal area, the pilot had better be thinking at 220 knots. With TAA, the additional learning curve of new avionics adds to the initial workload.<br><br> The advantages of TAA are many, but realizing those benefits will require pilots to shift from a typ- ical GA piloting approach. In TAA, piloting moves from the cphysical airplane, d the stick and rudder skills, to a more mental approach. Pilots who suc- cessfully adapt will enjoy these aircraft while gain- ing situational awareness and those who don 9t, will find challenge, complexity and possibly some unsafe situations.<br><br> The physical airplane Since Wilbur and Orville, pilots have defined cgood piloting d primarily as a set of eye-hand or stick and rudder skills that result in predictable outcomes. " Maintaining V Y precisely during a climb. " Holding altitude within 50 feet.<br><br> " Tracking a VOR needle within one dot on either side. " Landing in a full stall, with rate of descent per- fectly arrested at the exact instant the tires brush the concrete. As part of this mindset, alertness to the physical environment is valued ( ckeep your eyes outside the window for traffic d) as is an almost zen-like unity with the airplane ( ccan 9t you feel that little buffet- ing?<br><br> It 9s telling you it 9s ready to stall. d) cPhysical airplane d pilots, which is to say most GA pilots who trained before 1980, often carry a do-it-yourself attitude, which regards assistance as an affront. Popular writings by author Ernest K. Gann capture this way of thinking, telling of early airline co-pilots who were often told by their cap- tains to shut up and watch and to make sure they didn 9t get their feet on the furniture.<br><br> Autopilots were scorned as unnecessary and were often only available on the top end of light aircraft so it was largely a moot point. This view of the pilot has largely changed in airline and corporate cock- pits. The pros have recognized that the hardware is far more reliable than the humans overriding it.<br><br> This certainly doesn 9t mean an abdication of PIC responsibility but rather an acceptance that the autopilot does a bet- ter job of mechanical flying. The automa- tion,however,is incapable of programming itself and at times will significantly compli- cate a basic flying task. GA pilots are just begin- ning to face this transition.<br><br> The mental airplane The early corporate and airline operators who installed the new equipment employed primarily cphysical airplane d pilots, and the transition to glass cost considerably more time and money than expected. While most pilots were eventually suc- cessful in the move to glass cockpit of Boeing 757/767 and Airbus equipment, some were not and retired. Some senior pilots admitted they remained anxious about the complexities of glass right up to their last day.<br><br> The transition to the cmental airplane d means coping with distractions from the additional infor- mation and learning unfamiliar displays. This is the Technically Advanced Aircraft | www.aopa.org/safetycenter 9 The wing, fuselage, and empennage area of a Lancair Columbia is superimposed on a Beechcraft Bonanza A36. Proper training is neces- sary to overcome differ- ent handling characteris- tics between some TAA and conventional aircraft.<br><br> The more things change& Conventional wisdom still applies: Extensive cross-country flying on a schedule really should be done by instrument-rated pilots or by those who have plenty of time to wait on the vagaries of weather. The idea that the new technology is so simple and will protect the uninformed or overbold is over- simplifying the current realities of cross-country flight. It may become easier in the future but the AOPAAir Safety Foundation will take the conservative view until hard statistics show otherwise.<br><br> Safety Implications AOPA Air Safety Foundation root cause of the additional transition time. Among the casualties: a good see-and-avoid lookout for other aircraft. In airline and corporate cockpits, much of this is negated by having two professional pilots, having Traffic Collision Avoidance Systems [TCAS], and spending much of the flight in positive control airspace (Class A).<br><br> Most operators have an inside/outside policy where one pilot is clearing visually while the other deals with the internal sys- tems. For the single pilot, the attention must be appropriately split. There have been numerous Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) reports on crew confusion stemming from use of TAA or equipment that is typ- ically installed in TAA.<br><br> (See appendix C.) Reports included missing assigned routes, mis-program- ming approaches, mode confusion, alti- tude busts because of distraction with the equipment. It should be pointed out that pilots have always been susceptible to distraction, and many of these same problems are manifested in classic air- craft. Identical ASRS reports continue today, and for the same reasons.<br><br> In the case of corporate and airline operations, the landmark TAA-related accident that graphically defined the potential dangers occurred in Cali, Columbia, in 1995 when an American Airlines Boeing 757 collided with ter- rain at night after the crew mispro- grammed its FMS. After that tragedy, the airlines changed their procedures in how crews interacted with cockpit automation. There are lessons for GA pilots to write a safer history for TAA.<br><br> (See cHigh Terrain Tangle d and cBack to Cali, d Appendix B.) The GA Future The corporate and airline experience with TAA-induced confusion and work- load issues is present in GA TAA also, but the degree to which those issues are or will be a factor is not yet clear. Don Taylor, vice president of training and safety for Eclipse Aviation, manufactur- er of the new Eclipse 500, cautions, cIt is too early to say that glass cockpits increase workload for the single pilot by an inordinate amount. d Eclipse offi- cials believe that extensive use of integration sim- plifies the operation of the aircraft's systems and reduces the chance of overload and error. Taylor concedes, however, that pilots must be well trained to use technically advanced aircraft.<br><br> That comment, however, applies to any high performance aircraft flown in the IFR system. The Eclipse VLJ purports to have an even higher level of automation than most TAA today. This may simplify the pilot 9s task.<br><br> There are not enough ASRS reports from GA pilots to validate a statistical link between the airline and corporate experience and that of GA TAA air- craft. ASF 9s analysis of GA TAA accidents reported by the NTSB to date also showed no statistically valid link between distractions blamed on TAA and other distraction-caused accidents in the non-TAA fleet. Beyond workload: over-reliance A related safety issue, identified by the FAA as part of its recent hearings and reports on the FAA- Industry Training Standards (FITS), concerns pilots who apparently develop an unwarranted over 3reliance in their avionics and the aircraft, believing that the equipment will compensate fully for pilot shortcomings.<br><br> This is perhaps more related to human nature than to TAA itself and was raised more than a decade ago after several accidents shortly after the Piper Malibu was introduced. At that time, FAA instituted a Special Certification Review that ulti- mately exonerated the aircraft, finding that the Malibu problems were largely self-inflicted by pilots unfamiliar with operations in high altitude environments. Many of the fatal accidents occurred after encounters with convective weather while enroute.<br><br> Some pilots did not understand that FL250, the Malibu 9s highest operational alti- tude, was arguably one of the worst levels to pene- trate a thunderstorm. Clearly, these pilots believed that the aircraft, a fine piece of engineering, was capable of more than reality allowed. Related to the over-reliance is the role of Aeronautical Decision Making, which is probably the most significant factor in the GA accident record of high performance aircraft used for cross- country flight.<br><br> The FAA TAA Safety Study found that poor decision-making seems to afflict new TAA pilots at a rate higher than that of GA as a whole. The review of TAA accidents cited in this study shows that the majority are not caused by some- thing directly related to the aircraft but by the pilot 9s lack of experience and a chain of poor decisions. The fact that the aircraft involved was a TAA appears to be coincidental.<br><br> One consistent theme in many of the fatal accidents is continued VFR flight into Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC). 10 www.aopa.org/safetycenter | Technically Advanced Aircraft Trust, but verify Understandably, the American system of free enterprise does nothing to discourage perceptions of equipment as able replace- ments for pilot experience or dili- gence. ASF found one such exam- ple by pairing a product review for a GPS unit with an ASRS report that belies the boosterism: From Flight Training magazine, July 1995 : cThe presentation of spe- cial-use airspace boundaries is one of the unit's handiest features.<br><br> The depicted boundaries are quite accurate, and just as long as the map's airplane symbol doesn't touch a boundary line, you should be safely outside the depicted air- space. d An ASRS report filed by a Mooney pilot facing legal action as a result of entering restricted airspace over Virginia in February 2002: cAt no time did my GPS indi- cate I was inside restricted air- space (but later was) contacted by FAA and informed of a potential violation of restricted airspace. d See and avoid: TAA equipment increases pilot performance In a September 2004 paper presented to the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society annual meeting, cThe Effect of an Advanced Navigation Display with Traffic Information on Single-Pilot Visual Flight Operations, d by Kevin W. Williams of the FAA, the FAA found pilots could spot traffic faster with traffic displays. Sixteen pilots were tested in a flight simulator under VFR conditions.<br><br> Results were mixed, but generally showed that even though pilots looked out- side less when using traffic displays, they were more successful at locating traffic but with some cautions. Some GA traffic will not be transponder- equipped for detection by TAA anti-collision equipment so pilots must main- tain an outside scan, particularly in high density traffic. TAA Accident HistorySection III Comparing TAA accident pilots to non-TAA accident pilots A comparison of the experience of 41 TAA acci- dent pilots vs.<br><br> accident pilots in comparable non- TAA aircraft (Bonanza, Mooney, Cessna 210, Cessna 182) revealed some interesting informa- tion. Although TAA accident pilots had a higher average total time 42,413 hours vs. 2,030 hours 4 they had a much lower average time in type 4305 hours vs.<br><br> 451. This amounts to about 30 percent less time in type at the time of the accident. The distribution of total time shows that a higher percentage of low time pilots are having acci- dents in TAA.<br><br> TAAComparable Non-TAA Total Time 2,4132,030 Time in Type 305451 Technically Advanced Aircraft | www.aopa.org/safetycenter 11 ASF 9s GA Accident Database contains NTSB data on virtually every accident involving GA aircraft in the United States from 1983 to the present (fixed wing, weighing less than 12,500 pounds), accounting for more than 42,000 records. Unfortunately, government information-gathering on those accidents generally contains no clear markers that define TAA from non-TAA. For the future, ASF has requested that accidents investigators note the on-board avionics in accident aircraft.<br><br> This will allow a more precise determination of which aircraft are involved in what type of accidents. Classic TAA 4Cessna 182 0.0% 2.0% 4.0% 6.0% 8.0% 10.0% 12.0% 14.0% 16.0% 18.0% 20.0% 0-200 200-400 400-600 600-800 800-1000 1000-1200 1200-1400 1400-1600 1600 1800 1800-2000 2000-2200 2200-2400 2400-2600 2600-2800 2800-3000 3000-3200 3200-3400 3400-3600 3600-3800 3800-4000 4000-4200 4200-4400 4400-4600 4600-4800 4800-5000 5000+ Pilot total time 4TAA vs. non-TAA TAA Non-TAA New TAA 4Cirrus SR22 (Non-TAA pilots 4Cessna 210 and Mooney aircraft) TAA Accident History AOPA Air Safety Foundation The TAA population is still very small, com- pared to classic aircraft.<br><br> Two of the TAA acci- dent pilots included in the above averages had more than 20,000 hours of total time. This somewhat skewed the TAA average total flight time to the higher end. There are two hypotheses as to why TAA accident pilots have lower time in type as compared to the comparable non- TAA pilots.<br><br> It may be actual differences in pilots because of train- ing, technique, or inadequate risk asses- ment, or merely the fact that TAA are new to the fleet. If so, the average accident pilot time in type may increase somewhat over time. Comparing new TAA to classic TAA accidents To conduct at least a preliminary compari- son, ASF focused on two aircraft models that could reliably compare the accident rate of new classic TAA to newly designed TAA: the Cirrus SR20 and SR22, versus newly- built Cessna 182 mod- els 182S, 182T and T182T (turbocharged) built from 1999 to 2003.<br><br> All or almost all of these aircraft could be considered TAA because they have IFR GPS navigators with moving maps and autopilots. Why select only new aircraft? Because there is some evidence that new aircraft are purchased by a different economic cohort of pilots who use them differently than third or fourth generation buyers.<br><br> ASF 9s experience in conducting more than a dozen safety reviews has consistently showed a much higher accident cor- relation to how an aircraft is used than to a par- ticular make and model. At the time of the study, each manufacturer had produced a similar number of aircraft: 1,680 for Cirrus and 1,567 for Cessna. After discarding one Cirrus accident that occurred during a manufac- turer 9s test flight during the period studied and was not considered indicative of normal flight opera- tions, there were a total of 21 fatal accidents in TAA, 12 for Cirrus and nine for Cessna.<br><br> This results in a fatal accident rate per 1,000 aircraft produced of 7.1 and 5.7 respectively. Of more interest were the reasons these acci- dents occurred. All the accidents closely resem- bled typical non-TAA accidents with a few possi- ble exceptions: One Cirrus accident with very sketchy information, from which no reasonable guess could be made of causal factors, and a Cessna T210 which was not included in the sta- tistical comparison but has all the earmarks of a pilot losing situational awareness despite having one of the newest GPS navigators.<br><br> At the time of this report there were two fatal Cirrus accidents in preliminary status involving a possible loss of flight instruments and another with icing in a TKS equipped, but non-icing approved SR22. Both the Cessna and Cirrus models can gener- ally be considered ctraveling d airplanes, likely to be used much more extensively in cross-country operations than, say, Piper Warriors or Cessna Skyhawks, which are often used as trainers. As a natural consequence, cross-country accidents such as weather involvement, are more likely.<br><br> To expand the comparable aircraft study slightly, ASF also searched accident records for Beechcraft A36 Bonanzas, which have long been prototypical ctraveling d airplanes for GA pilots. As expected, the long-term accident record for these aircraft includes a relatively high percentage of weather-related accidents, typically pilots with no instrument rating or not on an IFR flight plan, penetrating weather. Interestingly enough, of the approximately 247 new Beechcraft Bonanza A36 aircraft delivered since January of 2000, predomi- nately with Garmin 430/530 GPS navigator units, ASF found only two accidents, neither of which could be even remotely considered to be TAA- involved.<br><br> One was attributed to a loss of control during a go-around, and the other resulted from fuel mismanagement. 12 www.aopa.org/safetycenter | Technically Advanced Aircraft Twelve Cirrus SR 20 and SR 22 accidents studied: " Three appeared to be caused by pilot deci- sions to continue VFR flight into instrument meteorological conditions. " Two indicated the pilot was performing maneuvers that exceeded design limits of the aircraft.<br><br> " One resulted from inadequate preflight plan- ning, when the aircraft was unable to out climb terrain in a takeoff accident during conditions of high density altitude. " One occurred when the aircraft hit trees or terrain on an IFR approach. " One suffered interference between an electri- cal switch and flaps, for which an AD was subsequently issued.<br><br> " Two appear to be pilot spatial disorientation. " One appears to be a stall/spin on initial climb. " One appears to be flight into icing conditions.<br><br> Nine Cessna 182 model accidents studied: " Two stalled during an attempted go-around (one is preliminary). " Two suffered pilot loss-of-control after enter- ing instrument meterological conditions during VFR flight. " Two were classified as pilot spatial disorienta- tion.<br><br> " One hit terrain while operating VFR in moun- tainous terrain. " Two hit trees or terrain while executing an IFR instrument approach. New TAA vs.<br><br> classic TAA accident summary 0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% Pilot time in type 4TAA vs. non-TAA TAA Non-TAA Non-TAA pilots 4 Cessna 210, Cessna 182, Mooney, and Bonanza aircraft. AOPA Air Safety Foundation TAA Accident History Of the Cessna 182 and Cirrus accidents included here,a few were selected for their instructional value as part of this report.A brief summary of the accident is presented first,followed by ASF comments.More detailed NTSB accident reports are included in Appendix A.ASF comments are offered for educational purposes only.In some cases an accident is in preliminary status so the analysis must be considered as preliminary also.<br><br> Please note that instrument approach procedure charts,provided to help readers better under- stand the flight environment,are current at the time of publishing and may not exactly reflect the procedure as it was at the time of the acci- dent. Accident 1 January 2003, about 4 p.m.; Cirrus SR20; San Jose, California. Likely cause: Lack of situational awareness.<br><br> HISTORY OF FLIGHT This crash took place near the end of a trip from Napa County Airport (APC) to Reid Hillview Airport (RHV), both in California. The weather along the route varied from marginal VFR to light IFR, and the pilot was operating on an IFR flight plan. Along the way, ATC had provided numerous traffic avoidance vectors.<br><br> At 1627, when the airplane was approximately abeam Oakland International Airport, the con- troller instructed the pilot to proceed to a fix near Palo Alto Airport (PAO), believing it was the pilot 9s destination. The pilot questioned the clearance, confirming that he was actually enroute to Reid-Hillview. The controller then cleared the pilot to an initial approach fix for RHV, but observed the aircraft heading toward the erroneously issued Palo Alto fix.<br><br> After a cor- rection and a reissuance of the Reid-Hillview fix clearance, the aircraft tracked more or less southbound for 3 miles before turning toward the correct fix. ATC again provided the wrong tower frequency as the aircraft started flying the approach. The pilot finally got to the right tower frequency, cor- rectly reported his position and then for reasons unknown, made a 90-degree right turn.<br><br> The radar track was lost in a mountainous area with high- tension power lines. The Mode-C-reported alti- tude was 1,700 feet. ASF comments This appears to be a loss of situational awareness leading to the impact with power lines and a mountain.<br><br> However, there are some clues that the pilot was having trouble with the technology. The first indication comes from radar data reported in the full NTSB report, cThe controller issued a clear- ance direct to OZNUM. After this exchange, radar indicated the airplane turned almost 90 degrees to the right, and tracked on a course consistent with proceeding direct to PAO. d The pilot could have programmed PAO into the GPS before the clearance changed to OZNUM, and with the autopilot coupled, the aircraft would have turned toward PAO.<br><br> The second clue occurred during the last moments of the flight. cAs the airplane passed just northwest of OZNUM, the controller instructed the pilot to contact the tower on fre- quency c118.6. d This is the PAO tower frequency, not RHV. The pilot queried the controller but the controller insisted, cYes sir, it is. d The pilot com- plied and contacted PAO tower.<br><br> The pilot and the PAO controller discussed that he was on the wrong frequency and the pilot said he would switch to the RHV frequency of 119.8. During this conversation, radar indicated the airplane began Technically Advanced Aircraft | www.aopa.org/safetycenter 13 Accident summaries and commentaries TAA Accident History AOPA Air Safety Foundation a turn to the right, with the target visibly dis- placed from the final approach course at 1652:33, approximately over JOPAN waypoint. The Cirrus 9 control stick is located on the left side of the pilot, while the GPS on the lower right of the pilot.<br><br> NTSB noted that the pilot was likely hand-flying the aircraft, while possibly program- ing the GPS on his right, he could have inadver- tently started a right turn by cleaning d to the right and moving the control stick to the right. This is, again, speculative and the exact cause of the right hand turn into the power lines will never be known. Accident 2 May, 2002; Cessna 182S, in Sheboygan, Wiscon- sin.<br><br> Likely cause: Failure to maintain control of the aircraft during a go-around. HISTORY OF FLIGHT A Cessna 182S crashed in VFR conditions while executing a go-around from Runway 21 at Sheboygan County Memorial Airport, Wisconsin. Witnesses stated the aircraft began to drift to the right during landing before the attempted go-around.<br><br> Local winds were report- ed from 150 at 9 knots. Witnesses reported the aircraft banked to the right entered a right downwind to Runway 21, then impacted the ground. Several pilots stated the engine sound- ed as though it was running smoothly at the time of the accident.<br><br> The aircraft was observed in banks of approximately 40 to 60 degrees and as far as 90 degrees prior to impact. The aircraft was reportedly very close to the ground (approx- imately 10 to 20 feet agl) when making its first turn, and approximately 200 feet agl when bank- ing sharply to the right to enter a downwind leg for Runway 21 prior to impact. ASF comments: The presence of TAA equipment on this aircraft appears to have no bearing on this accident, which from all indications, was caused by a sim- ple lack of pilot proficiency and the inability to fly a normal pattern.<br><br> Accident 3 October 2002; Cessna 182S; Accident, Mary- land. Likely cause: Continued VFR flight into IMC. HISTORY OF FLIGHT: While en route, the noninstrument-rated private pilot contacted air traffic control for flight follow- ing advisories and information about the cloud conditions ahead of him.<br><br> The pilot also contacted a flight service station (FSS), for further weather advisories. Upon contact with FSS, the pilot stat- ed that he was in level flight at 3,300 feet, flying in and out of the clouds, and encountering light icing conditions. The FSS specialist advised the pilot of instrument meteorological conditions along the route of flight, mountain obscuration, and icing conditions.<br><br> The FSS specialist also rec- ommended that the pilot climb to 6,000 feet, where he could expect VFR conditions. The pilot responded that his flight conditions were cnot that bad, d and he would remain at 3,300 feet. The pilot recontacted the air traffic controller, requesting a climb because he was accumulat- ing rime ice.<br><br> The controller replied that an air- plane had reported ice at 7,000 feet, and another had reported cloud tops at 7,400 feet. The pilot then stated that he could not maintain VFR, and had "been in it" for 10-15 minutes. He further stated that ice was building up, but he was cOK d with it.<br><br> The target disappeared from the radar screen. ASF comments: It is possible that this pilot succumbed to the belief that the advanced avionics on board his aircraft would compensate for the lack of qualifi- cation to fly in instrument weather conditions, and thus he entered deeper into IMC before call- ing for help. Or perhaps not, since a significant number of such VFR-into-IMC accidents occur each year in non-TAA.<br><br> In any event, this pilot was not responding appropriately to the obvious weather warning signals. Accident 4 September 2003; Cessna 182T; Concord, Massachusetts. Likely cause: Spatial disorienta- tion.<br><br> HISTORY OF FLIGHT The pilot received vectors for a daytime ILS approach for Runway 11 at Bedford, Mass- achusetts, in IMC. The airplane crossed the outer marker approximately 500 feet high, and then descended 1,300 feet in 40 seconds. It then start- ed a climbing, left turn.<br><br> When questioned by the controller, the pilot reported headings that were consistent with his radar track. The pilot's answers to questions from the controller were sometimes delayed and/or incomplete, and when instructed to execute a missed approach, the pilot did not know what heading to fly. The airplane turned more than 360 degrees before descending into the trees in a steep left wing down bank.<br><br> 14 www.aopa.org/safetycenter | Technically Advanced Aircraft AOPA Air Safety Foundation TAA Accident History ASF comments: Although this instrument-rated private pilot was estimated to have flown 60 total hours in the last six months, there was no record of the amount of instrument time. It appears that the pilot was not instrument proficient. Attempting to verify con- troller instructions may have caused him to use rapid head movements to reference instrument charts.<br><br> Witnesses also reported hearing a large increase in power, which may have also con- tributed to kinesthetic illusions. Basic lack of proficiency in attitude instrument flying, exacerbated by spatial disorientation, was the apparent cause of this accident. The use of autopilot could have helped.<br><br> There is no indica- tion that the TAA equipment on board was any factor. Accident 5 October 2004; Cessna 182S; Santa Rosa, California. Likely cause: Spatial disorientation.<br><br> HISTORY OF FLIGHT The instrument-rated pilot took off from an air- port with a 600-foot ceiling. During his climb in instrument meteorological conditions, the pilot failed to maintain directional control and alti- tude, and subsequently entered a right descend- ing spiral until impacting terrain 2 miles west of the airport. According to the aircraft operator, the pilot rented the 182S because the Cessna 206 he normally flew was down for mainte- nance.<br><br> According to the operator, there was no record of the pilot ever being checked out in the 182S. The pilot 9s logbook was not located, and the pilot 9s recent instrument experience was not determined. ASF comments: It 9s likely that this pilot became spatially disori- ented when trying to use avionics that he was unfamiliar with.<br><br> Flying single pilot in actual IFR conditions is not the time to learn how to pro- gram the GPS. The use of autopilot could have helped. Accident 6 November 2003; Cirrus SR 20; Las Vegas, New Mexico.<br><br> Likely cause: Spatial disorientation. HISTORY OF FLIGHT During a cross-country flight, the non-instru- ment rated private pilot encountered heavy fog and poor visibility, and the airplane was destroyed after impacting the terrain in a wildlife refuge. An airmet, issued and valid for the area, reported the following, cOccasional ceiling below 1,000 feet, visibility below 3 miles in mist, fog...mountains occasionally obscured clouds, mist, fog.... d On the day of the accident, the pilot did not file an IFR flight plan or receive a formal weather briefing from an FAA Flight Service Station.<br><br> ASF comments: The noninstrument-rated pilot in this accident may or may not have been tempted to continue his flight when encountering IMC conditions because he had TAA equipment on board. ASF files bulge with similar accidents involving non- TAA, going back to 1983. Accident 7 December 2001; Cessna 210TC; San Jacinto, California.<br><br> Likely cause: Loss of positional aware- ness. HISTORY OF FLIGHT During a GPS approach in IMC, the pilot did not turn onto the prescribed course toward the final approach fix. The pilot initially navigated along the prescribed instrument approach course, but failed to make a critical 75-degree course change Technically Advanced Aircraft | www.aopa.org/safetycenter 15 TAA Accident History AOPA Air Safety Foundation toward the final approach fix.<br><br> Instead of main- taining the 4,100-foot msl minimum altitude until passing the final approach fix, the pilot descended to 3,550 feet msl. The airplane was equipped with a late-model GPS receiver with a moving map. The airplane crashed 5.9 nm east of the prescribed course and 550 feet below the authorized altitude.<br><br> The reason for the pilot 9s lost of situational awareness and his track divergence is unknown. ASF comments: Although the NTSB does not speculate on the reason for the pilot 9s loss of situational aware- ness, it 9s possible that he was either distracted or confused while dealing with the details of the GPS approach on the moving map display in his T210. In the full NTSB report (contained in Appendix A), the flight instructor who conducted this pilot 9s last Instrument Proficiency Check did not report any GPS approaches performed dur- ing the check.<br><br> The availability of high-tech equip- ment does not alter the pilot 9s responsibility to know where the aircraft is relative to high terrain but it should help him to locate it. TAA and the parachute Some TAA have added new features that did not exist just a few years ago.One such change is Cirrus Design 9s complete aircraft parachute.The chute is designed to be deployed when the pilot believes there is grave danger. Information from the Cirrus Design Web site cAce in the Hole dregarding the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) says, cThis safety sys- tem will lower the entire aircraft to the ground in extreme emergencies and when all alterna- tives to land have been exhausted.With the pull of a handle,a solid-fuel rocket blows out the top hatch,deploying the parachute,and buried har- ness straps unzip from both sides of the air- frame.Within seconds,the canopy will position itself over the aircraft and allow it to descend gradually.The final impact,roughly equivalent to falling 10-12 feet,is absorbed by the special- ized landing gear. d The parachute raises questions that will almost certainly affect other areas of TAA train- ing,including: " Will the presence of such a potentially life-sav- ing tool encourage pilots to intentionally fly into situations they would not normally attempt in more conventionally equipped aircraft?<br><br> " What detailed guidance (if any) should be con- veyed to pilots of chute-equipped TAA to deter- mine when to cpull the chute? d At publication time,there had been four reported accidents involving use or possible attempted use of the CAPS system.They are summarized here.The NTSB accident reports are included in Appendix A. Accident 8 March 16, 2002; Cirrus SR20; Lexington, Kentucky. Likely cause: Pilot failure to maintain control of aircraft after apparent malfunction of turn coordinator in IMC.<br><br> Additional information: Pilot attempted to deploy the Cirrus Airplane Parachute System (CAPS) parachute, but was unsuccessful. Parachute apparently deployed after ground impact. HISTORY OF FLIGHT The instrument-rated pilot and a passenger departed into instrument meteorological condi- tions (IMC), intending to practice some instru- ment approaches.<br><br> Shortly after takeoff, the pilot reported a turn coordinator failure. The turn coordinator indicated a left bank regardless of control inputs, disorienting the pilot. The pilot stated he pulled the CAPS activation handle repeatedly, however, the cable did not extend and cnothing seemed to happen. d The airplane broke out of the cloud layer, and the pilot performed an emergency landing to a field.<br><br> Witnesses near the accident site reported that the CAPS parachute deployed after ground contact. Post-accident testing of the wreckage did not reveal any pre- impact instrumentation, or autopilot failures. The CAPS system also functioned normally, how- 16 www.aopa.org/safetycenter | Technically Advanced Aircraft AOPA Air Safety Foundation TAA Accident History ever, it was noted that the pull forces to activate the CAPS parachute varied significantly.<br><br> ASF comments Pilot decision-making in a potentially deadly sit- uation appeared to be proper, given that the pilot apparently believed that a crash would ensue without deployment of the parachute. There was extensive post-crash investigation by the NTSB and Cirrus Design regarding pull force required to activate the CAPS system. As a result of this accident, and the subsequent test- ing, Cirrus Design issued Service Bulletin 20-95- 03, which required replacement of the CAPS han- dle access cover.<br><br> The new cover incorporated an expanded description for the CAPS activation handle use. Additionally, on July 10, 2002, SB20- 95-05, was issued and required the replacement of the CAPS activation cable to further reduce the pull forces required to deploy CAPS. Cirrus Design issued similar service bulletins for the SR22 series airplanes, which were also equipped with CAPS.<br><br> Pilot decision-making appeared sound given the situation, ASF reviewers questioned why loss of the turn coordinator only (as reported) should cause an instrument pilot to lose control of an aircraft in otherwise-benign IMC, but when faced with what is a perceived life threatening situa- tion 4pull the chute! Accident 9 April 24, 2002; Cirrus SR22; Parish, New York. Likely cause: The pilot 9s failure to maintain air- speed, which resulted in an inadvertent stall/spin.<br><br> The continued spin to the ground was a result of the pilot 9s failure to deploy the onboard parachute recovery system. HISTORY OFFLIGHT The airplane was maneuvering about 5,000 feet above the ground, where witnesses noted that it seemed to be repeatedly practicing stalls, when it entered a right, flat spin. It continued the spin to the ground, without deployment of the onboard parachute recovery system.<br><br> Examination of the wreckage, and a subsequent examination of the engine revealed no mechani- cal anomalies. The two accident pilots pur- chased the airplane 6 days before the accident and had separately received airplane-specific training. The accident flight was their first flight together.<br><br> The pilot in command, and the pilot at the controls leading up to and during the acci- dent sequence could not be determined. The pilot's operating handbook states that the only approved and demonstrated method for spin recovery is the deployment of the parachute recovery system. ASF comments Whether the pilots believed that chute deploy- ment was not needed, were unable to pull the chute for some reason, or simply forgot under the stress of the moment is not clear.<br><br> If pilot deci- sion-making (or non-decision-making, as the case may be) was a factor here, it argues for emphasis on scenario/case study type of instruc- tion during transition training. ASF reviewers also questioned why a spin was allowed to develop, considering that spins are clearly not approved in Cirrus aircraft. Was the presence of the CAPS a factor in encouraging the pilots to presumably take the aircraft beyond its flight limits, creating a false sense of safety?<br><br> Accident 10 September 19, 2004; Cirrus SR22; Peters, California. Likely cause: The pilot 9s loss of control after a possible weather encounter resulted in what the pilot deemed to be a spin. Additional information: The pilot activated the CAPS para- chute, preventing almost certain loss of life.<br><br> HISTORY OFFLIGHT On September 19, 2004, at 1550 Pacific Daylight Time, a Cirrus SR22 landed in a walnut orchard during an emergency descent. While flying in an area covered by a convective sigmet and where radar data showed the aircraft having consider- able altitude deviations, the pilot deployed the CAPS about 16,000 feet msl, and the airplane made a parachute landing into the walnut orchard. The instrument-rated commercial pilot and single passenger were not injured, but the airplane was substantially damaged.<br><br> Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight plan had been filed but not activated. The flight originated at Redding, California, at 1500. The pilot reported to the NTSB that he was passing through 14,000 feet msl with the autopi- lot set at 100 feet per minute (fpm) rate of climb.<br><br> He and his passenger were using supplemental oxygen. There was a broken cloud layer 1,500 feet below the airplane and he was in visual meteorological conditions steering east to avoid some weather. He said he heard a cwhirring d sound in his headset and the nose pitched up.<br><br> He disconnected the autopilot, the left wing dropped and the airplane appeared to enter a spin. The pilot determined that the airplane would be in the overcast cloud layer before he could recover and decided to activate the CAPS. The CAPS deployment was successful; the air- plane broke out of the clouds about 2,500 feet above ground level (agl), and landed in the walnut grove.<br><br> Technically Advanced Aircraft | www.aopa.org/safetycenter TAA Accident History AOPA Air Safety Foundation There was a convective sigmet active in the vicinity where the airplane landed, warning of a line of severe thunderstorms 30 nm wide mov- ing from 300 degrees magnetic at 15 knots with cloud tops to 27,000 feet; hail up to 1 inch in diameter; with wind gusts up to 50 knots possi- ble. Weather radar showed Level 5 and Level 6 (extreme) thunderstorms predicted in the vicinity of the accident. ASF comments This is one of several accidents that shows suc- cessful deployment of the CAPS system in an actual emergency, likely saving lives.<br><br> Given that the pilot believed the aircraft had entered a spin, the decision to activate the parachute appears to be correct decision making, and the end result (no fatalities) bears this out. A fair question is whether the availability of CAPS was a factor in the decision-making that led this pilot into an area of Level 5 (severe) and Level 6 (extreme) thunderstorms in the first place. Had CAPS not been available as a last resort, would the pilot have ventured into such inhospitable weather?<br><br> Is it possible that the autopilot played a part in the loss of control by attempting to climb or hold the aircraft in tur- bulence? None of this can be answered with certainty at this point, but training and attitude are as important to TAA as they have been in the past with classic aircraft. Accident 11 October 3, 2002; Cirrus SR22; Lewisville, Texas.<br><br> Likely cause: The improper reinstallation of the left aileron by maintenance personnel. HISTORY OFFLIGHT During cruise flight the left aileron separated from an attach point, and the pilot executed a forced landing to a field. Prior to the accident flight, the airplane underwent maintenance for two outstanding service bulletins.<br><br> During com- pliance with one of the service bulletins, the left aileron was removed and reinstalled. The pilot confir

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